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Examining  Committee 
Wars of religion, of alliances,  of rebellion, 
of aggrandizement,  of dynastic intrigue or ambition- 
wars in which the personal element was often the pre- 
dominant factor—tend to be replaced by frontier wars, 
i.e., wars arising out of the expansion of states and 
kingdoms,   carried  to a point as the habitable globe 
shrinks, at which the interests or ambitions of one 
state come into sharp and irreconcilable conflict with 
those  of another. 
Lord Curzon 
In the Collective Relationships of mankind 
ruthless aggression must be encountered by resolute 
defense; and the impulse of dominion must be resisted, 
if slavery is to be avoided. A sacrificial submission 
to a ruthless antagonist may mean a noble martyrdom 
if the interests of self alone are considered. But 
if interests other than those of the self are sacri- 
ficed, this nobility becomes ignoble "appeasement.H 
Reinhold Niebuhr 
PREFACE 
This work is submitted in partial fulfillment of a Program 
of Honors Work at the Woman's College of the University of North 
Carolina. In reading for this paper, attention has been centered to 
the greatest possible extent upon the study of the documentary 
records of the Nazi Era as found in the captured German Archives 
and printed by the governments of France, Great Britain, and the 
United States following World War II, and in the records of the 
trials of the Nazi war criminals. 
Consideration has also been given to secondary material, 
both that covering the entire period of the paper in general and 
that dealing in a more detailed manner with the various parts of it— 
for instance, with the economic phase of Nazi aggression. However, 
because of the limited time available, obviously no claim for com- 
pleteness of coverage can be made, especially with regard to peri- 
odical literature. 
The title of this paper is "Lebensraum; The Idea of Empire," 
and the subject is the course which this idea has taken within recent 
German history.  The word Lebensraum translates into English as "liv- 
ing space," and is a term applied to a complex of ideas dealing with 
certain conceptions of the nature and role of the German "race" and the 
destiny of the German state. Basically, Lebensraum refers to the belief 
that, since the Germans were a great and numerous people, they deserved 
to control a much greater geographic area, that Germany was overpopulated 
in relation to her soil.  The usual claim ">ade by apologists was that 
Germany possessed something like 0.5^ of the world's area and about U% 
of the world's population. Hence, the demand for "living apace". 
It was feared that the "race," being cramped and confined in a space 
unworthy of it, might decline to the point of extinction. 
The space was to be obtained through an ■-xtension of German 
influence throughout East Central Europe, an area including Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
and the rest of the Balkan Peninsula--a large region holding the 
Baltic nations at one extremity and the islands of Greece at the 
other. The area is central because it constitutes the amorphous 
dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe; it is Eastern in 
the sense that the average observer is oriented geographically from 
a Western European viewpoint. 
In the Nazi era Lebensraum meant the belief that all racial 
Germans, being the main bearers of civilization, should unite into 
a great industrial nation, while the surrounding spaces, inhabited 
by inferior Slavs, owed its "masters" a living by serving then as 
an agricultural hinterland. In another sense, Lebensraum is a Ger- 
manic "Monroe Doctrine}' a belief in German predominance over her 
neighbors and an unwillingness to allow any other power to challenge 
this predominance. It was this milder form of the concept which 
figured in the Hitteleuropa schemes of World War I. But as a Nazi 
rationale for aggressive expansion, Lebensraum was the corollary of 
the Aryan race theory, the belief that the German "race" was superior 
to all others and hence predestined to rule. Lebensraum was the major 
slogan of the Nazi propagandists to excuse further expansion after the 
partition of Czechoslovakia marked the surrender to Reich control of 
the most important peripheral settlements of Volksdeutsche. of racial 
Germans. 
ii 
Lebensraum ha    ties in German tradition reaching back into 
the Middle Ages.     It combined romantic and nationalist ap.-eal with 
the authority of a semi-scientific basis drawn from racist and geo- 
political thought.    The concept achieved the position of a major 
tenet  of German nationalism i^ue to  the humiliation of the Versailles 
Feace Treaty ending World War  I    and was part of  the  official dogma 
of the super-chauvinistic National  Socialist Movement. 
The aims  of th's paper are,  after a brief  outline of  German 
aggression in the period before World War I, to concentrate upon the 
strategy and method:—military,  political,  econo.-r.ic,  and  ideological — 
utilized to this end by the Third  Reich;  and  secondly upon the diplo- 
matic ramifications of these aggressions on the major powers.    Finally, 
Nazi techniques and objectives—including the concept of Lebensraum— 
are illuminated by specific focus on Hitler's destruction of Czechoslovakia 
and  Poland. 
Fdr his aid and guidance in compilation and writing, special 
thanks are due to Dr. Lenoir Wright, and also to Miss Marta Nahikian 
whose  timely typing contributed to this paper in a most  concrete way. 
April 30, 1959 Meredith Blake Lentz 
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THE LEBENSRAUM CONCEPT AND 
ITS ANTECEDENTS 
PART I 
THE LEBENSRAUK CONCEPT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS 
When, in the 1930's, the shadow of Adolph Hitler fell across 
the East-Central European 'Shatter belt," and a radical National 
Socialism rose up to do battle with its neighbors, these phenomena 
were no drastic new departure in German development. If one could 
only have read the signs aright, the seeds lay deeply embedded in 
the history of Germany and of Europe, in one sense being as old 
as the struggle between Teuton and Slav, and in another sense as 
new as integral nationalism. This dynamic expansionism was Euro- 
pean nationalism reaching its logical but demonic conclusion-r-proud, 
total, bruta] —the evolution of a master race demanding a master des- 
tiny, a place in the sun, a Lebensraum. 
The temptation to expand must have come easily to the German 
State, a highly organized, homogeneous "island" with few fixed natural 
borders to contain its population. Eastern Europe, moreover, was 
soft, a weaker, relatively backward area of conglomerate nationality, 
into which the Germans had for centuries been filtering, founding 
numerous linguistic islets within the formless eddies of the sur- 
rounding population. Germany has been aptly designated the "land 
1 
without a back." If to these geographic and ethnological conditions 
are added a radical nationalism smarting under a sense of humili- 
ation, a military race accustomed to win and ashamed to be defeated, 
IDerwent S. Hhlttl—y,flmM Strategy of World Conquest 
(New York: Larrar.and Rinehart, 1942), p. 172. 
2. 
a machiavellian civil government and a pseudo-scientific racism, 
the results are perhaps inevitable. 
Since the expansionism of Twentieth Century Germany is the 
abortive development of German nationalist sentiment, it seems logi- 
cal to search for its roots in the movement for political unification. 
The country was ripe for nationalism when Napoleon I appeared and 
triggered its outbreak. But unlike the other European national units, 
Germany had an additional problem.  There was a disparity between the 
location of German racial stock and the areas of German political 
administration: The wider the Volk were scattered, the harder it would 
be to collect them all into one common fatherland. Conservative 
Austria advocated a large Germany, a Gross deutschland; but Prussia, 
jealous of her prestige and power, sought to create a Kleindeutsch- 
land, a small Germany totally under the hegemony of Berlin. There- 
fore, in 1871, there came to be two "German" powers. Bismarck, a 
Junker, had worked, not for the ingathering of the Volk. but for the 
glory of the Hohenzoilern crown. 
Even before 1871, there were some radical nationalists who 
looked beyond the limits of Bismarck's Kleindeutschland to the vision 
of a racial German state.  There were also a few isolated planners 
who saw that a unified Germany could exploit immensely rich eco- 
nomic opportunities in the East Central European hinterland. The 
first of these planners was Friedrich List, who visualized a bal- 
anced central European economy integrated by a well planned trans- 
portation system and drawing upon the common cultural, political, 
and economic institutions of the area. Since the world's colonies 
were preempted, Germany must seek hers upon the continent. Even 
M 
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in Austria, the Schwarzenberg cabinet advocated a Central European 
customs union in order to save the dying Empire. 
But the idea of a Lebensraum, always complicated by the patch- 
work of mid-European races and nationalities, lapsed after the Gross- 
deutsch defeat of 1871. Demanded by a few scattered voices in the 
wilderness, the idea lived only in intellectual tradition, in the 
universities and in student societies, until World War I. It did not 
succeed until it could rally behind itself the awful dynamism of an 
offended German nationality. 
But the idea lapsed. Ncr is this lowering of the German 
national horizon very strange: 
The Second Reich of Bismarck and William II had many hopes, 
but a recreation of the Holy Roman Empire was not one of 
them. A random sampling of scholarly and more popular 
histories published in Germany between 1897 and 1910 il- 
lustrate how the vision of the medieval Reich had faded.... 
These confident examples of the Wilhelmian era...at best bespoke 
a philistine sense of security in the political and cultural 
achievements of their times.  The historical process th>t would 
lead to reorientation and reevaluation was to begin at a 
later date. 
The idea of a large national Germany possessihg economic 
hegemony over Central Europe ran counter to the politics and diplomacy 
of the times and was submerged except for two threads of thought. 
Some Austrian sentiment remained in the labors of the demagogue 
Freiherr von Sch8nererj and among the Reich-Germans Paul de Lagarde 
campaigned for "a strange mixture of Prussian dynastic conservatism, 
anti-semitism, and radical nationalism."2 lagarde was virtually 
2 Henry C. Ifeyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1955), p. 28. 
3 Ibid., p. 31. 
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ignored until  the Nazi era, while Schflnerer's social and economic 
proposals were too liberal for the conservatives, his anti-semitism 
offended the Liberals, and he was precluded by the polygot nature of 
the Austrian Empire from too great an emphasis on German nationalism. 
The movement died out, but not before it had had its effects upon a 
young Austrian named Hitler. 
So the German people were split into Reich Germans, Viennese, 
Sudeten, Alpine, Styrian, Carinthian. Since both the Hapsburgs and 
Bismarck were suspicious of nationalism, and since public opinion 
was largely disinterested, it fell to numerous private societies 
to keep the Lebensraum idea alive. These school, defense, and patri- 
otic societies, of which the Pan-German League was one, were propa- 
gandist, middle-class a^vocators of the ingathering of all racial 
Germans, and of the economic, political, and military expansion of 
the fatherland. 
Although the Prussian government repudiated the national 
and racial claims of the extremists, it did acknowledge its economic 
interests in Eastern Europe. There the interests of Germany and Austria 
ran parallel, and the commercial antagonisms of the 1870's led to a 
halfhearted consideration of a customs union, a scheme which lost 
out to a policy of protectionism. But 
as a commercial power, Germany often became a creditor of 
those nations to which she exported large amounts of goods. 
In the light of her vigorous internal activity and growth, 
she pursued a remarkable energetic policy of foreign lending. 
In the Age of Imperialism capital was not entirely a fluid 
af-nt following the promise of greatest return. It functioned 
as well to strengthen the national state, became its instrument 
of domination in smaller or underdeveloped nations, and rein- 
forced the diplomatic system to which its nation of origin 
belonged. In Germany there wete indeed "two needs for every 
Mark." More than in England and France, the German government 
was able to influence the trend of German foreign investment 
5. 
both as to type and destination. The Emperor and Foreign Office 
were in private and unofficial, yet direct cntact with the 
heads of important banks and commeriial and industrial organi- 
zations.  Consultations were often held on the political 
significance of loans and investments. 
While Central Europe was never neglected as a sphere of German 
investment, it should be emphasized that Germany was never dominant 
there. Nor did this region attract more than a small part of the 
total German investments. By World War I, Germany had invested 24 
billion marks abroad, only one-fifth of which were in Central 
5 
Europe.  This area, moreover, was a source of markets more than 
a supplier of raw materials, for which Germany depended on world 
trade. The economies of these smaller nations were not compelled 
to become subservient to that of Germany.  And the volume of trade 
was insignificant as compared to the total of German world trade, 
a condition which remained tru9 until the blockade of World War I 
and until the disintegration of the Enpire opened up new possibi- 
lities.  There is absolutely no sign, despite the popularity of 
the famous Berlin-to-Baghdad Railroad, that before 1914 there was 
any plot to link Turkey with Germany by way of sate mid-European 
political or economic scheme. 
Those propagandist groups which were interested in such 
schemes did seize joyfully upon the implications of the Berlin- 
to-Baghdad Railroad, and an alarmed West watched suspiciously. Among 
these interested groups was the Pan-German League, a small but active 
A Ib-ld.. p. .66/ . - 
5 Ibid., p. 68. 
organization which preserved a slender contact with post-Napoleonic 
pan-Germanism. Anti-semitic nationalism had been deliberately 
fanned by Bismarck to obtain support for a state-directed colonial 
policy; the League also capitalized on these sentiments: 
In 1884. the colonial interests in Germany forced the government 
to undertake a colonial policy officially, but it was felt to 
be an uphill task. It was out of the mrveme--<t for colonial 
expansion that the Tan-German League was born. The League was 
interested in stimulating that spirit of nationalism in the 
German people which would back any German anywhere and be super- 
sensitive to any suspected tarnish on the clear surface of the 
national honor. Other patriotic societies worked for specific 
things; acquisition of colonies, enlargement of the navy, 
national security, German schools abroad.  The League advocated 
all these, agitated for all of them, but strove in particular to 
inspire in the German people a spirit of nationalism which should 
always be ready to burst into flame.  Because it felt that the 
only way in which GermanJs position as a world power could be 
advanced was through the support on an intensely nati'nalist- 
minded public opinion, the^Pan-German League worked primarily 
to create such an opinion. 
The handbook of the League described its functions in this 
manner: 
It is an organization of all German-minded people...who aim, 
without respect to the pleasure of the government and the 
great   oass of the people,  independent of political parties and 
factions, to oppose everything which is un-German and to stretch 
a helping hand to all those Germans, whether at home or abroad, 
who are oppressed.     It believes that the national development of 
the German people is not completed. 
Pan-Germanism was also receptive to the ideas of Gobineau and 
of H.S. Chamberlain.    Thus it incited the populace to antisemitism 
and to fear of minorities, especially Slavic minorities.    One of the 
early leaders, Franz Hasse, described a national state as one "in 
0~Wertbeimer, Mildred  S.,  The  Pan-Gftrman  League.   (New York 
Columbia University Press, 1924.), p.  206. 
7 Ibid, p. 95. 
A 
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which the boundary lines correspond exactly with the boundaries of 
nationality, though we consider that a state in which there are 
racial minorities  beside  the ruling race,  may be termed a  Nation- 
8 
alstaat if  it pays no special attention to these minorities." 
Considering the scattered conditions of the Volk.  such 
doctrine was  inevitably dangerous.     It embarrassed   the government    and 
was harmful to Bismarck's policies.    The League made far more of a 
noise outside of Germany than inside.    The other super-nationalisms 
of the world looked suspiciously upon what they conceived to be a 
plot to control the world,  or at least East Central Europe.    The 
League became a major  source of anti-German propaganda. 
The League's concern for Germans as a race led to an anxiety 
lest emigrants from the fatherland should lose their national identity. 
It  organized expatriates  into community centers    and sought to  influ- 
ence the local press and to abtain the sympathies of local leaders. 
To keep nationals ant? also German capital under the flag, the League 
advocated colonies.    To promote a proud independence from the world 
economic order,  it advocated autarky. 
The League was interested in the economic aspects of das 
Deutschtum as well as in its racial aspects;   indeed, aside 
from the sentimental satisfaction which the leaders felt in 
their super-patriotism, an undercurrent of fear seems to have 
greatly influenced their opinions.     "How can the 53 million 
Germans  in the  German empire," asks Hasse,   "hope to compete 
with more than 122 million Anglo-Saxons, Yankees, and Russians?" 
The answer to this question was to be found in the formation 
of a closed mid-European comrercial area, an idea which is 
reminiscent of Fichte's Geschlossener Handelsstaat.    This mid- 
European plan embraced Germany and Austria-Hungary primarily 
and was directed mainly against the British Empire, Russia, 
3 Ibid., p. 97. 
and "Pan-America." The idea was nebulous and hazy and the 
means by which it was to be carried o.t were limited to a 
customs' union and closer railway connections....However, it 
was such a nebulous scheme and the hopes of its fulfillment 
were so far in the future that the treatment of th» whole 
matter was decidedly academic. 
Important as the League was as a forerunner of Nazi expansionism, 
its influence upon its own times should not be over-emphasized. It 
was a minority pressure group. The majority were indifferent. The 
main contribution of the League was its most lasting one, the galvani- 
zation of this majority and its education in the passions of super- 
patriotism. The League spread itself too thin in its wide interest 
in everything conceivably pan-German, from language reform to foreign 
policy. Absorbed in broad principles and vague purposes, it never 
brought its full forces to bear upon the idea of the German Leb- 
ensraum. Nevertheless, it laid the ground for a national monomania. 
A further development of the Lebensraum concept came during 
the First World War, which Germany entered    chiefly in order to 
stand by her best ally, Austria. The war was the result, not of any 
scheme of world conquest, but of the diplomatic bankruptcy of Wilhel- 
mian Germany.  It was during the war that Germany was forced to turn 
away from the WeltpolitiK-a foreign policy world-wide in scope-of 
post-Bismarckian policy, to the development of a Mj,tteleuropapolitik. 
Germany was choked off from the world by the allied blockade: 
The Mitteleuropa was primarily the result of an accident 
with delayed, but catastrophic, results.  Mitteleuropa was 
the unanticipated product of a total strategic situation 
that was largely unfoaeeen by both alliance systems an^ which the 
Central Powers were almost completely unprepared to meet. 
9 Ibid.. p. 101. 
A 
9. 
Seldom have the so-celled fortunes of war produced social and 
economic changes that had such a relatively great effect upon 
certain nations and peoples within so brief a span of time.1" 
The blockade found the Central Powers without stockpiles of 
food  or munitions.    The governments therefore began  to look east- 
ward,  drawn together by feelings  of wartime comradeship,  urged  on 
by such groups as the Pan-German League, by the importunities  of 
industry pinched for raw materials, and by the pride of the military 
groups.    Annexation became a possible war aim.    A German Hltteleuropa 
was envisioned.    This term was never very clear.     It meant different 
things to different groups,  picking up various historical,   economic, 
military,  and  political  shades of • eaning.     After World War I,   the 
term was taken over by the f*eopoliticians.     Mttteleuropa meant dif- 
ferent things  also to the Slavs and  to the   Allies,  for  it was never 
a plan,  but a  concept,  an  idea,  and  hence complicated and  complex. 
The expression, Mitteleuropa. gained currence in the German 
world during 1915;  within a year the knowledge and fear of it 
had  entered  intimately into the awaremess  of the  Entente 
i-eople.    Subsequently it circulated widely.    Few slogans have 
ever had greater international implications or provoked such 
strong reactions. 
A practical mid-European plan was impossible due to the diver- 
sity in the development of the various regions, to the lack of economic 
co-operation,   to   the forcible breakup of the Austrian Empire, and to 
political jealousies.    Only short-range wartime decisions spurred on by 
patriotic emotionalism made its consideration possible.    The idea of 
a Central European customs union to compensate for the loss of world 
trade was submitted to the chancellor in 1914 by Walter Ratheneau. 
lr Mever.   op.  cit..   p.  117. 
11 Ibid.,  p.  2.' 
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It was an economic plan entirely apart from ideas of Pan-German 
nationalism, which precipitated some discussion and investigation. 
The idea led finally to an abortive customs union with Austria in 
October, 1918. 
The governments acted from military necessity.  The long 
range planning which resulted in the popular growth of the Lebensraum 
concept was again carried on by independent patriotic organizations 
and private persons. Organizations such as local chambers of com- 
merce, the Bavarian Kanalverein and the Hansasbund •spoused the 
idea with greater or lesser degrees of enthusiasm.  They constituted 
sources of pressure upon the governments of both monarchies.  Pam- 
phlets, -agazin^s and newspapers propagandized the concept, and by 
1915 there was a growing deluge of Mitteleurora writings.  Austria 
took the lead.  She was fighting to save her empire, and the economic 
arguments were her chief pillar. 
The scarcity of raw materials and the absence of trade and 
foreign capital led to internal financial changes.  Great changes offer 
great opportunity.  The economic organization of Central Europe, it was 
argued, would promote the military, political, and economic power and 
international prestige of the organizers.  The modern tendency was 
towards large economic units, and at any rate the German people could 
expect to be met after the war with the hatred and economic discri- 
12 
mination of their former enemies.  Would Eritain share her Empire? 
Mitteleuropa represented inthe eyes of the most idealistic of its 
12 Ibid., p. 163. 
11. 
supporters much more than "merely a combination of resources and 
policies, but a creative and productive economic organism greater 
13 
than the sum of its several parts." 
But by 1917, the strength of internal politics proved to be 
strong enough to outweigh any possible economic advantage which might 
result from economic union. The vested interests, especially the 
powerful agrarian Junkers, demanded protection from Balkan competition. 
As a war measure, ' itteleuropa was far more feasible than as a peace- 
time policy.  In terns of normal economic criteria, Mitteleuropa_ was 
a return to mercantilism in an era of the free market. 
The hope of fulfilling the plan lingered in Austria up to the 
very end of the war. The Hapsburgs were struggling to retain their 
polifcal control of Central Europe.  But as might have been expected, 
strong support from this quarter >-erely led to increasing opposition 
from the Slavic groups.  In Austria, therefore, as well as in Germany, 
the idea was defeated. 
Frustrated, many of the Austrian Germans turned to the leader- 
ship of a sincere man named Friedrich Naumann.  "Both at hone and abroad, 
it was Naumann who gave the Hltteleurora agitation a sense of unity, 
U 
meaning, and perspective."  He was also the chief popularizer of the 
concept.  Theologian, social reformer, student of capitalism, Naumann 
envisioned a German spiritual union. An economic plan alone was not 
enough, nor must this union be the exclusive property of one nationality. 
13  Ibid., p.. 163., 
H  Ibid.., p.- 193. 
12. 
17 
Conceived in a spirit of tolerance, compromise, and flee ibility, 
and  completely devoid  of antisemitiam,  Naumann'a Mitteleuropa was  to 
15 
be  "a  superstructure,  not a new building."       "Mitteleuropa  is  the 
fruit of war," he said.    "We have sat together in the prison of our 
war economy.    We have fought together;  let us henceforth live together." 
Such noble aspirations,   of course,  were do med  to failure. 
While  they appealed  to moderates,   Naumann's  ideas failed  completely 
to understand the  nature of radical nationalism.    They were repu- 
diated by both Slav and  German.     As one cynical critic  said,   "These 
are  the kinr!   of economic  ideas which only a clergyman eould  produce." 
Freidrich Naumann,  heir to the Liberal tradition,  suffered  the fate of 
all European  Liberalism in the environs  of East Central  Europe. 
The governments of Germany and   Austria, insofar as they were 
willing to consider a practical Mitteleuropa at all,  refused  to move 
beyond  purely economic schemes.    Naumann's  influence was not  on policy 
but  on public  opinion.    Allied propaganda seized upon his  ideas as 
proof of German determination to  conquer the world.     They were also 
grossly distorted and put into Hitler's service by the Nazi idea men. 
But Naumann 
gave the i !itteleuropa movement a sense of unity and higher pur- 
pose... He represented Mitteleuropa at its best, as a conviction 
that out  of the destructiveness  of war must arise a positive 
contribution to  the future well-being of all the mid-European 
peoples. 
16 
16 ibid., p.-206. 
17 Ibid., p. -212. u     • 
18 Ibid.f p. 217. - 
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The interest of the governments was due not so much to motives 
of future control as to the immediate necessities of war.  The 
Hitteleuropa concept reached its peak of popularity in 1916, which 
date was also the peak of military success for the Central Powers. 
The pan-Germans, understandabfy, had always opposed Hitteleuropa. 
They advocated annexation and Germanization. These conservatives 
were talking of Aryan purity and of fulfilling the unification of 
the fatherland, whereas the advocates of Hitteleuropa were Liberals. 
The idea of Mittelafrika became a competitor, supported by the colo- 
nial, export, and shipping interpsts. Thus Hitteleuropa. child of 
seige and warfare, rose and fell with the fortunes of war. 
The last upsurge of enthusiasm was the result of the Paris 
economic conferences of 1916, where a tightened blockade and stricter 
control of neutrals were advocated, and plans were made for the economic 
strangulation of oostwar Germany through abrogation of treaties, boy- 
cott of exports, and monopoly of raw materials. Tie West was still 
suspicious for a long time. Due to a translation lag the decline 
of Hitteleuropa sympathies was not at first noticed. 
There was a gradual decline of popular interest.  As the war 
became grimmer, the horizon no longer seemed to be unlimited.  At the 
Salzburg Conference of September-October 1918, a very tame customs 
treaty was signed between Austria and Germany. Even so, the nego- 
tiators were out of touch with the trends of German business. But 
the idea of Mitteleuropa made an impression upon the German national 
consciousness which was not forgotten. 
The spatial perspectives of the Nazi era were coming into 
focus.  If, as on this occasion, they ran under the false 
colors of Neumann's well-known slogan, it was to trade on jn 
its oopularity and destroy the genuine meaning he had given. 
Speaking of the Nazi spatial perspectives, it has been said that 
20 
"The key to Hitler's global mind is geopolitics."  Geopolitics 
had been an obscure pseudo-science since the publication of 
Mackinder's famous book, Democratic Ideals and Realities, in 1919; 
but during the First World War and afterwards it took root in Ger- 
many and grew steadily in popularity, especially within the univer- 
sities. Geopolitics is the science, not of how to conquer, but of 
what and why. It is concerned with the relationship of geographical 
space to political organizations, teaching that frontiers were merely 
reflections of the current power balance. Frontiers were dynamic, 
not static. Since there were many types of them, such as ethnic, 
topographical, economic, linguistic, cultural, historical, military, 
offensive, defensive, etc., they were not inviolablf , but could be 
changed as desired. There could not be sure peace until one power 
was clearly so strong that no other could challenge its frontiers. 
If one may indulge in pat formulizing, it would not be too great an 
exaggeration to say that geopolitics plus the "superman'' or Fflhrer 
concept plus racism plus integral nationalism plus the organic state 
equals Nazi Germany. 
In geopolitical theory, it was land power which determined 
world dominance. The most strategic land area in the world was the 
so-called Eurasian heartland, centered in East Central Europe and 
including Russia and Germany. The coastal areas of the world were 
■^Ibid.. p.~27£ 
20Robert Strausz-Hupe', Geopolitics. The Struggle for Space and Power 
(New Yorh G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. xii. 
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merely peripheral, and whoever controlled this land fortress could 
rule the world. That this theory was adopted by Germany was a tacit 
admission that it was really English seapower which had defeated Ger- 
many in World War I. A powerful new Germany must consolidate its 
position for a landward drive against the bases of this seapower. 
First economics, then geography, and finally German history 
fell in behind the new geopolitical theories. They began to have 
popular circulation, especially due to the propagandist activities 
of a certain Haushofer. 
The geopolitician saw "the political structure of the earth 
as growing out of stresses between different peoples in the process 
of settling and occupying their respective territories."21 These 
stresses were aligned along an acis. To achieve its maximum great- 
ness, a state must be completely independent: Economically, by a 
careful scientific study of surrounding resources, a state might 
become autarchic, or independent of world trade. This ambition im- 
plied a strong government able to reach beyond its own language area 
and lead its neighbors into economic captivity. Geopolitics posited 
a sort of "law of enmity between neighbors."22 
The methods of the geopoliticians involved careful study, 
planning, and organization, "a very exact knowledge of all political, 
ethnographical, economic, social, military, and naval problems, not 
only of Europe, but of the whole world. n2^ This task was carried on, 
21 Whlttlesey, p£1_cit., p. 98. 
22 Ibid., p. 100. 
23 Ibid., p. 55. 
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not by German diplomats, but by private persons and organizations, and 
also by the German secret service. Geopolitics, however, was "not a 
rigorous discipline, but rather a mixture of science with political 
aspiration."24 The theories of the geopoliticians, over and above their 
factual labor, had trerendous influence upon Hitler's theories as 
expounded in Mein Kanpf.  Geopolitics started merely as the geographic 
study of the nation state from the standpoint of foreign policy. The 
Nazis made it the chief justifier of the German need for Lebensraum. 
The concept of a Hitteleuropa and the growth of geopolitics, 
then, were two results of the First World War. To all practical 
extent, the 'tltteleuropa concept was lost to the German public from 
1919 to 1933. The popularity of geopolitics, however, grew strongly 
during the whole interwar period, and the system was accepted by the 
geographers in an area or political sense and incorporated into their 
theories. So matters stood. But the system, if it were espoused by a 
strong government, would be extremely dangerous, for 
in the final analysis, geopolitics is nothing but the idea of 
imperialist expansion. What little intelligible geography it has 
retained, as in the arguments for certain frontier rectifications, 
is neither new nor particularly important within the whole struc- 
ture. The bulk of geopolitics is a hodgepodge of ethical, mili- 
tary, economic, racial, demographic, historical, and political 
considerations.... 
As a scientific justification for expansion, geopolitics is 
nonsense, of course.... Obviously, the answer does not lie in 
geography—it lies in power.25 
Postwar Germany, defeated, isolated, and disgraced, was 
certainly not possessed of the requisite power to implement the 
geopolitical theories. 
** Ibid.., p.-77. 
25 Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National 
Socialism ( London:   Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 147. 
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The Versailles Treaty which ended World War I, although harsh, 
was a compromise, for the views of the victors were quite divergent. 
Both England and France desired to rid Europe of the menace of war; 
but fearful France desired to hold down her former enemy by force and 
by economic castration. England returned to her old balance of power 
policy, stirred by sportsmanlike pity for the underdog, unwilling to 
take any responsibility for the new order on the continent but willing 
to let things develop as they would, provided that they did so in a 
peaceful manner. From 1924- to 1929, the European scene was compara- 
tively tranquil.  But then came the Great Depression which weakened 
the victors, galvanized the vanquished, and released pent-up radical 
and revolutionary nationalistic passions. 
Any German government which kept power would have had to have 
agitated for the revision of the Versailles Treaty. So much the 
worse for the victors, for 
everything depended on Ger-nany's acceptance of or conversion to 
a conservative attitude. That sort of acceptance wouH require, 
at least during the first phase of two or three decades, a mix- 
ture of contentment and impotence. The Treaty of Versailles 
created a maximum of discontent and an impotence that was only 
transitory. Whichever way she turned her eyes, towards Poland 
or Czechoslovakia or Austria, Germany saw grievances which she 
could only consider legitiiate. The disarmament clause, the 
demilitarization of the Rhineland, and the Little Entente made 
her temporarily helpless; but they did not weaken her for good 
and all. Having saved her unity and her industry, she had 
thereby kept intact the means of recovery. As Jacques Bain- 
ville put in a famous phrase, "the Treaty was too harsh for its 
softer elements, and too soft for the harsher ones*.'26 
The Versailles treaty not only sought to repress Germany 
but also to create a new order in the area of East Central Europe. 
The French Revolutionary idea of political nationalism was imposed 
26 Raymond Aron, The Centurv of Total War (Garden City, New YorY: 
Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 29. 
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upon the Balkan melting pot of nations, a plan which, however well 
it might have worked in homogeneous Western Europe, wrought only 
confusion and antagonism in the East. Czech or Polish or Serbian 
chauvinists, -on account of some medieval victory which should have 
made some stretch of soil forever theirs, wanted more than they got, 
while many Germans, Hungarians, and Bulgars were obviously not treated 
to very much self-determination."27 Nevertheless, the Versailles 
settlement worked, and the discontents it engendered might have been 
overcome under better circumstances. But Central Europe, which was 
an economic whole under the Hapsburgs, soon found itself in the throes 
of nationalistic excitement. Each small new country made haste to 
raise its own tariff barriers. Each proudly strove for autarky. A 
poor peatant country must impose still further poverty upon itself if 
it is to accumulate enough capital to become industrialized. The 
Allies, who had their own national interests, were not eager to trade 
with their step-children. And the Depression was disastrous to their 
economies. 
The weakness of the Central European "shatter belt" left it 
ready for picking. In Germany, the awareness of Mitteleuropa was not 
destroyed completely; "the years of economic blockade and ideological 
isolation; the vast military-geographic panorama opening to the East 
and South East; the fact of discovering kinsmen in remote parts of the 
middle-European area, personally experienced by at least a million men: 
These were events that had made a permanent impression on the thinking 
and attitudes of Germans at a time of acutely aggravated national 
sensitivity."28 The First World War was a military stalemate. The 
'£l  Elizabeth Wiskeraann, Prologue to War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1940), p. 6. 
28 Meyer, OP. clt.. p. 291. 
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German leaders could not but remember that they had been defeated by 
superior economic power and by the blockade. 
PART II 
TH E ADVENT OF H ITLER 
THE LBBENSRAUM CONCEPT 
BECOMES POLICY 
• ■ * 
CHAPTER I 
WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS 
The French Alliance System was the cornerstone of postwar 
Europe.  Therefore, an overview of its makeup and administration is 
quite important to any study of how Nazi aggressiveness penetrated 
the European scene and sought to dor.inate it. 
Five nations supervised the reconstruction of Europe. Of 
these, the United States withdrew and Russia was debilitated by the 
Communist Revolution. The remaining three—England, France, and 
Italy—were somehow unwilling to assume responsibility either for 
the preservation of the good or the alleviation of the bad in the 
Versailles system. No attempt was made to secure the cooperation of 
Germany, who was left to fester in her own resentment. France's lack 
of domestic unity, and the fact that throughout the interwar period 
she was never sure of her wartime ally England, made her an inef- 
fective barrier to the resurgence of German power. There was no 
unity among the allies, either for the job of keeping Germany down 
by force as France at first advocated, or for the mediation of Euro- 
pean troubles. The potential of the League was in effect left untried. 
The primary concern of postwar French diplomacy was slcurite. 
From 1920 to 1924, it sought to obtain this illusive state by means 
of strict enforcement of the Versailles system. After the withdrawal 
of England from continental politics, France was the most powerful 
European nation; yet even so, fear of Germany became an obsession with 
her, and security from direct attack, which was guaranteed by the 
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League, did not seem to be enough. Indirect attack, or aggression, 
any alteration of the status quo, seemed to be a monstrous omnipresent 
threat, if Germany were ever to become strong again. All French 
diplomacy, therefore, was "an attempt to lay the specter of a German 
revisionist 'explosion'against the established order by assigning 
superior force to the defenders of the 'law.'"1 France demanded a 
physical guarantee of her position. But instead of a permanent mili- 
tary occupation of the Rhineland, which she desired, she was forced 
by her allies to settle for the demilitarization of that area. Nor 
would England cooperate in holding Germany down by force, and England 
was France's most important ally. France felt herself obliged to 
seek military alliances elsewhere, and the newly established states 
of Central Europe seemed to offer a desperate chance for building a 
bulwark to support the status quo. A treaty was made with Belgium in 
September of 1920, and a Franco-Polish agreement was signed in Febru- 
ary of 1921. This marked the beginning of the French alliance system. 
Most of the other European powers either ignored the German 
problem or underestimated it. England even employed a mildly en- 
couraging attitude, real or tacit, towards her old enemy, and in this 
her policy was mutually frustrating with France's. Versailles to her 
was not a rigid system but a temporary settlement which would be modi- 
fied as need arose. Feeling safe, she was willing to pacify and to 
appease. She soon found herself in the position of mediator between 
Germany and the French wrath. A.noderately strong Germany was to 
England a welcome bulwark against the insanities of Communist Russia. 
Aside from Dominion opposition to continental entanglements, Britain 
also was deterred by a fear that France would become too powerful and 
1 Arnold Wolfera, Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting 
strategies of Peace~since Versailles (New York, Harcourt, Brace and 
Co., 1940), p. 20. 
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would  upset the European balance.     It was believed   that as long as 
Germany did not endanger British interests elsewhere, she should be 
strengthened. 
The new nations of Central Europe did not wait for French 
initiative to  organize  themselves in  support of the status quo. 
In 1920, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia joined in an 
alliance  called  the Little  Entente,  which was directed against 
Hungary and  the possibilities  of a  Hapsburg restoration.     France 
regarded her Polish treaty to be the keystone to her alliances, a 
barrier  against Russia  and a  counter-weight to Germany.     She also  signed 
treaties with Czechoslovakia in 1924-, Rumania in 1926, and Yugo- 
slavia  in 1927.    From 1924, France definitely abandoned the attempt 
to repress Germany by force,  and relied  on '^er  system of  collective 
security. 
In 1925, after the failure of Europe to adopt the Geneva 
Protocol for compulsory arbitration, France sought to reinforce her 
position by MUM  of a  collective guarantee against Revisionism. 
Britain,   along with  Italy,  was persuaded  to become a guarantor  of the 
Franco-German frontier.    In exchange for pledging to recognize her 
western borders and  for negotiating arbitration treaties  with Poland, 
France,  Czechoslovakia, and Belgium,  Germany received membership in 
the League and a permanent seat on the Council.    These were the 
Locarno Treaties.    Neither England nor Germany nor Poland, however, 
va«    willing to sponsor an Eastern Locarno.    As a method of keeping 
Germany within her appointed bounds,  therefore, the whole elaborate 
system was a farce.    The "Land without a Back" was not obligated to 
recognize its eastern frontiers. 
■ 
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The Locarno treaties were not only, In the last analysis, 
futile. They undermined the League of Nations. They: 
contained certain important implications which no» of the 
signatories would have cared to admit, but which became more 
apparent as time when on. In the first place, there was a 
tacit assumption that the voluntary endorsement by Germany of 
her western frontier gave that frontier a more sacrosanct character 
than had hitherto attached to it, or that now attached to her 
other frontiers; and this implies that obligations imposed by 
the Versailles Treaty were morally, if not legally, less binding 
than obligations voluntarily accepted.  Secondly, the readiness 
of Great Britain to guarantee certain frontiers and her refusal 
to guarantee other* had the practical effect of grading frontiers, 
from the point of view of security, into first and second class; 
while the British government firmly protested that all its 
obligations under the Covenant would be honored, the impression 
resulting frcm the Locarno Treaties was that Great Britian was 
not prepared to take military action to defend frontiers in 
Eastern Europe.  In the long run, the Locarno Treaty was des- 
tructive both of the Versailles Treaty and of the Covenant.  It 
encouraged both the view that the Versailles Treaty, unless con- 
firmed by other engagements of a voluntary character, lacked 
binding force, and the view that governments could not be 
expected to take military action in defence of frontiers in which 
they themselves were not directly interested. Ten years later,  ? 
nearly all governments appeared to be acting on these assumptions. 
From 1930 on, European conditions became more and more strained. 
The first Nazi victories in the Reichstag came in 1930, and growing 
German power made the allies, especially France, incressingly nervous. 
The period was marked by a return to naked power politics. The League 
Assembly of 1930, which attempted and failed to have the Kellogg- 
Briand Peace Pact incorporated into the Covenant, was the last attempt 
to find security through international organization. The years 1924-30 
marked the zenith of the League's efficiency. 
As the League declined, the French alliance system grew more 
it was 
and more elaborate, and at the same time/the cause and the effect of the 
2 E.H. Carr, International Relations between the Two World Wars. 
9-1939. (London.! Macmillen and Co., 1947), p. 96. 
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weakening of that international body.  But even as France elabo- 
rated her alliance system, in a manner of speaking she spread 
herself too thin.  Her position grew progressively weaker as Ger- 
many's grew stronger.  In January of 1933, Hitler came to power. 
On October 14., he withdrew from the League and gave plain indica- 
tions that Germany was about to rearm.  The prewar period had 
definitely begun. 
Its advent, however, was slow and cautious.  In June of 
1933, on Italy's proposal, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany had 
signed a Four Power Pact reminiscent of the Concert of Europe. 
Neither Italy nor England wished to see France or Germany grow too 
powerful.  Since these Fig Four sermed to assume hegemony of 
European politics and implied that revision of Versailles would 
be considered, suspicion was generated in Eastern Europe as to the 
true intentions of France, patroness of the status quo.  Italy was 
led by her jeaJousy of France to sponsor the revisionist countries 
of Central Europe, Hungary and Bulgaria.  Although the Big Four 
Power Pact was quite innocuous from the standpoint of workability— 
indeed, Germany and France never ratified it—it paved the way for 
an important new alignment of power. 
The alliance systems which France endorsed in East Europe had 
a rich potential which they never realized, partly through their own 
inability to cooperate and partly due to the diversionary activities of 
Germany and Italy. Each country in the Little and Balkan Ententes 
had received territory in the Versailles settlement.  It was 
decidedly to their interest to unite in the protection of the 
status quo. The Little Entente, which included Czechoslovakia, 
26. 
Rumania, and Yugoslavia, wor!;ed so well at its inception that the 
three countries together almost acquired great power status. The 
Little Entente, however, was an alliance against Hungary and not 
against Germany, with whom it was prevented from making a set- 
tlement because of her endorsement of Hungarian revisionism. The 
Little ICntente was extremely important in the postwar diplomatic 
scene because 
it enlarged France's conception of  ^er own security.     She was 
now definitely  committed  to the maintenance not only of the 
Versailles  Treaty,  but of the  whole  European peace settlement. 
It was no longer her concern merely to keep Germany at bay on 
the Rhine and prevent her from strengthening her position in 
the east.     It became a recognized French  interest to support 
Poland  against Lithuania,   Czechoslovakia against Hungary,  and 
Rumania against Bulgaria,  and even to save her friends from 
the  inconvenience of a too rigorous  interpretation of their 
obligations  towards  their minorities.^ 
In 1934, a French-Cz^choslovakian-Russian alignment emerged, 
directed against Germany.    At this point French diplomany made one 
of  its greatest : istakes.    German power was definitely on the rise. 
The year 1934 also saw the Rohm massacres and  the abortive  coup by 
the Austrian Fascists, in which Chancellor Dollfuss was slain.    Italy 
saved her protege' then by rushing troops to the Brenner pass in time 
to prevent a Nazi occupation, and with skill might at that time have 
been induced to align herself formally with the West against Germany. 
Instead, however, France chose to concentrate upon courting Russia. 
This miscalculation had great consequences later.     In December of 
1934 the West's position on Italy's Ethiopian venture shoved her 
bodily into alignment with Nazi Germany.    France could have solved 
her problem by a definite alliance with either Russia or Italy.    By 
3 Ibid., p. 42. 
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taking half measures, she miffed both possibilities; and her halfway- 
measures, both in alliance and in application of the League Sanctions, 
lost to her the possibility of peace. 
In February, 1934, also under French auspices, the Balkan 
Entente was formed by Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.  It 
was directed against Bulgarian revisionism as the Little Entente was 
against that of Hungary.  It was never very strong, however, and 
never had the potential for unity that the Little Entente possessed. 
A year later, in February, 1935, the success of the Saar 
plebiscite gave Nazi Germany a tremendous boost of confidence. In 
March Hitler openly violated the arms limitations imposed at Ver- 
sailles, causing Italy to veer slightly to the West an;ain.  In April, 
Britain, France, and Italy united in the so-called Stresa Front whose 
ostensible purpose was to keep Germany in check and to guarantee 
Austria. The whole amounted merely to "a spirited display of fin- 
U 
ill   •■ ger-shaking." 
The Franco-Russian pact worked in the long run to the advantage 
of Germany.     It fitted in well with the popular Nazi anti-Conmunist 
propaganda.    Because Germany could claim that the pact violated 
Locarno and rendered it void, the way was open for the downfall of 
the whole French alliance system.    By the end of 1935, furthermore, 
Mussolini was dfinitely estranged from the West and had begun to 
cooperate with Germany.     Poland, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had pro- 
' 
 New York: 
U  John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe. (Henry 
Regnery Co., 1953)> p. 51. 
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German elements in their -overnments, and these elements were 
becoming stronger  in Hungary,  Greece,  and Turkey.     nBy 1936 France 
could boast  of  the richest collection of alliances and agreements 
which any power had ever made since the Emperor Charles VI at- 
tempted  to safeguard the Pragmatic Sanction and rights of his 
5 
daughter by paper guarantees."     France found herself losing both 
the initiative and the moral leadership of interwar Europe. 
As Germany gradually assumed the military predominance,   she 
reaped all the benefits of an offensive position.     It would have 
been an impossibly large task to keep a rich and populous Germany 
in the  state  of defeat,  especially a Germany motivated  by a lust for 
vengeance and   organized totally for the  recovery of its  national 
prestige.    France's halfhearted  measures,  unsupported  by the  Allies, 
were merely salt in the German wounds.     With Russia  untested,   Italy 
recalcitrant and  the League debilitated  before the  test  came,  unable 
to give her Central European allies effective economic aid and unable 
to complete her alliance chain, France found herself face to face 
with a rearmed Germany.    The only legal excuse for a collective inter- 
vention  in Eastern  Europe would have been under the auspices of the 
League.     The Little Entente had been the League's most enthusiastic 
supporter.    Now the states of    Central Europe saw their patroness 
growing  steadily weaker and more remote at a  time when  there was no 
one else to rely on.    Germany swiftly filled the void left by re- 
treating French influence. 
5 L.B. Namier, nflr]nnmtia Prelude.   (London:   Macraillan, 1949), 
p. x. 
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France may pride herself for her part in the consolidati n of 
the new and aggrandized states of the Vistula and the Danube 
during the most difficult oeriod of the'r infancy. But at 
the same time she rendered impossible any adjustment or change 
of the status quo which might have permitted nre-Hitlerian 
Germany to play a constructive role in shaping a new economic 
and political order in the Past and Southeast and might have 
given sufficient outlet the German energies to save both the 
German Republic on the one hand, and the new Slavic states on 
the other.  Instead, a policy of resistance based primarily 
on military force prepared the way for the aggressive methods 
and demands of Hitler's revisionist policy and thus contributed 
to the series of circumstances which plunged Europe into a 
new and disastrous struggle. 
For France, alliance with England was the conditio sine uua non 
of safety. Therefore, as she began to lose her hold in Eastern Europe, 
she began to retreat behind the. Maginot Line and to submit more and 
more to English leadership. 
6 Wolf irs, OP. cit.. p. 110. 
CHAPTER II 
EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS 
But what of the objective of Nazi aggression, that confused 
and disunited, backward area known as East Central Europe, the area 
destined by the Nazi ideology to be the Lebensraum of pure Aryan Ger- 
many. ■It is clear that the states of the region, certainly singly 
and perhaps collectively, had only a marginal control over their 
destiny.  Traditionally they have been the objects rather than the 
subjects of history."-'- Eastern Europe had been the oawn of the 
Romanov, the HapsburiT, the Hohenzollern and the Ottoman dynasties. 
Its struggle for autonomy had lasted for over a hundred years, and 
at last the region was relatively free following domination by the 
three most autocratic of the great powers in Europe—Germany, Russia, 
and Austria-Hungary.  Central Europe was the battleground of three 
cultures: Teutonic, Byzantine-Greco-Slav, and Turkish.  Isolated, 
agricultural, splintered by differences in geography and climate, 
the void left by the fall of the old governments was glazed over for a 
time by a thin veneer of parliamentary democracy, which was later 
displaced by an accelerating trend towards authoritarian government, 
the heady nationalism of these secession states meant hatred, rivalry, 
trade barriers, attempted autarky and the frantic stimulation of heavy 
industry to the additional impoverishment of the peasantry.  It was 
physically impossible in this region to draw boundaries suitable to 
everyone. The minority problem was a continual bone of contention. 
The new nations needed time, but they were denied it. No sooner 
had thev been well established than they were cruelly knocked down by the 
1 C. F." Plank f Ed.. Challenge in Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, N. J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1954.), p. 194. 
31. 
forces  of inflation and depression.    Furthermore,  the ruling classes 
found themselves confronted by an increasingly dissatisfied peasantry 
and by the threat of Communism.    War, economic crisis, nationalism, 
parliamentary weakness,  reaction against the  Left,  and  old regime in- 
fluences  led  to authoritarianism.     "The  Eastern European states,   semi- 
democratic,  semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future 
recovery, between socialism and' aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, 
were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution."2 
The  Eastern  European nations began well by working among themselves 
and in cooperation with France.    Their hopes were highest when Ger- 
many and Russia were weakest.    They were in trouble when these two 
giants grew strong again, and were in real danger when they joined 
forces.    The trend towards authoritarianism did not mean gravitation 
towards Germany, for in Eastern Europe there was a strong desire for 
freedom.    But in its traditional fear of Russia, red br> tsarist, this 
unhappy region closed a door on itself,  a possible way out of its 
isolation before Nazi Germany.    But Western Europe was guilty of the 
same miscalculation and perhaps the psychology of the times prevented 
its ever being a real alternative. 
t 
But the attempts at alliance should not be played down simply 
because they failed.    The Ententes showed real promise    and held their 
own up to the rise of Hitler.    The Ententes were weakest in that they 
did not include every country in the area.    The major stimulus in their 
formation was not cooperation but fear of their neighbors; they never 
really transcended the principle of nationality.    Nationalism, social 
dissatisfaction, poverty, anti-semitism, the minority questions, and 
political instability seemed to be the things which the nations of 
2 Ibid., p. U7. 
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Central Europe had most in common.     Nazi Germany was able skillfully 
to manipulate these fears and ambitions to her own ends. 
Yet these centripetal forces are not wholly the fault of East 
Central Europe itself.    The Allies had provided the countries with no 
unifying policy, but merely abandoned them to their own political 
devices.    The League was never permitted to grow into an instrument 
which could arbitrate with any real effectiveness among them. 
Owing to the expanding power of Germany and Russia, and to 
the growth of revisionism,  regional security pacts were popular. 
Besides  the Ententes,   Italy,  Austria,   and  Hungary were  informally 
allied under the Rome Protocols of March,  1934.     In November of that 
year Esthonia.   Latvia,  and  later Lithuania  formed  the  so-called  Baltic 
Entente. 
Poland was  the  exception.     Like Italy,   she was  in that amor- 
phous state halfway between major small power and minor great power 
and terribly conscious of her prestige and independence.    Poland 
believed she was strong enough to take care of herself.    When Britain, 
Italy, France and Germany signed the Four Power Pact in 1933, which 
sepmed to aim at the dominance of the great powers at the expense of 
the lesser, Poland indignantly asserted her independence by turning 
away from France and more towards Germany.    Hitler at that time with- 
drew from the disarmament conferences and the League.    The German- 
Polish declaration of January, 1934-, was the result.    Germany was 
anxious to break her isolation and to protect her rear if France 
should attack.    The treaty, Hitler's first diplomatic activity, was 




important  stone from the  postwar  structure and unbalanced  the whole 
3 
conception  of East European solidarity." 
Germany had 8   special interpst in Poland,  not  only due to the 
existence  of a German minority und^r Polish administrations,  but 
because Poland barred Germany's way eastward.    The Polish corridor 
which separated  East Prussia fro™ the rest of the Fatherland was an 
abomination  in the eyes  of the Germans,  as was the estrangement 
of Danzig and  its  inclusion within the Polish tariff area.     Hitler 
desired an understanding with Poland to offset suspicions  of his 
aggressive  intent,  to stabilize his position  in case  of attack,  and 
as peace propaganda to counteract his abandonment of  the League. 
The signing of the pact creating a ten year truce between the two 
countries  took place quietly    and  outside    the influence  or acquies- 
cence  of the League  or  of France.     Upon its ratification the Four 
Power Pact was dead. 
Poland  was clearly in a very difficult position and  it is 
hard to understand  the attraction of an  offer which seemed to 
promise an alleviation of the German revisionist compaign. 
The pact served, however, to increase the disunity of Eastern 
Europe.    Although it was the basic intention of the Polish 
policy to maintain an even balance between its two great  neighbors, 
this agreement served in effect to bring Poland increasingly 
to a position increasingly paralleling that of Germany.     This 
tendency was heightened when Czechoslovakia, by its 1935 pact 
with the Soviet Union,  came to look eastward for its support. 
Here again the local Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict became , 
involved in a more extensive and dangerous diplomatic issue. 
Poland's border dispute with Czechoslovakia had estranged 
Poland from the Little Entente, as had her friendship with Hungary, 
3 Josef H«nn. Tornado across Eastern Europe,   (New York:  Grey- 
stone Press, 1942), p. 127. 
4 Black,  OP. clt.. p. 190. 
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another revisionist power. Hungary's policy was similar to Poland's, 
namely, to play off the various opposing powers to her own advantage. 
Austria was also one of the prime areas of early German con- 
cern.  There can he no doubt that the Austrians basically desired to 
unit with their kinsmen to the north.  Their reaction to the Nazi 
revolution was not one of repulsion but of invitation. The fascist- 
type government under Dollfuss was sponsored by Mussolini.  Germany 
sought to influence events through subsidies of money and arms to the 
opposition groups within Austria, and by such economic pressure as 
the placing in 1933 of a prohibitive fee on the Austrian tourist 
trade. The Austrian government retaliated by suppressing the 
Austrian Nazis in February, 1934. In July, the Nazis attempted a 
coup which was foiled by Italian resistance. Hitler was forced to 
be conciliatory until the events of European diplomacy made Italy 
his ally. 
The rise of German power had important repercussions in East 
Central Europe. For one thing, it stimulated revisionism, except in 
Soviet Russia, who abandoned her revolutionary agitation to endorse 
the French system of collective security. Poland drew closer to 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia to Austria and her other allies. In 1-tay of 
1935, the Czechoslovak-Russian pact was signed. Russia was hated and 
feared in Central Europe. Yugoslavia had yet to recognize the Soviet 
government. 
Czechoslovakia's unilateral action was indicative of the 
fact that the Little Entente was beginning to drift apart.    As 
Germany was growing stronger,  the West apparently was growing weaker. 
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Germany was a valuable market which it would be unwise to offend. The 
Ethiopian crisis seamed to indicate both the strength of the Totali- 
tarian powers and the dependence of France upon England. In a search 
for security, the Entente ties were relaxed in September of 1936, so 
that each member was free to negotiate individually with any other 
power.  The strength of unity which had almost secured great power 
status for the entente -embers was allowed to atrophy. 
Mention has been made above of the economic nationalism of 
Eastern European states. Due to their high tariffs and to the Depres- 
sion, these countries experienced an agrarian crisis of alarming 
proportions. With a paucity of credit and capital, they needed foreign 
trade in order to survive.  Austria and Czechoslovakia were the only 
large 'nanufacturing states in the area, and by the end of the depres- 
sion only Czechoslovakia was economically stable. Austria was kept 
alive by loans. 
Had more liberal trade policies been maintained in the out- 
side world, had emigration been permitted to take its natural 
course, and had moderate external loans been toad* available, 
the price structure would have probably not reached such a 
critical state.  A measure of liberalism on the part of the 
powerful •lemocracies would have made it more difficult for 
Germany to increase her economic and political hold over the 
Southeast European area.' 
But with the failure of the '.Vest to core to the aid of their 
economies, the nations of Central Europe had nowhere to turn but to 
Nazi Germany. This was especially true after Italy, financially 
strained by her Ethiopian venture, was forced to retire from her 
position as chief rival to France in East Central Europe. By the 
late 1930's, Germany had cornered most of the Balkan trade. 
5 Hanc, on- cit.. p. 106. 
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A number of European states created in 1917did function as 
buffer  states  even  though the nature  of their individual fron- 
tiers left much to be desired.    They functioned as such as 
long as the powers which had  sponsored  their creation chose 
to maintain them as true buffer states between themselves and 
the expansionist tendencies of other powers, i.e., regarded 
these states as  in a sense their own frontiers.     Unfortunately, 
the great powers did not do so for very long. 
The Cordon Sanitare was no strorger than all itsraembers indi- 
vidually.     It was  no barrier to those determined  aggressors who envisioned 
the  German  Lebensraum. 
The  only other great nation  in Europe besides  Germany to stand 
aloof from the French Alliance system w-.'s  Italy.     Along with France, 
Italy was Germany's chief rival  in Central Furope.     She was  suspicious 
of  German interest  in the Balkans,  which she regarded  as her  sphere, 
and even toyed with the idea of cresting a cordon sanita-je of Poland, 
Hungary,  Yugoslavia and   Italy to keep the Nazis  in bounds  on the East. 
England was  inclined  to be conciliatory because  of the danger 
to her ! 'editerranean communications with the Empire.    France,  however, 
refused  to cooperate because  Italy was a revisionist power.     Conse- 
a.uently Italy's ambition to be a great colonial power remained unsatisfied, 
and  upon  obtaining  the  support of Germany she became more  independent 
of the West.     A Franco-British,   Italo-German alignment began  to emerge. 
The traditional Italian policy of seeking a few limited aims in con- 
junction with giving diplomatic  support to whichever  side was able  to 
offer  the most, was  thrown over for a policy of wild  expansionism;  but 
instead  of obtaining the freedom  she sought,   Italy became lost  in power 
politics and  eventually was  constrained  to bow to Hitler. 
6~Peter De'-'endelssohn,  Designs for Aggression.   (New York & London: 
Harper and Brothers, 194.6),  p. 216. 
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Germany was quick to recognize Italy's new aquisitions, and 
the Spanish affair drew them closer.  In July, 1936, relations 
among Berlin, Vienna and Rome were normalized and Italy performed 
for Germany the service of warding off an Austrian flirtation with 
the Little Entente. The subsequent treaty organization of Italy, 
Austria, and Hungary wrecked the last attempt to solidify Central 
Europe outside great-power domination. Yet Italy was serving v;hat 
she conceived to he her own interests.  She was suspicious of German 
intentions, and the alliance was more a facade of solidarity than 
a true partnership. Italy wore herself out in Ethiopia and Spain. 
Germany became the leader, she the follower. 
There is irony in the fact that in September 1939, Fascist 
Italy with her proudly advertized first-rank-powe-r foreign 
policy ended up roughly in the same position in which par- 
liamentary Italy had found herself at the beginning of the 
First World War. Likewise there is irony in the fact that 
from the summer of 1939 on Ciano developed into a practitioner 
of the policy of co:.ibinazioni—i.e., of trying to reap advantage 
from maintaining an undecided balancing position in the struggles 
of stronger powers—a policy which in earlier years Ciano had 
regarded as characteristic of the weakness of democratic Italy 
and condemned as undignified and unfitting to the reborn 
strength of Fascist Italy. 
But by the time Italy had returned to her old policy, it was 
too late.  Germany had the field.  In November of 1937, Italy had 
signed the Anti-Comintern Pact; in December she had abandoned the 
League. In January of 1937, Germany was practically ordered out 
Austria; in November Austria was practically given away.  In Feb- 
ruary of 1939. the Italo-Yugoslav front against Germany failed due to 
 7~G.A. CraiP, F. Gilbert, The Tiolonats. 1919-1^39. (Princeton, 
New Jersey: 3rinceton University Press, 1°53), p. 535. 
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the fall of Stoyadinovic.  By that tir*e Italy wag no longer indepen- 
dent.  In May, 1939, Italy signed the "Pact of Steel." If Italy had 
gone with England and France she would have had to have given up her 
ambitions.  So she chose Germany.  She gained her glory at th? cost of 
Central Europe and. ultimately of her own freedom. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY 
The Nazi program for aggression was flexible, well-planned, 
and deeply rooted in Central European history.  The earliest National 
Socialist platforms called for the reunification of all Germans with 
the Fatherland, for the recovery of the self-respect lost in World 
War I, and for land and territory equal to the glory and power of 
the great German nation. These goals may be called the constants of 
German aggression. 
At first, Hitler WP.S occupied with consolidating his power within 
Germany and with other internal developments.  His foreign policy was 
cautious and pacific; but it grew more and more open as Germany rearmed. 
Whereas the means of the Nazi foreign policy were completely opportun- 
istic from the beginning, the end was always in sight, having been 
formulated even before Hitler came to power. Hitler outlined this end 
in Mein Kampf.  It was world domination.  The welfare of the Reich was 
the suromum bonum to which all other considerations wer*> subservient, to 
which the country's whole resources were to be devoted. 
Mein Kampf may be described as the blueprint of the Nazi aggression. 
Its whole tenor and content demonstrate that the Nazi pursuit of 
aggressive designs was no mere accident arising out of an immediate 
political iituation in Europe and the world. Mein Kampf estab- 
lishes unequivocally that the use of aggressive war to serve German , 
aims in foreign policy was part of the very creed of the Nazi party. 
1 U.S. Chief of Counsel for thfl Prosecuting of Axis Criminality, 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggressior. (Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 
1946), Vol. I, p. (M-. 
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One of the strongest influences upon Me in Kampf was geo- 
politics. The geographical materialism, the struggle—not for class 
but for space-r-the rejection of liberalism, the utilization of a revolu- 
tionary dialectic with simple mass appeal, all these are geopolitical 
cannons as preached by Haushofer and adopted by Hitler. The importance 
of geopolitics to the development of the theory of Lebensraum has al- 
ready been mentioned. Also, it is significant that "Hitler found in 
Geopolitik a coherent explanation as to how world powers had developed 
in the past and how Germany could assume her nlace in the historic 
2 
procession of great states."  It has been said of Mein Kampf that 
in a sense this geopolitical "brain trust" for the first time 
summed up all the German addictions...:  the drive for territory, 
systematic study of regions nnd races, a "chosen people" com- 
plex, a love of war.  In so doing, it forged these elements into 
a weapon of conquest.  It is this Naming up, this integration 
of latent forces, that gives geopolitics its effectiveness. 
The influence of geopolitics upon Meln Kampf was direct. 
After the failure of the Bierhallen-Putsch of 1923, Major General 
Professor Doktor Karl Haushofer visited the imprisoned Hitler and is 
said to have inspired Chapter XIV, which "defines the aims of Nazi 
foreign policy and gives Hitler's own understanding of Lebensraum'! 
Mein Kampf investigates the possibilities for Germany of 
autarky or of an economy dependent upon world trade.  Since the one was 
seen to be impossible and the other spurned as beneath the dignity of 
2 Whittlesey, on. cit.. p. 69. 
3 Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geonolitics. the Struggle for Space and 
Power (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942)7 !39. 
4 Ibid., p. 49. 
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independent Germany, the answer to which Hitler and the gee-politicians 
arrived was— expand. The idea that pure Aryan Germany needed, and 
was entitled to, a Lebensrauia was "the Nazis' mostpopular apology for 
aggression."  The Germans were taught to see themselves as the 
6 
Volk ohne Raum.  the nation without space.  "Geopolitik, in its ren- 
dering of economics just as in the interpretation of other sciences, 
functioned as an educational device for conditioning the average 
7 
German's responses to political leadership." 
The M'tteleuropa movement and the Nazi revolution rose from 
the same general postwar cressures:  the desire for economic security, 
for liberation, to fulfill the historical mission of the German race. 
But by Hitler's day there were few of the old Mltteleuropa men left. 
The anti-liberal Nazis envisioned economic domination, not cooperation, 
and then political conquest of the Central European area.  They demanded 
the economic and national fulfillment upon their own terms.  The 
Lebensraum concept was more than rerely, as some would believe, "an 
attempt to conceal a political and strategic technique for dominating 
8 
lesser powers."  The concept was the direct ideological impetus behind 
that desire to dominate, an important idea in the makeup of a regime 
composed of a weird mixture of ideology and realpolitiaue.  Nazism was 
the greatly distorted offspring of the movements for Mltteleuropa. for 
Pan-Germany, and for geopolitics. 
' 
5 Ibid., p. 99. 
6 This was the title of a novel by Hans Grimm, an emotional 
treatment of the geopolitical theories. 
7 Ibid., p. 99. 
8 Wertheimer, OP. cit.. p. 7. 
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According to Hitler, the prewar German foreign policy was a 
mistake.     Germany should seek power or the continent first,  and then 
the much-desired  world  power would be added unto her.     In the search 
for this power, German foreign po1 icy was only, in the ••■ords of 
MeIn  Kampf. 
a means to an end,  but the end must be exclusively the advancement 
of  our own  nationality.     Ho consideration of foreign policy can be 
guided by any point of view but this:  Does it benefit our nation 
now or  in the future,   or will   it be harmful to  it? 
This is th° sole preconceived op'nion permitted in dealing 
with the question. Partisan, religious, humanitarian, and all 
other points  of view in general are completelv beside the point.^ 
Hitler was voicing an  old  Pan-German tenet.     The end  justified 
any means,  for the end  was  glorious.     But Hitler saw his aims as a 
new departure  in German history: 
We National  Socialists  consciously draw a  "Hne through  the foreign 
policy trend  of our pre-War period.     We take up at the  halting 
place  of 600 years ago.     We ter-inate the endless  German drive  to 
the  South and   West  of Europe  and direct our gaze toward the lands 
in the  East.     We finally terminate  the colonial and  trade policy 
of the pre-War period.  and  proceed   to the  territorial  policy 
of the future.iu 
Hitler further said  that 
the  National Socialist movement must endeavor to eliminate the 
discrepancy between our population and our area—the latter viewed 
not only as a source of nourishment, but also as a point of 
support for oower politics—between  our historical  past and the 
hopelessness  of  our  impotence  today. 
For  to defend   its glorious Aryan race,   Germany rust not only be able  to 
sustain its people physically, but to protect them; Germany must also 
be a world  power.     According to Mein Kampf.   "the foreign policy of a 
9 Adolf Hitler.  Mein Kampf   (New York: Reynal and  Hitchcock,   1^39), 
p.  8P8. 
10. Ibid., p.  950. 
11. Ibid., p. 940. 
fnlkish 3tate is charged with guaranteeing the existence on this planet 
of the race embraced by the State, of establishing between the number 
and growth of the population on the one hand, ftfld the size and value 
of tl-r-  soil ami territory on the other hand, a viable, natural relation- 
ship." The only healthy relationship was the feeding of a great 
people completely from ita own soil. "Only a gufficently extensive 
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area on this globe guarantees a nation freedom of existence." This 
is the Nazi theory of Blut und Boden—of race and land. 
The ethical and moral justification of German expansion by 
an means—aside from the Aryan theory and geopolitical dogmas—was 
the belief, well-founded enough from the German viewpoint, that 
enemies of the Reich were united to crush the F atherland and to deny 
it its rightful place among the nations of the world. The concept 
of a struggle for existence became the Nazi mandate for aggression: 
Either exist as a world power or exist not at all. Frontiers were 
only the reflections of political power.  A powerful Germany was a 
larger Germany, and it was up to the rest of Europe whether the Father- 
land was to be allowed to receive its patrimony in peace, or 
whether blood must be shed.  "One must be quite clear." said Mein 
Kampft "about the fact that the regaining of the lost regions will 
not come about through solemn appeals to the dear Lord, or through 
Pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only bv force of ans." 
12 Ibid., p. 935. 
13 Ibid., p. 912. 
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First the Fatherland must regain its native vitality. Then 
th>= ingathering of Deutsche Volk could take place unopposed. 
Oppressed countries will not be brought bac' into th*» bosom of 
the corinon Reich by means of fiery protests, 1   1 y a ■ ighty 
sword.. To forge this sword is the tag; of the domestic political 
leadership of a eople; to guard the work of forging and to seek 
comrades in ar:r,s is the task of the foreign policy leadership.. 
Nazi foreign policy was incalculable 3nd unpredictable.  It was 
a continuation of the Nazi revolutionary techniques in world affairs, 
and as such it was an erratic crisis policy led mostly by amateurs. 
As grandiose and frighteningly specific as were the plans of llein 
Kampf. their implementation was in many respects almost haphazard. 
It was definitely not the case that "every military and diplomatic 
operation undertaken by the Nazis was preceded by a plan of action, 
15 
and a careful coordination of long prepared plan of aggression." The 
question to be asked is whether or not the above irrpressions were 
created, not so much by the success of prior Nazi planring, as by the 
Nazis' laying claim to prior successes as the result of the genius of 
the Fiihrer's plans. Although Lebensraum was planned well enough in 
broad outline, the methods by which the details were carried out were 
enfrely opportunistic. 
In the first place, Hitler suffered from diplomatic schizophrenia. 
The regular official channels and their personnel were at first pre- 
served almost unchanged; but there existed also a multiplicity of 
allied agencies outside the control of the foreign minister, and even 
14 Ibid..p. 891. 
15 PIS;.. Chief of Counsel, OP- cit.. p. 411. 
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in addition to these agencies Hitler relied heavily upon personal 
agents and spies.     Business and industrial contacts were utilized by 
Hitlerian diplomacy.    The foreign minister,   the officials and  career 
diplomats were kept because they were felt to be useful, although Hit- 
ler did not trust them.    They often worked in the dark, uncertain of 
what the  official  policy was until Hitler hinself  spoke,  often competing 
with  special agents and  rival organizations for entirely opposite 
policies.     Frequently  several plans were being worked  on simultaneously, 
the adherents  of each  in  ignorance of  t'-e  others.     This state  of af- 
fairs is especially confusing to observers, for the German diplomatic 
records reflect neither the full  intent?ons of the  Nazi leaders nor 
the complete story of German diplomatic activity. 
There were many agencies  outside the Foreign  Office concerned 
with foreign affairs.     To name a  few of  the major  ones,  the Dienststelle 
16 
Ribbentrop was Hitler's private intelligence agency and in many way* 
the real foreign office of the National  Socialist Party.     The Aus- 
senoolitisches Amt.  der HSDAP under Rosenberg never had  very much power. 
The  Au. slandsorganization de-   Aussenministerlum.  or  AO, was under 
17 
Bohle,  who froze out several competing agencies.     It was also a party 
device,  whose function was to organize all German citizens abroad,  to 
cooperate with sympathizers, and to train teachers and leaders for 
propaganda work.    The object wss to hold all Germans together in a 
united front.    Boebbels"     propaganda men also had a great deal of 
16 See Appendix for translation and explanation. 
17 B.CT Yolkadeutafeha Mlttelstelle.  Volksbund  fuer das Deut- 
schtum im Ausland. 
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influence. When Ribbentrop succeeded Neurath as foreign iinister he put 
a stop to the diplomatic encroachments of the AO; but before that time 
Bohle used the Foreign Office, to which he was nominally subservient, as 
a mere stenographic bureau. 
Not even the Nazi Party was dominant in the Foreign Office before 
about 1940. For awhile it was even advantageous to cultivate an impres- 
sion of independence from the party. In time, however, the German embassies 
and legations tended to serve the additional function of local party 
headquarters for expatriates, for citizens residing abroad, and for 
sympathizers. But after about 1936, Hitler proceeded without the advice, 
consent, or even the knowledge of his diplomats. The invasion of Austria 
was made without consulting the foreign minister. 
These various agencies created a great deal of duplication, con- 
fusion, and inefficiency. No policy was official until Hitler spoke, 
either directly etc cathedra or through his cardinal lieutenant, von 
Ribbentrop. 
But to point cut the weaknesses of the Nazi diplomatic establish- 
ments is not to say that a great deal of highly detailed planning did not 
take place at the top level of the Nazi leadership. Hitler—and the geopoli- 
ticians-realized that certain "control regions" were strategically vital 
to the domination of East Central Europe. But the methods by which these 
regions were to be seized upon were extremely flexible and improvised, 
even at times haphazard. One of these control regions was western Czecho- 
slovakia, whose military value even Bismarck had recognized and commented 
upon. Another was Austria who commanded the Danube and some important 
railway connections. The Polish corridor has been mentioned. Czecho- 
slovakia was also dangerous as a«ajor industrial competitor. Austria, 
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Poland, and  Czechoslovakia were Germany's immediate neighbors to the east, 
and "most of the postwar agitation was therefore concentrated on the 
'bleeding frontiers' of these three neighbors. "-1-8    These states were also 
the ones with the largest number of  "racial Germans" living within their 
borders, although scattered German language groups could almost be said 
to be the common denominator of the whole East European area. 
'nlhile the Nazi long-range plan was to organize Eastern Europe into 
a  "colonial area," the immediate, short-range objectives were to extend 
Germany's borders and thus her power and influence    and to prepare economi- 
cally for the eventuality of war.    The acquisition of Austria, for instance, 
was a patriotic and emotional goal because of its pure German character; 
but at the same time such a move would virtually surround Czechoslovakia 
and outflank her mountain defenses. 
As to the matter of economic preparation of war,  it was essential 
that Germany obtain some very essential commodities for which she was 
currently dependent upon world trade.    Vegetable oils, wheat, cotton, fats, 
coffee and raw meats were needed, as well as industrial raw materials, 
both to rebuild Germanyir strength and to stockpile in case of war.    For 
these things Germany turned to Central Europe, which was to be for Germany 
roughly what the West once was to the eastern United States.     The economic 
offensive was at first under the direction of a financial genius named 
Dr.Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, from whose plans there was little 
deviation, even after his fall from power. 
Of all the German short-range objectives, one of the most obvious 
was to break up the Paris-Prague-Moscow alliance and the Ententes, to 
18 Hanc,   OP. cit.. p. 165. 
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eliminate French influence in Eastern Europe, and to find allies to 
support her in her opposition to the French diplomatic system. Italy 
and England seemed at first to be the most likely allies. Although con- 
first 
fident after his/cautious moves that the West would not interfere in the 
earlier stages of his plans, Hitler had realized that his campaign to 
make the world safe for racial Germans would involve probable war; there- 
fore, in addition to his preparatory diplomatic and economic moves, he 
made rather detailed military plans looking towards the gaining of his 
immediate objectives. An example of these plans is the Blomberg Directive 
of 1937, which states that "to parry the imminent attack of a superior 
enemy coalition, the war in the East may begin with a German surprise 
19 
operation against Czechoslovakia."   The excuse for such an attack must 
be created beforehand by certain political preparation, which the Directive 
discusses in detail. 
The Hossbach Minutes of a top-level military conference which 
took place on November 5, 1937, is the most detailed of these military 
blueprints. It really amounted to a careful analysis of foreign policy by 
Hitler himself, and as such it is perhaps the single most valuable document 
for an insight into the actual state of German planning upon the Lebensraum 
question immediately before the war. The select group to which the speech 
was made consisted of Field Marshall Von Blomberg, the Minister of war; 
Baron von Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the Army; Admiral Raeder, 
Commander in Chief of the Navy; GBring, the Commander in Chief of the 
Luftwaffe; Baron von Neurath the Foreign Minister; and Colonel Hossbaoh, 
who took the minutes of the meeting. 
19 Peter De Mendelssohn, Design for Aggression ( New York & London: 
Harper and Brothers, 1954-), p. 8. 
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Hitler began by stating that the aim of  German foreign policy 
was  "to make secure and to preserve the racial community ^Volksmasse/ 
20 
and  to enlarge it.■    Therefore,   the question to be settled was  one  of 
space.    The rare,   tight  German racial core had a  right to greater 
Lebensraum.  and  if  it was not secured the inevitable result would be  the 
decline  of Deutschtum.     The whole future  of Germany depended upon ex- 
pansion and Hitler  intended  that the   problem should be solved  in the 
space  of  one to three generations. 
The question of  Autarky versus a world economy was then inves- 
tigated.     Autarky would   involve the strictest of  controls and the 
closest of planning,  but would never worl   due to the  industrial needs 
for raw materials and to the fact that even  in the best of times  Ger- 
many was unable to feed herself.    Conversely, a world economy could 
not be depended on because of the disturbing effects of rearmament and 
of Bolshevism upon economic stability,  and because England  dominated 
the sea lanes.     The  only remedy in an age of economic  empires was the 
creation of a Lebensraum.    If food could be secured in EastemEurope 
instead  of faraway colonies,  Germany would have a  stop-gap to preserve 
her for another two or three generations. 
The main question was where the greatest gain could be made at 
the lowest cost.    Britain and France were "hate inspired antagonists" 
who would on no account permit German expansion overseas.    England was 
more reasonable than France, but would encounter dominion opposition. 
 P?T Gflrmanv    AuswHrtiges Amt.,  Documents  on German Foreign Policy, 
^^jO^Germany, Auswar^gM^^  ^f*g*ft gkgSg Office, 1949), p. 29, 
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Germany might regain her colonies later when her strength relative to 
England's was more favorable. 
The German problems could be solved only by force and with risk; 
but when and how? There were three cases to be dealt with. The 
military, for one, was almost ready for action. Delay might result 
in obsolescence, in loss of monopoly on valuable secret weapons, inthe 
ageing of the movement and its leaders, and in a decrease in relative 
strength. The current draft age had been picked clean. Foreign ex- 
change might become harder to import. The world was preparing for 
defense; therefore, Germany must take the offensive. Conditions were 
doubtful after 194-3-45. In the second place, Germany must be prepared 
to move immediately against Czechoslovakia in case internal strife 
should render France temporarily impotent. Or, in the third eventuality, 
France might well become occupied b; another war. To improve her 
politico-military position, .Germany must remove the danger of a flank 
attack from Austria or Czechoslovakia. The neutrality of Poland could 
then be assumed, but only so long as Germany remained strong. 
Assuming that all wit well, Hitler went on to surmise the 
probable attitudes of the Allies by 1943-45. Britain and France had 
probably already written off Czechoslovakia, for England feared war and 
imperial complications and France would hardly attack without England. 
If France did attack, she could not pass through the Lowlands without 
British acquiescence, and Germany had strong western defenses. 
Czechoslovakia and Austria were becoming stronger. If the Reich 
could conquer them she would win a net gain in -.«• food supply, obtain 
more easily defensible frontiers, and be able to release a possible 
twelve divisions for military service elsewhere. If the Spanish war 
were kept going and the tension kept up, Germany might take Czechoslovakia 
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with speed.    Care must be taken, however, not to put England and 
France  into position as  enemies. 
The unfolding of  the whole Lebensraum plan must be seen 
against this revelation of Hitler's motives.    Hitler,  as has been 
seen, beo;an his drive for expansion by attacking the point of least 
legal resistance within Germany proper, by rearmament in opposition 
to the Versailles Diktat.    His first move outside Germany met with a 
rebuff. 
In 1934.,   Italy was the prime influence in Austria.    Even though 
Germany was at that tire militarily weak,  the bulk of her propaganda and 
agitation was directed towards her sister nation, who was in a state 
of domestic confusion verging on civil war.    The failure of the Nazi 
coup of July 25 by Italy's action in sending bar troops to the Brenner 
Pass has been mentioned above, but the irresolution with which France 
met this    somewhat clumsy challenge was lost neither upon Hitler nor 
Mussolini.    French gestures towards Eastern Europe found only Russia 
and Czechoslovakia interested  in stronger defensive alliance, while 
France's relations with Foland grew more strained  through the letter's 
absolute refusal to accomodate Russian troops. 
After 1934,  Italy was preoccupied with her ambitious empire- 
building.    She did not oppose,  in July, 1936, a vague German-Austria n 
agreement in which Austria declared herself to be ••culturally'' German. 
In the space of three years, from 1934 to 1937, a diplomatic 
revolution of major proportion occurred.    Germany, the defeated and 
cowed underdog,  became the most powerful nation on the  European continent, 
while mighty France became virtually powerless. 
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All this was more than just the product of Mach^vellian man- 
euverings of the Germans and Italians and the fumbling of the 
French and British diplomats. All this had been in the air for 
almost a decade, portended by the apparently decreasing Western 
influence on central-eastern European life and attitudes, the 
change in trend went., back to almost a decade before the Dip- 
lomatic Revolution. 
The year 1934- was in many ways the watershed of the interwar period. 
German initiative and Western apathy grew side by side. 
In 1935, the Nazis received encouragement from the fact that the 
3aar voted 90$ in favor of returning to Germany. Also -luring this year 
Germany reintroduced conscription, receiving for this formal repudiation 
of Versailles merely an innocuous rebuke from the League. Great 
Britain recognized this breach of international law by negotiating a 
naval agreement with the offender. This repudiation of a treaty was 
very striking, for heretofore treaties had beenchanged only by negot- 
iation, by tacit understating, or by silent and unobtrusive evasion. 
Another staggering blow to the League and to the Versailles Settlement 
came when Italy embarked upon her Ethiopian venture. Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, and Albania did not participate in the sanctions imposed by the 
League. The allies, unwilling to go to war to upholc their system, 
withdrew the sanctions in July, 1936. The French-inspired Hoare-Laval 
treaty of 1935 blocked the terms of Italy's readmission to grace. Allied 
weakness was once again demonstrated, for the British public was as 
indignant over this act of appeasement as France had been over the Eng- 
lish naval agreement with Germany. 
I 
21 Lukacs, op. cit.. p. 36. 
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The end of the whole French alliance system was at hand, for 
the Reich had conceived a counter-stroke to the promulgation of the 
Franco-Russian treaty.    Germany considered this military alliance 
against her contrary to the spirit of Locarnoj therefore, the earlier 
treaties,  which had re-guaranteed the demilitarization of the Rhineland 
were null and void.     On March 7,  1936,  Germany marched  troops  into the 
Rhineland area,  at the  same time  offering to accept a  new demilitarized 
zone on both sides of the Rhine,  instead of on the German alone;  or a 
new Locarno omitting the Rhineland,  complete with nonaggression pacts 
in the East, based on the Polish treaty, and a return to the League. 
France took alarm,  but although she had plenty of time  to take counter- 
measures she did nothing but man the Maginot Line.    The Spanish 
question seemed at the time to be the more serious natter.    Nothing 
came of the German offer to negotiate.    Hitler refused to sign a pact 
with Russia and France refused any settlement which did not guarantee 
the East as well as the West.    The German move met with complete suc- 
cess.    Locarno was dead in its old form.    On Ootober H, 1936, Bel- 
gium declared her complete neutrality and the first crack appeared in 
the French alliance system.    England declared that she would aid France 
or Belgium if either was   the victim    of unprovoked attack.    France 
returned the courtesy to England and Belgium, but the declarations 
were obvious?? a poor substitute even for Locarno. 
Hitler's success was the result of a bluff, a calculated 
risk.    The Rhineland was remilitarized again«t the advice of the Ger- 
man generals, and  its success was also a victory for Hitler over the 
army.    Only the month before had he conducted a shakeup and as- 
sumed personal command.    The remilitarization had taken place when 
the army was still on a peace basis.    No mobilization was ordered, 
and the commanders were told to turn back if opposition were encountered. 
In  order  to meet expected hostile reaction,  Hitler declared  that he had 
no further territorial clai-is to Take in Europe.    But no steps were 
taken.     Hitler was free  to fortify his new position by constructing 
the Siegfried Line. 
This development altered  fundamentally the Eastern balance of 
power.     Heretofore  the Little and  Balkan  Ententes  had  calcu- 
lated  t^at if the  Reichswehr struck to the southeast,   its right 
flank would  be exposed to a French counterattack across the 
Rhine and  southern Germany.    Now, however, the German armies 22 
could operate with impunity behind the protecting Siegfried Line. 
After this success,   European war,  if not inevitable,  was most 
probable.     "The decisive capitulation, dividing the period 1933-39, 
was agreed to not at Munich in 1938, but at London and Paris in March 
23 
of 1936."        After that,  the European status quo disintegrated steadily. 
The refusal of France and England to take up the gauntlet left French 
prestige at a low ebb in Eastern Europe.    The Poles had offered mili- 
tary assistance, but the offer was not accepted by France,  thus 
throwing Poland permanently back to her policy of balancing both ends 
against the middle.    Italy also was lost after the weak attempt at 
cooperation which characterized the Stress  frort.    France was unwilling 
to use force; yet +,he remilitarization of the Rhineland was the end 
of France's carefully planned  Eastern European policy.    The only basis 
22 Stavrianos,  L.S., Th* Balkans since U52    (New Yorl .: Rinehart 
and Co.,  1958). p. 7a. 
23 Aron, OP.  cit.. p. 35. 
Ill 
56. 
for which had been France's temporary military superiority and her 
indirect acce-s to her proteges through the Rhineland.     The French 
Foreign Minister,  Pierre-Etienne Flandin, said at the time that 
the French alliance with the Little Entente is now valueless.    In 
the future France could not hope to give effective assistance to 
Poland,  Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Rumania, in the event of 
German aggression...In my opinion,   the last chance  of saving 
central and eastern Europe from German domination has been 
thrown away.  * 
March 7,  1936, marked the sec nd phase of the diplomatic 
revolution.    France could count now upon neither England nor Italy 
for support.    The League was plainly of limited effectiveness.    Mus- 
solini was alienated from  Britain and  had agreed  to pay a visit to 
the Reich.    The danger of conflict in the Mediterranean made England 
even less willing  to become  involved  in a war on the continent.     Italy 
was  in  the flush of her Abyssinian  triumph,  and  the  German-Austrian 
rapprochement of July, 193&, had removed a major source of German- 
Italian contention.    Italy was also committed to Franco's position 
in the Spanish Civil war and the cooperation begun upon this matter 
was finally to mature in the Rome-Berlin Axis.    Italy's position in 
the Mediterranean and Germany's in Eastern Europe were formally recog- 
nized. 
France was  seething with domestic unrest.     The final blow came 
in October when Belgium declared her absolute neutrality and denounced 
her French alliance of 1921.    Eastern Europe took a long,  critical 
look at the value of its pacts with France.    The fact the French had 
refused to push the prosecution of the assassination of Alexander of 
24 Stavrianos,  op. cit.. p.  741. 
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Yugoslavia at Marseilles in 1934, had been a blow to Eastern European 
confidence.    Yugoslavia and Rumania had been hurt economically by 
the League sanctions against Italy.    The weakness of the West was now 
exposed, and the reaction of the nations of Eastern Europe was to 
make sure that their alliances with the larger powers did not drag 
them into war.    There was*movement to limit their obligations to 
strict League requirements and purely local -natters.     Titulescu,  the 
Rumanian francophile,  was dismissed.     There was a new policy of con- 
ciliation with Germany and  Italy. 
The Bratislava Conference of May, 1936, resulted in making 
the Little Entente more elastic. The members might make their own 
policy decisions independent of the others. Yugoslavia hastened to 
make a rapprochement with Italy, whom she feared, and abandoned her 
traditionally pro-French policy. At the Belgrade Conference of the 
Little Entente in April, 1937, Czechoslovakia felt herself to be in 
grave danger; yet her proposal for full military assistance in case 
of aggression was rejected.    Germany began making overtures to Rumania. 
As to the Balkan Entente,   "only six days after the Rhineland 
occupation,   the Greek Premier Demertzis denied the existence of Greek 
commitments  to the Balkan Entente in regard  to Central Europe;   in 
other words,   the Balkan Entente became a frail instrument,  replete with 
25 
reservations,  a mere eighteen months after  its  inauguration."    Central 
Europe was once more an amorphous grouping of tiny states.    The    Leb- 
25 Lukacs, p. 72. 
gnsraum came to be a distinct practical possibility, the more so now 
that Nazi Germany, having secured her western frontier, could now turn 
her attention once more to the East. 
PART II I 
THE APFROACH OF 'J A R : T H E 
CONCEPT GERMINATES 
CHAPTER I 
THE SCHACHT SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC  OFFENSIVE 
Prom the very initiation of Nazi rule, steps were taken to force 
the Lebengraum area to supply Germany with needed raw materials and to 
contribute otherwise to the strengthening of the Fatherland.    The build- 
ing of a Nazi war economy and of the economic and financial bases of 
Hitler's power was the work largely of one man, Hjalmar Schacht.    When 
he came to trial at Nuremberg following the war,   it was charged that 
Nhe planned and prepared for wars of aggression and wars  in violation 
of international treaties, agreements anc assurances,  and  that he 
knowingly and wilfully participated in the Nazi coi.jnon p.an or con- 
spiracy to plan, prepare,  initiate, and wage such wars...that he was 
the chief architect of the financial ;lans...which made possible... 
rearmament; that he played a dominant role in the economic planning of, 
and preparation for, wars of aggression...."     Schacht did indeed help 
Hitler to power,   but back of this help was a strong desire to see his 
country rearmed and able to defend itself once more.     It was largely 
through his efforts that "the German capital market was completely 
harnessed to the expanding needs of the Nazi war machine."*   His "new 
plan" kept this machine supplied with raw materials. 
Schacht was made head of the Reichsbank in March, 19331 Mini- 
ster of Economy in August, 1934.} and Secret Plenipotentiary for the War 
Economy in May, 1935.    In November, 1937, Schacht resigned as Minister 
" Conspiracy and Aggression, op. cit.. p. 737.,Voi. Z. 
2 Ibid., p. 1UU. 
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and as Plenipotentiary due to an argument with GBering over their 
respective methods of procedure.    He was appointed Minister without 
portfolio.     In January, 1939, he was dismissed as President of the 
Reichsbank partly due to conflicts with Hitler's methods and rearma- 
ment policies, partly because he believed that a severe inflationary 
crisis was coming and he desired to be out of office.    Schacht began to 
lose influence as early as April, 1936, when G«ering was made Coordi- 
nator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange.    Fearing inflation, he 
found himself too conservative to support the drastic rearmament poli- 
cies which the government advocated.    He was not included   in the group 
of political policy makers of the Naxi regime, and was ultimately de- 
clared innocent by the War Grimes Trials. 
Before the war was over, Schacht had been arrested and placed 
in a concentration camp.    Although in effeot he was one of the main 
creators of the Nazi system, placing at its disposal enormous resources, 
he was critical of the regime.    One might go so far as to say that the 
"new plan'"*was reluctantly introduced by Schacht (who did not perceive 
its full possibilities and perhaps would not have welcomed them so far 
as the program facilitated aggressive war)....1*^ One of the few ever 
to speak openly in opposition to Hitler, he opposed the U3e of force 
in Kitteleuropa. favoring instead the creation of a Central African 
colony, obtained from the Western Powers in exchange for a pledge to 
keep the European status quo. 
Though Schacht was practically the only one who tried to curb 
Hitler,  it is true aiso that "in foreign policy Schacht differed from 
■> Dr. Frank K. Graham and Lt. Col. J. J. Scanlon,  Economic Preparation 
and Conduct of War under the Nasi Regime (Pamphlet of the Historical 
Division of the War Department Special Staff, 1946), p. 9. 
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Hitler in method, not in aim."4   He favored territorial expansion, but 
peacefully,  if possible.    Schacht«s methods would have won Germany- 
secure European hegemony if they had been followed exclusively and 
without resorting to force.    The ultimate praise of the "new plan" is 
the fact that "Schachtism" is today commonplace. 
Wars for balance of power have been comr.on enough in Europe. 
Perhaps the fact that a man like Schacht was pushed aside and a fanatic 
like Hitler was able to adopt a policy of force, would go a long way 
to help explain the total and vicious nature of World War II. 
Schacht always omitted feeling anc emotion from his political cal- 
culations;  hence his failure.    Dr. Schacht is a very clever ran 
and, in his way, a civilized man, faithful to his banker's code 
of ethics, even a good member of the Confessional Church.    let he 
was helpless against Hitler.    It was the story of Tallyrand and 
Napoleon all over again: the clever, sensible man of ideas could 
achieve nothing against the genius of action.    Hitler, like Napoleon, 
understood that politics are a matter of power and emotion, not of 
calculation....Hitler was "without a home, without a family, without 
friends, without women, without a church, without tradition."    For 
this very reason, he incorporated Germany; he was a genius—a genius 
of will, of resourcefulness, of organization.    He was a titanic 
demon.    Against such, cleverness is not enough.5 
The essence of the "new plan" was this: Foreign funds inside 
Germany were to be blocked.    The use of foreign exchange was regulated 
so that German spending on non-essentials was kept to a minimum.    The 
Lebensraum area found  itself exporting more and more vital products 
into Germany and unable to secure payment for them except by buying 
inferior or unneeded German manufactured goods.    Germany was therefore 
able to supply itself with the raw materials of Central Europe and still 
conserve its small supply of foreign exchange for use on the world market. 
? A. J.  P. Taylor,  From Napoleon to Stalin  (London :  Kamis Hamilton, 
1950), p. 155. 
5 Ibid., p. 156. 
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Under Fascism, foreign trade is controlled almost entirely by 
the government.    Therefore,  since foreign trade is the point of greatest 
contact between countries, the fascist government is in control of a 
very sensitive instrument of subversion.    "The control of foreign 
trade, pri:^irily through manipulation of foreign exchange, was inaugu- 
rated in Germany several years before Hitler came to power and may, to 
a certain degree,  be viewed as the culmination of an economic policy 
that was coterminous with the development of the German Qnpire itself."" 
nationalism, protectionism, and the desire for autarky seem to be mu- 
tually sustaining goals. 
The controls imposeu upon Nazi economic policy were largely a 
refinement of the old controls.    The German economy was hurt severely 
by World War I, sustained by loans until the Depression, and wrecked 
again.    In 1931 it was felt to be necessary to place controls on for- 
eign exchange  in ordor to halt the flight of capital from the country. 
All exchange had to be made at official rates through the Reichsbunk. 
In thle way the German nark was held up ar iflcially whil<   th<   cur- 
rencies of the oiVi r i i   n .   lon-atrlc] en countries were decreasing in 
value.    This mone tary condition cut down the German market.    In 1932 
exchange-clearing agreements were made with various countries.    Direct 
barter was resorted to, for since the mark was depreciating in relation 
to other currencies, foreign exchange became more and more difficult 
to acquire. 
After the Nazis obtained power, they increased the existing 
trade controls until they acquired almost complete domination.   The 
extreme nationalism and antisemitism of the new regime eusec. the 
flight of still more capital, foreign an.   Jewish.    In September, 1934., 
0 U. S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, gagcism in 
Action (Washington  U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1947}, p. 75. 
Schacht initiated his "new plan."    When the export-producing industries 
turned to the manufacture of arms, and with the subsequent rise in prices 
and decrease in available trading goods, it became almost impossible 
to obtain foreign goods except by using the meager supply of foreign 
exchange.    Schacht turned a necessity into a virtue.    His "new plan" 
created of this very shortage an offensive and defensive weapon.    Ex- 
ports were tightly controlled, as was the release of foreign exchange, 
and imports were forbidden except by permit.    Price and production 
controls were instituted for the twin purpose of obtaining from German 
industry maximum military strength and maximum trade advantage. 
Germany, as Europe's largest consumer, filled the breach created 
in Central European trade by the Depression.    Germany would naturally 
have been an attractive market for the countries to the south and east 
of her, but she deliberately attracted still more of their products by 
offering much higher prices than the West, operating as  it did under 
the usual profit-making incentives, would have been able to meet. 
Germany sought not the cheapest market but the one which covld supply 
the most.    Complete control of Foreign exchange had totally divorced 
the Nazi price system from the world price level.    Bartering and clear- 
ing agreements were made whereby raw materials and foodstuffs were ex- 
changed for non-essential goods, spare parts, or merely promises, for 
an international trade agreement is unenforceable outside the goodwill 
of the state itself.    Often, entire crops were purchased ahead of time 
in exchange for unnamed German goods.    Although these agreements 
amounted to German dumping, which damaged the rising Central European 
industries,  small states have small bargaining power, and since they 
could get needed articles in the Reich at good prices which were settled 
beforehand, they were inclined to accept what Germany offered them. 
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The agricultural crisis had produced a desperate need for markets. 
Good German offers were taken eagerly without much thought as to how 
these purchases were to be paid for.    By simply regulating the exchange 
rates of the mark, Germany could buy more for less.    Even Sweden and 
Switzerland were caught in this web. 
When international purchases are made, the importer deposits 
payment in his own currency with his country's clearing establishment, 
which credits that amount to the agency of the exporting country.    If 
the balance of trade is unequal, the exporting country will builc up a 
balance against the importer which can be redressed only through trade. 
Germany's creditors were paid in blocked marks, good only to purchase 
German export goods; and aue to production control these gooes were of 
a limited and often inferior quality.    In order to secure payment for 
their exports, the Central European countries found themselves com- 
pelled to purchase more and more German goods. 
Since Central Europe was a poor region, the exporters were 
unable to wait for payment.    There was also the fear that to wait would 
be to risk a devaluation in the exchange rate.    They borrowed from the 
banks or the governments    and received money which represented the 
savings or the taxes of the peasantry.    The higher prices offered by 
Germany raised the cost of Central European goods and made them more 
difficult to sell elsewhere.    The exporters, therefore, put great 
pressure on the banks to continue their loans, and the banks found 
themselves doing everything to encourage trade with Germany in hopes 
of eventual payment.    Thus the banks constitute a pressure group upon 
the economic policies of their governments.    Germany's creditors deman- 
ded the admission of German imports.    By making .provisional payment 
for its purchases, the "new plan""transferred from the Germans to the 
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exporting countries any embarrassment that the Germans might otherwise 
have felt at their inability to make final settlement on the excess of 
their imports over the German counter-claims against foreign countries."7 
The countries of East Central Europe did not seem to know how 
completely German business was a tool of the Reich. 
But what the Balkan, Latin American and other smaller countries did 
not realize was that the Nazi businessmen were, to all intents and 
purposes, agents of the Reich.    Although technically their arrange- 
ments were  commercial, they amounted,  on the German sido,  to  state- 
trading.    In the long run, as the merchants and govern-.-.ents of Ru- 
mania  and other smaller countri s who unwittingly fell  into the 
economic trap of Nazi Germany found out,   individual enterprise 
cannot stand up against the power of a sovereign state that  is 
determined upon economic exploitation." 
German economic and technical missions were often a cover for political 
and military spying and for propaganda work.    By more or less imprison — 
ing the Central European trade, Germany acquired a valuable weapon, 
for she could always threaten to stop buying;  and whereas her trade 
with the area represented a small part  of ', er total commerce,  the  blow 
to the Central  European countries would  have  been unbearable.    Although 
Germany was their debtor, she could dictate exchange rates favorable to 
herself. 
The results were felt by all of Europe.    "The expanding and au- 
tarchic character of the German total economy not only disturbed com- 
petitive cost economy, ruptured the natural price situation, and strength- 
ened latent tendencies towards economic nationalism, but it further ag- 
gravated the unbalanced social and  economic position of Europe and the 
world generally."9    Schacht's successor Dr. Funk added another refine- 
7 Antonin Basch, Th» New Economic Warfare (New Yorh : Columbia Univer- 
sity Press, 1941)» P* 31- 
8 U. S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, o^^it., p.80. 
Basch, ;it..   p«   21. 
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ment to the "new plan".    Germany also tede large bulk purchases from 
Central Europe and resold the surplus on the open market for gold. 
The reselling further increased the difference between German prices 
and the low world markets.    The golc thus obtained brought the for- 
eign exchange needed for the financing of rear, ament; ana the result 
was that while the prices of non-military nanufactures were high, the 
cost of the arms establishments was kept down.    One of the best ways 
for the Central European countries to liquidate their trade balances 
was therefore to purchase German arms.    They  found themselves  financing 
German rearmament in no small way.    "Brazilian caoutchouc, African 
copper, North-American cotton, Australian wool, and Canadian nickel, 
as Voll as Swedish steel, which Germany had for years imported for its 
armaments and for which it had to pay almost exclusively with foreign 
exchange bills, were paid for with the means of the poorest nations in 
Europe, namely of the states in the Danube Basin and the Balkans.-10 
In case of war they would find themselves dependent upon Germany for 
further supplies of arms, for spare parts, and for IJazi instructors. 
But the only alternative to accepting such unwanted goods was being 
Germany's banker. 
Germany's creditors became more and more impoverished;  however, 
their peasantry could see in Germany only a purchaser of their produce. 
As an exploiter of dependence, Germany was even popular.    As the trade 
structure of Eastern Europe changed, so did the structure of production. 
More and more acreage was devoted to those things which Germany needed, 
such as fodder plants or the soya bean, which was of little or no good 
on the world market.     -Not less than 60,000 hectares of land in Roumania, 
PI Dr. Gerhard Schacher, g»r™.nv Pushes South-Bast (Iondo: i Hurst and 
Blackett, Ltd., 1938),  p. 156. 
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and much more than 30,000 hectares in Bulgaria, were given over to 
German concerns especially, for example, the I. G. Far ben-Industries, 
for the cultivation of soya beans."11    More and better deliveries at 
better prices were demanded, and the farmers responded to the demand. 
Thus the dependence of the area upon the German economy was increased. 
"From 1933 to 1936,  Germany more than doubled her imports from Greece, 
Turkey,  Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; the value of her 
exports to these countries rose from 155 to 175 million Reichciaarks."12 
And as German trade  increase*7, tie  influence of the 'r^rt decreased. 
Dr. Funk called for still more German control of Central Euro- 
pean property, and heavy pressure was exerted to get interest in the 
major industries. 
Germany continued to strengthen her position and brought still 
greater pressure to bear.    Once a sufficient degree of control was 
achieved,   Germany began to take a hand even in internal policies, 
giving preference to exporters and ii porters sympathetic with the 
Nazi regime.    The systematic application of these methods of 
foreign trade brought impressive results.    From 1935 to 1937 
Germany's exports to the countries of central anc. south-eastern 
Europe  increased by 62$,  while her total exports  increased  by only 
38%.    German imports from these countries increased by 51$ while 
total German imports increased by only 30$.    In general, the 
smaller the country dealing independently with Germany, the less 
complete was its  control over foreign trade;  furthermore,  the more 
conflicting the interests among various groups of producers and 
exporters,  the more successfully could Germany gain complete 
influence.1^ 
When one country began trading extensively with Germany, her 
competitors woulc be compelled in self-interest to seek German markets 
also.    The German economic policy, of course, did not come under the 
g Ibid.. ~157. 
12 Lukacs, OP. cit.. 93. 
13 Basch,  OP.   cit.. p. 37. 
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League's definition of aggression. Yet it was one of the gravest mis- 
takes of the West to permit such a condition to develop. Germany had 
a fair total war economy, while the West neither stopped her nor-^ 
prepared for its own defense. If Germany had changed to a peace econ- 
omy at that time, the entire economy of Eastern Europe would have been 
upset. 
With such a large extent of economic control,  one is sur- 
prised to find that Nazi Germany did not exploit her system with the 
cold determination which might be expected. 
Germany did not exploit her strangle hold on the Balkan economy. 
She charged competitive prices and did not restrict the types of 
goods she sold....In fact Germany's treatment of her Balkan cus- 
tomers was more  generous than was necessary in the  given circum- 
stances.     This   suggests that considerations other than purely 
economic ones were involved.    Germany was apparently seeking to 
develop in the Balkans a source of vegetable and mineral raw 
materials that was secure from blockade.    Whatever the reasons, 
the fact remains that Germany already  dominated the Balkan 
countries  economically before she occupied  them militarily 
during World War II. ^ 
This  state  of "generosity" might also point to the fact that 
the German controls  were less effective than they might have been   The 
advantages Gen.any derived were to a large extent short-term only, 
directed towards the immediate creation of strong armament. 
In fine it may be said that  in the field of economic foreign 
policy as elsewhere the Nazis were very inept in their conscious 
preparation for war.    They made some effort to tie the foreign 
suppliers within their military orbit to long-term contracts with 
Germany, but they showed no consistent concern for the foreign 
investments or disenvestments appropriate to warand,   in general, 
were blind to their opportunities in the field. 
One reason for this state of affairs was the fact that the 
usual bureaucratic multiplicity and confusion obtained. 
14 Stavrianos,   OP.  cit..  p. 600. 
15    Graham and Scanlon, OP. cit..  p. 33. 
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fSi7 "t* determined ^ technical everts in the Foreign Office 
(Rltter haa almost complete autonomy)  in co-operation with their 
counter-parts in the Ministry of Economics.    These experts were 
apparently never instructed to proceed in other than the ways of 
presumptive peace and do not in fact appear to have shaped the 
German economic foreign policy to the requirements of prospective 
war.    It so happens that a good deal of what they did served the 
Nazi war preparation (such as, for instance, the content of German 
trade relations in the European zone) but this was the result of 
accident and of opportunistic action rather than of conscious 
preparing for war.    It can at any rate be said that if the trade 
negotiators were deliberately preparing for war, their practice   , 
while issuing to the advantage of Germany in some cases, was full 
of errors of omission and commission.*° 
But be that as it may, while the Schacht system would certainly have 
been more effective if used to a greater extent for political ends 
rather than for the traditionally economic, the Nazi economic domina- 
tion of the Lebensraum area was real.    After 1935 direct barter was 
replaced by the ASK I procedure  (Auslaender Sonderkonten fuer  Inlands- 
zahlungen).    Every single  foreign trade transaction was negotiate.?  or 
approved  by trade officials.    The  creditor accepted ASKI marks good 
only to finance German exports to the country of the creditor's origin, 
sometimes good only to that particular creditor.    The accounts of each 
country could be kept separate, the exchange value  of the ASKI marks 
credited to one country sometimes being nowhere in relation to that of 
another's marks.    The exchange value might vary from creditor to credi- 
tor within one country.    3y the end of 1935, Germany had negotiated 
such clearing agreements with every European country except Albania, 
England, and Soviet Russia. 
German hegemony increased greatly after she took control of 
Austria and Czechoslovakia.    Both were important in industry and bank- 
ing, an importance which accrued to Germany along with their markets. 
Germany then controlled more that 50* of the Danubian trade and this 
i0 U. S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, opT ci.t.,  p. 83. 
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percentage grew steadily.17    it was only then, when she was so strong 
that no one could chall3nge her, that Germany made any definite moves 
to place the Central European nations in a semicolonial status.    The 
economic treaty with Rumania of March, 1939, is a good example of this 
new boldness.    "The demands which Germany now formulated with more 
and more insistence in the countries to her south-east amounted to 
something not far from economic annexation to the Reich—long-term 
trade agreements involving the monopoly of the small countries1 foreign 
trade together with the virtual linking of their currencies with that 
of Germany.wl8    This new trend was the culmination of Dr. Schaclt's 
method under the direction of his more aggressive successor, Dr. Funk. 
Eastern Europe represented under German hegemony a single 
economic unit, a Groasraumwirtschaft relatively free from the world 
market.    The next step to the creation of such a large unit would have 
been to use it as a powerful bargainer to repeat the process, probably 
in South America.    The Nazis had perfected a strong new weapon—eco- 
nomic warfare.    And  all was to the ultimate glory of the Fatherland, 
the summum bonum of the Nazi movement.    As Dr. Funk said, 
the peacetime economy which I have prepared in a comprehensive plan 
must guarantee to the Greater German Reich a maximum of economic 
security and to the German people maximum consumption f irected 
toward raising tho national prosperity.    The European economy must 
be directed toward this end. " 
The West neither recognized the situation fully, let it be 
repeated, nor did they move to block German economic aggression.    It 
is true that such a strict economic regime would be possible in peace- 
time only to a totalitarian government, but the West could at least 
18 Wiskemann, OP. cit.. p. 41. 17 Basch, OP. cit.. p. 40. 
l9 Joseph C. Harsch, Pattern of conquest (Garden Cit;, New York. 
Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941)> P« 71. 
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have defended its political position in Eastern Europe by means of 
increased purchases.    Even moves towards economic cooperation made by 
the Little Entente,   such as the Czechoslovak idea for the collective 
marketing of cereals, ran headlong into Western economic natiomlism. 
But the fact that such a situation was allowed to develop at all was a 
sign of Western diplomatic failure.    As Henry L. Roberts said, 
Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 1933 was 
not a primary factor in the breakup of this region.    While the 
reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more 
than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, 
its importance may be questioned.    This penetration did not really 
impair the political independence of these states until after the 
diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the 
German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the 
area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance 
of power.20 
7~ KLack,   OP.   cit..   p.  191« 
CHAPTER II 
TEE HI :  '] 
The success of Hitler's first bluffs, rearmament and the remili- 
tarization of the Rhineland, converted Germany into a well-defended 
bastion faced on the east by the small states of Central Europe and 
on the west by a disunited and confused France and England.    Hitler 
had long since determined upon a policy of aggression.    Now the object 
of German diplomacy was to insinuate Nazi influence  into the affairs 
of neighboring countries with the object of using that  influence to 
the glory of the German nation. 
German diplomacy did not consist merely in politeness to crowned 
heads or prime ministers—although it could rival its opponents 
in this field when necessary—but used  every weapon,  open or 
secret,  fair or foul, that was available.    It was based on careful 
study of the history, economy, politics,  social structure, and 
psychology of  each nation with which it had  to deal,  made possible 
by innumerable contacts of individual Germans with peorle of every 
class and origin in every country.    The "vulgar champagne-seller" 
von Ribbentrop outclassed the elegantly languid gentlemen opposed 
to him from t! e very start.-'- 
The actual extent of Ribbentrop1 s skill might be a moot topic, 
but a careful study of surrounding nations with an eye to politics and 
diplomacy had been one of the main contributions of the geopoliticians. 
Aside from their theories on the heartland and on power geography, much 
true scholarly work on their part had been devoted to the gathering 
and analysis of a wealth  of factual information.    What  Hitler added to 
his geopolitical forebears was the ability to coerce and an understand- 
1  Hugh Seton-Watson,   Eastern Europe between the Wars.  1918-19/U 
(Cambridge university Press, 1946), p. 383. 
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ing of the mob. 
It is a credit to the skill of Hitlerian diplomacy that it achieved 
results that can be called astounding through the judicious inter- 
mingling of force ana threats with cajoling and oronises based on 
a shrewd appraisal of the psychology of the German people no less 
than of others.    Psychological understanding has ever been useful 
in diplomacy,   but the modern art of exploitation of the mass was 
brought by Hitler to a point of perfection that demands no less 
admiration for its having 'oeen diabolical in intent, unprincipled 
in method, and catastrophic in its final outcome.    For good or ill, 
mostly for ill  so far,  it may be said that a new dimension was 
introduced in diplomatic practice.* 
Hitler's long-range  goal was to prepare for war by extending 
the power and resources of Germany beyond the borders of the Reich. 
His methods again were purely opportunistic;   nevertheless, they con- 
formed to certain general methods of agitation and  infiltration which 
might be comprehended under the slogan of "divide and conquer."    Hit- 
lerian diplomacy turned then to the  "soft" central regions to the eart, 
combining with t're  old eastern orientation of German diplomacy a new, 
ruthless,  systematic  technique motivated by an ideology of religious 
intensity and coordinated by a totalitarian dictatorship.    This is 
the difference which transforms the  Lebensraum as conceived by the 
Nazis into something entirely different from its beginnings.    Having 
started as a visionary dream of private persons or groups, not encour- 
aged by the government or supported  by public opinion, Lebensraum 
became the attainable goal of a government ideologically dedicated to 
expansion. 
It took Hitler quite some time to realize how attainable this 
goal was.    To plan and to implement are two entirely different things, 
and difficulties and opposition to his plans seemed   inevitable;  but 
the flabby paralysis with which the West met his first moves was unex- 
^ Hens' Albrecht-Carrie', A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Con- 
gress of Vienna   ('lew Yorl'.-  Harper,  1958),  p.  £76. 
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pected.    Only gradually did Hitler realize his good fortune and increase 
his boldness and audacity.    A committee sent from the United States to 
interrogate the Nazi war crir.ir.als cume to the conclusion that 
whether or not Hitler, fror. the very beginning of his rule, oheriahed 
gra    Lose &c hoses of aggression nay be an open question.    There is 
in Kein Kaiapf no lack of the lust for Lebensraum.    But, on the other 
hand, we have  on our mission encountered no convincing evidenc: 
that, during his first years  in power,  Hitler  expressed even to 
his closest intiiiates any specific plans for large-scale territorial 
plunder.^ 
Once the realization came to Hitler  of the true extent  of the West's 
disinterest—or more properly, of the West's desire to keep out of war 
even at the expense of fostering an alien ideology and of allowing it 
to overwhelm its neighbors—his immediate reaction was one of scorn. 
Weakness to him was despicable, and its very existence was excuse for 
exploitation;   therefore he took increasingly bolder and  more open  steps. 
And as the Nazis grew in power and self-assurance, the Hitlerian method 
was not so much one of bluff but one of tremendous strength ruthlessly 
wielded. 
For these reasons, and due to the quality of his personality, 
Hitler would have been incapable of sitting back and devouring his 
Lebenprauro by Schacht's system of economic enslavement.     In his  need 
for action,  Hitler took the road of force.    He would hack his empire 
out of the substance of Europe. 
Hitlor was obsessed with the idea of Blitzkrieg.    This idea com- 
pletely dominated the German preparation for the  impending conflict. 
The Ftthrer spurned the advice of General Thomas, chief of the eco- 
nomic planning division of the High Command  (OKW), who contended 
that Germany must go in for armament win depth1* which would have 
meant totalitarian preparation,  covering the whole economy,   for a 
war  of attrition against opponents with immense economic resources. 
Hitler clumped,  instead, for armament "in width" which meant a con- 
centration on finished munitions for quick campaigns  of currently 
*  Graham and Scanlon,  op.  cit..  p.  1. 
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limited objectives, to the relative neglect of the new material 
and equipment basis of an enormously greater ultimate program.^ 
Hitler was sure that his Lebensraum was there for the taking. 
His plans were made on what seemed to be a self-evident fact:  that if 
he applied enough pressure he would receive what he desired.     "Only 
very raroly was strategy determined by war-econo: ic ends, and the eco- 
nomic requirements of the strategy that was in fact adopted were not 
clearly foreseen or met in advance of the need."5 
Hitler had little use  for methods running counter to his  own 
ideas.    Just as the Schacht method was rsjecten, the military advice 
of the more cautious older generals was overruled.    In February, 1938, 
Hitler appointed Ribbentrop Foreign Minister and General Keitel head 
of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.    This step meant that he took the 
direction of foreign policy and  of armed forces   into his own hands, 
and purely military considerations would no longer hinder his political 
moves.    The step also removed opposition to his plans as they were 
revealed  in the Hossbach Minutes of November, 1937.    This revelation 
had a terrible effect in that  it had shown the General Staff that  goals 
which they had  regarded as only hypothetical eventualities were real 
and definite,  that the Fflhrer wanted war. 
Once Ribbentrop took over the Foreign Office,  the German diplo- 
matic forces were no longer so splintered. and became a better tool 
for the preparation of Hitler's plans.6    Nevertheless,   it is true also 
that "as Hitler's armies advance, Ribbentrop's diplomats retreated."7 
u ibid., p. u> 5 2aA>> P* u- 
6 Documents.Ser. D., Vol.   II, no. 237. 
7 Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse (Berkelej , University of California 
Press, 1954), p. 111. 
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The stage was set for some explosive action as Hitler sought to clam 
the Lebengrau^, not by bluff, nor subtly by diplomatic pressure nor 
economic penetration,  but openly and by force. 
The Nazi moves in Central Europe, the bids for power and  in- 
fluence which accompanied the "new plan" and preceded actual conquest, 
were marked by their thoroughness.    Roughly coordinated with the eco- 
nomic offensive, the German moves consisted in a combination ofbribery, 
"promises, threats,  internal demoralization,   'peaceful'  penetration, 
and the encouragement of national antagonisms—with a powerful military 
machine on the border to move if 'the strategy of terror'  should fail."8 
The  Nazi moves  were always ultimately backed up by the trump card  of 
force:  "The real trump in Germany's hand was its rearmament and more 
than that  its willingness to go to war."^    The Nazi technique  included 
an effort to undermine the morale and unity of its victim ana to iso- 
late  it  internationally,  utilizing defeatists, agents,   sympathizers, 
and  collaborationist  groups of any sort within the country.    The results 
were  offered to Europe as faltes accomplis.    Any means  to be  had were 
used.     "It is essential to understand that the very principle of Nazism 
is  its radical opportunism."^ 
The Nazi ability to utilize mass psychology and emotional appeal 
was put to good use by means of propaganda.     Greater leeway was demanded 
for German cultural associations abroad,  but most of the material cir- 
culated among them was Nazi-inspired.    German business establishments 
also worked  for the dissemination of propaganda.    By far the most 
"  Joseph Roucek,   Balkan Politics  (California:   Stanford U. Press,  194.8), 
p. 265. 
' Conspiracy and Aggression,  vol.   I,   p. 477. 
10 Erich Fromm,   fcgftM tSM Fre^o" (New Yorl     Rinehart and Co., 1941), 
p. 220. 
profitable subject of this agitation was 
fear of revolution, which was a very real and constant danger owing 
to the corrupt and brutal  social and political systems,  but which 
the rulers of Eastern Europe attributed not to their own faults but 
to the machinations of unknown Muscovite agents and gold, predis- 
posing the Governments to any Great Power which adopted an openly 
hostile attitude to Russia.    Perhaps more than any other single 
factor, this anti-Russian obsession paralyzed the will to defense 
of the Eastern European states.11 
Within the various countries,  Germany made very elaborate use 
of the  "fifth column."    The large German minorities were the most 
obvious objects of Nazi attention, and the easiest to win.    But often 
the interests of the German minority and of other useful groups such as 
the non-German fascists,  ran counter,  and   in such cases  it  became con- 
venient to suppress pan-Germanism for awhile.    Much difference was made 
between minorities  in a target country and those in a state with which 
Germany happened to be cultivating good relations. 
Much of Hitler's  success in dealing with his weaker neighbors was 
due to his insistence on making his own choice of persons with whom 
he could "collaborate."    The collaborative or  "reasonable" elements, 
as the Nazi press referred to them, were recruited principally from 
among the anti-liberals,  outright fascists,  Jew-baiters,  disgruntled 
oppositionists,  long-flattered ambitionists or weaklings.     Equally 
helpful to him was the practice of the Byzantine diplomacy of play- 
ing off his rival victims against each other and thus making himself 
constantly useful in squaring their differences.12 
The Nazi "fifth columnists" also included the radical pacifists who 
preferred a totalitarian empire to a war, the defeatists, and those 
who embraced the fascist ideology, although "obviously th«T« could not 
be many genuine Nazis outside Germany."^ 
Indigenous fascist movements there were, however, sometimes 
11 H.  Seton-Watson,   PD.  cit..P.  £U. 
12 Hanc,  OP. cit.. p. 263. 
13 Aron, OP. cit.. p. U5- 
7*. 
formed in opposition to the ruling government and sometii.es sponsored 
by the government itself as a device for obtaining support. 
It was,  of course, impossible to prevent the existence of National 
Socialist movements by parliamentary or seed-parliamentary methods. 
According to National Peasant sources /Rumania/  , 600 million I*i 
were given to the Iron Guarc by the Germans in 1936;   in the same 
year there were no less than six Nazi "parties" existing in Hungary, 
where they gained  among the agricultural proletariat and among the 
less capable of the university youth.    In Bulgaria, Kuncev's  National 
Socialists,  Tsankov's  group, and another Nazi-type organization, 
"Roona ZaStita,"  carried the Nazi oannerj   in Greece there was the 
Fascist  EEEj   in Poland a segment of the Government bloc played with 
fire for awhile and in 1937 a Fascist-type NARA and a "Union of 
Young Poles" existed, their heyday coinciding with a wave of minor 
anti-semitic demonstrations in Galacia. ^ 
The Arrow-Cross was one of the main fascist groups in Hungary, and in 
Rumania there were the Secret Society of the Archangel I'ichaol ■-•■no the 
All for the Fatherland Front. There were also fascist groups outside 
East Central Europe such as the Franco movement, the Mosley group in 
England, and the Croix de Feu of France. King Carol of Rumania tried 
to fight the Iron Guard by his own fascist-type Front of National Re- 
birth,   but never succeeded   in generating the necessary mass enthusiasm. 
Specifically Fascist movements,   such as the Polish National Radi- 
cals,  the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party and  Romanian  Iron Guard, 
failed in their purposes.    The first two never attained Dower, 
while the third made such a mess of its brief period of government 
that  it discredited  itself in all classes of the nation.1-' 
These fascist organizations were indigenous to their countries, and 
their sources are to be found, not in Nazi subsidization—although this 
was certainly instrumental in aiding and supporting them—but in the 
social, economic, and psychological stresses of postwar Europe.    The 
fact that Nazi Germany aided these organizations surreptitiously created 
a disrupting element within the borders of the target country. 
14 Lukacs.   OP.   cit..  p.  90. 
15 H. Seton-Watson, oo. cit.. P- 257. 
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Hitler's real  human dynamite,  however,  was the Volksdeutsche. the Ger- 
man minorities found scattered all over Central Europe,  in the Saarland, 
Sudetenland, Memelland, Western Poland, and the South Tyrol. 
Race pride, fear of Bolshevism, and antisemitism were again strong 
propaganda points.    Neighboring Germans were enrolled in cultural, 
gymnastic, and  benevolent  societies,  in which a sense of distinct,  self- 
conscious minority status was cultivatud,  taught by agents  of the 
Yolksbund fttr das Deutschtum iro Auslnnde;  the minorities were told 
that they owed allegiance to Hitler as leader of their race,  that they 
were the outposts of world empire, superior to their Slavic fellow- 
citizens, that they must strive for corporate personality.    Cells were 
formed and the National Socialist Party was built up. 
German citizens residing abroad,   the Auslanrisdeutsche.  were 
organized  for purposes of supervision into Gaus  ,  or provinces,  under 
Bohle of the National Socialist Foreign Organization.    All members of 
the Gay. were undur German law.    Unlike the Volksbund. which was tech- 
nically a private organization,  the NSFO was loud in its dissemination 
of Nazi propaganda. 
Other minorities besides the  German were exploited.     For instance, 
the anti-Hungarian bias of Rumania was strong, and the mixed Transyl- 
vanian border region was a source of bitter contention between the two 
countries.    At the tl e of the fall of Prague, they were mobilizing 
against each other; and since Germany was in control of Rumania's main 
arms sources,  she was obliged to si*n a treaty virtually surrenaering 
control of her economy. 
By 1938, German hegemony in East Central Europe was unmistake- 
able.    But  it was a hegemony similar to that the United States  exercises 
over Latin America, that of one strong naf.on among many weak ones.    An 
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empire, a true Lebensraum. would  still be far in the future, especially 
as long as an increasingly suspicious Russia faced it on one side and 
a West on the  other.    HTo organize  the Balkans as a dependable hinter- 
land was a gigantic task....As long as submission did not extend  beyond 
diplomatic concessions wrought by extortion, Germany's hold was to 
remain    insecure."1° 
But one might add that the Schacht systen was building an in- 
creasingly firm network  of economic  interdopen    nee.    Yet Hitler's way 
was one of action and of force, and it was his method which both brought 
him his most concrete successes anc. led to his downfall.    His most im- 
portant triumphs were due  to the prestige of his diplomatic victories 
over the West. 
As Hitler  scored one success  after another—Saar, Conscription, 
Remilitarization of the Rhineland, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Kernel—the  immense capital of good will and esteem for the "estern 
Powers was frittered away.    When the creator* of the 1919 settle- 
ment denounced their own work,  and pleasantly shook hands with the 
robber chiefs, it was not astonishing if the small men crawled into 
their own holes, and tried to make the best  term with the new 
victors.^7 
There were many reasons for the West's willingness to pacify and anpease. 
For one, the Versailles Treaty was unjust, and therefore made good 
German propaganda.    Since France was obligated to the status quo, tension 
was fostered between her and her ally Britain, who was willing to follow 
a policy of appeasement.    Communism and the fear of Russia was an im- 
portant factor in making the West more willing to accept Nazi Germany. 
"Some have thought that the virulent attacks upon Russia in the Zeitschrift 
fflr Geopolitik and elsewhere were  instrumental in bringing France and 
10 Roucek, o£t_cit., p. 259. 
17 H. Seton-Watson,  on-  eit..  p. 386. 
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Britain to accept the annexations that pr^cedec the outbreak of war." I8 
Hitler's initial coups were tolerated because fascism was r.een as an 
internal movement stirred up by Germany's humiliations, which would die 
down as socn as certain reasonable demands were met.    The international 
irnpl; cations of Nazism were not at first recognized; the Nazi excesses 
were felt to be merely the froth of revolt or wind for home consumption; 
and in their own nationalist;   it seemed reasonable to tie Western Powers 
that Germany should desire her old borders, her national integrity, and 
the rule of all those who belonged to the German **race".    All those 
beliefs were dependent,   of course,  upon the assumption that Hitler's 
demands were limited and that  his agreements were  to be relied upon. 
It was via revisionism that the Nazis first found their way to 
geopolitics and that Kaushofer found 1 is way to Hitler.     It was 
the moving plea for revision of frontiers unjustly and foolishly 
drawn that early Nazi propaganda wooed public  opinion abroad, par- 
ticularly in England and the United States.1' 
Much of the Western apathy must also be attributed to sheer 
ignorance on her part.    The whole geopolitical, pan-German, and Nazi 
literature was available to anyone who would read it and take it 
seriously.    The Nazi goals, after all, were not secret,  but widely and 
boastfully propagandized,    "hucr of the most revealing Gerran writing 
on war and politics was brushed aside by 'informed* quarters abroad as 
simply 'specialist' literature not representative of German official 
thought."20      l-Mch of it was never read at all. 
The Nazis profited greatly from the international amnesia which 
blotted  out awareness  of the geographical  issues of world policy. 
They knew only too well which of the political frontiers of Europe 
18 Whittlesey, OP. cit.. p.,165. 
19 Strausz-Hup/,  o».  cit..  p.  222. 
20 Ibid., p. 132. 
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they intended to delete.    But neither the statesi en of Great Britain 
nor France,  nor for that natter their peoples,  could agree as to 
which of these frontiers were in truth their own.21 
The problem faced by the West was whether to guarantee Eastern 
Europe and to make it resist change, even though the status quo was 
unjust,  or to leave it to its own devices and thus encourage the revi- 
sionists,  or to sponsor change and then attempt to control it when it 
got out of hand,    These problems were never solved.    In pacifying Ger- 
many, and in allowing Hitler a free hand, the only result was that the 
strong was bolstered in the face of the weak.    "Above everything, the 
incapacity and apathy of the Western Powers were the greatest asset 
Germany and her Central-European friends had in their arsenal of 
pr opaganda. *"^2 
Central Europe  itself must bear part  of the blame for  the 
tragedy of its defeat.     Poland, standing contemptuously aside from the 
early attempts at unity and alliance, overrated herself even in moments 
of crisis.    Corrupt government and  social tensions,  such as the con- 
flicts between peasants  and landlords,   offered tempting issues for 
"fifth-column" agitation.    No serious attempt was mde by the victors 
to cooperate with the losers; the small revisionists were allied against 
the  small supporters of the status quo and both sides were blind to the 
aims of the large powers.    The Ententes have been called "no more than 
limited alliances against small states which represented no danger."23 
As France saw the defeat of the Eastern European diplomatic 
system,  she began more and more to turn to England, and to surrender 
21 Ibid.,  p. 225. 
22 Lukacs,  OP.   cit..  p.  37. 
23 H.  Seton-Watson,   OP.   cit..  p. All. 
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the initiative for opposing Hitler to her ally, whose diplomatic policy 
consisted in appeasement.    Lora Halifax,  in his conversations with Hit- 
ler in November, 1937, recognizea a British-French, Italo-Gennan power 
alignment and agreed that Germany was a great power.    Great Britain, 
he said,  did not necessarily support the status quo but would  recognize 
change  only "upon the basis of reasonable agreements reasonably reacled."2^ 
hitler  said that,  granted  such a reasonable attitude on the part of the 
West, the Czechoslovukian and Austrian problems coul<   be solved easily. 
The West must decide  if,   when,  and  in what direction Germany's claims 
should  be satisfied.    Lord  Halifax made  it plain that England desired 
a general settlement,  even at the price  of finding Gernany some  over- 
seas colonies.    The Halifax conversations v -re the  first  step towards 
a policy of appeasement. 
France was also putting out fo Lers for . 
understanding had been proposed when Dr. Schacht had visited Paris in 
1936,  but  Germany suspected the French aavances and did not reciprocate. 
Instead of talking,  she turned to "bloc" politics.    France s---nt Foreign 
Minister Delbos  on a tour of distern iCurope  in 193V  in a vain attempt 
to recruit enthusiasm for a mutual assistance pact.    However,  even 
before he  returned,  there was a pro-Nazi government  in Rumania.     In an 
unsigned,   secret German Foreign Office document dated December 20,  1937, 
which analysed the current European diplomatic situation, the verdict 
was reached that 
what France  is afraid of today is a conflict  in which she might 
become  involved  solely because  of her treaties of alliance,  without 
herself being attacked.    She cannot,  of course,   free herself from 
these alliances,  because  she herself attaches too much importance 
to them and  in case of need definitely wants to be able to count 
on them,   something which she  can only do,  however,  if she herself 
2T ser . D., vol.   I, no. 31,  p.  58. 
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proves a faithful ally.    But the prospect of a war in support of 
Czechoslovakia against Germany,  for example,   in which only Soviet 
Russia, obviously much weakened by Stalin's policy of executions, 
would be  obliged to assist,   is not very tempting to France.    Even 
so,   if things  became  serious,  Paris would of course not si'nply be 
resigned to its fate, but on the contrary would go to any lengths 
to promote what has been the ultiirate goal of all French foreign 
policy in case  of failure of the attempts to come to an understand- 
ing with Germany: collective action.25 
In dealing with Great Britain,  it was felt to be the case that 
British policy today proceeds  on the thesis that  it  i3 possible 
to do complete  justice to German grievances  by peaceful means. 
Whether this is possible is to be determiner by means of nego- 
tiation.     If Germany rejects a test of the correctness of this 
thesis,   it  is to be expected that England will draw all the 
closer to France....Failure to negotiate on this subject would 
not be detrimental to German policy but,  like the failure of tlM 
Disarmament Conference,  would mean increased freedom of action 
for Germany,   and less risk in the use of this freedom of actiou.26 
Germany saw that whether England or Franco would  intervene  in  Eastern 
Europe would depend upon the inmediate circumstances.27 
The desire for settlement on the part  of the Western Powers merely 
made Hitler more sure of himself.    Although warned by his foreign office, 
he misinterpreted the  "soft line"  to mean that   England would not fight 
and reasoned that therefore France would not oppose him.    From that 
hour, Munich was inevitable.    It has been rightly said that "appeasing 
the appeasable  is a most reasonable endeavor,  but whetting the appetite 
of the insatiable is mere suicidal folly."28    Once the French alliance 
system became enervated, Britain became the leader, France the follower. 
The new British ambassaaor to Germany, Sir Nevile Henderson, greatly 
favored an Anglo-German settlement; and owing to his enthusiastic 
ZS Ibid.,  no.  86, p. 150. 
26 Ibid.,  p. 151. 
27 Ibid.,  no. U93. 
28 Albrecht-Carri/, OP. cit.. p. 514. 
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application of the appeasement policy there was an apparent  international 
relaxation until November 6, 1937, when the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was 
signed.    This pact marked a new phase of German policy, the triumph of 
force. 
The year 1937 might be termed the logical starting point of 
World War II.    The Halifax visit embarked the West upon appeasement 
just when Hitler's plans, which had been in outline as early as 1934, 
were  being completed in detail,29 and when his  objectives seemed   in- 
creasingly clearer and more attainable.    The army was roady,   its  com- 
mand newly renovated. 
In 1937 also, Mussolini came to Berlin.    Italy played an ambig- 
uous role in the working out of the Nazi schemes.    Although fascist, 
she was diplomatically speaking neither fish nor fowl,  neither allied 
with the West nor with Germany.    Generally she was seeking her own ad- 
vantage, and when she signed the Anti-Comintern Agreement one of her 
motives was to force England to seek a  settlement with the Axis.    The 
lack of unity of the West was clearly evident in the whole situation: 
When London tried mediating between Paris and Berlin, tho result 
was the weakening of French prestige and interests to an extent 
which drove many otherwise responsible French politicians to take 
up a bitter and almost negative anti-Brit's* attitude; when Paris 
endeavorea to reconcile London and Rome, British suspicions rose, 
anc it became easier for Hitler to win Mussolini. And now, early 
in 1937,  Neville Chamberlain began to favor the Germans.-5 
Chamberlain underestimated Hitler and Mussolini,  not realizing how 
far the scales of the balance of power were tipping away from France 
and towards Germany, while Henderson, "the Carlylean, narrow-minded, 
** c.f. Nov. 5 declaration of Hitler's decision to use force on Austria. 
3° Lukacs.   OP.  cit.. p.  7i« 
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snobbish, and stubbornly Germanophile Ambassador of His Britannic 
Majesty to Germany"^1 was known to have said privately: "I don't see 
why we shouldn't say to Germany,   'give us satisfactory assurances that 
you won't use  force to deal with the Austrians and Czechoslovakians, 
and we will give you similar assurances that we won't use force to 
prevent the changes you want,   if you can get them by peaceful means." 
This statement represents the whole British diplomatic   policy  in little. 
The main cause, then,   of the German successes  in 3ast Central 
Europe was the almost benevolent neutr- ility of the West.    Hitler believed 
himself to be entirely justified in thinking that the way was clear, 
that he could seize his Lebensraura by force. 
,»32 
^■i Ibid..  P. 112. 
32 Ibid., p. 80. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE METHODOLOGY OF MB CONQUEST: ANSCHLUSS 
Anschluss, or the political union of Germany and Austria, had 
been a dream ever since the movement for the unification of Germany. 
It was  a goal especially desirable to Nazi Germany,  the first  objec- 
tive of any plan of expansion, because of tre prominence of the Aryan 
race theory in the official  ideology, and also because independent 
Austria lay directly  in the  path of the wider Nazi claims to Lebens- 
raum.     Speaking of Anschluss.  G. S. Messersmit". ,  U.  S. Ambassador to 
Vienna,   said that "I can assert that it was fully v.nderstocd by every- 
one  in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of What was going on 
that Hitler and the Nazi Germans were irrevocably committed to this 
end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or state- 
ments to me was   'how'  and   'when1."1 
The First World War had instantaneously converted Austria from 
a huge empire to a small second-rate state.    She was saved economically 
only by loans which were conditional upon the maintenance of her inde- 
pendence.    There had  been some Anschluss sentiment,  especially among 
the socialists, which, however, died down after Germany's disastrous 
experience in the Depression.    Meanwhile, Austria was proven to be 
viable economically after all, and so matters stood until Hitler's 
coup.    The old Austrian pan-Germans adopted the Nazi ideology when it 
arose. 
1 Conspiracy and Aggression, OP. cit.. v. I, p. 45*1 
69. 
Austria was forbidden to compromise her independence by Article 
Eighty of the Versailles Treaty    md also by Article Eighty-eight of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain, which stated that "the independence of Austria 
is  inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the League of Nations."2 
Austria reaffirmed this restriction in 1921 when she applied for a League 
loan,     In 1931, an attempted customs union with Germany was thwarted. 
The Austrian Protocol of 1932, which once more reaffirmed her indepen- 
dence,  was negotiated upon the occasion of another loan;  and   in 1934 
the  so-called Stresa Front  of England,  France,  and  Italy was pledged 
to preserve Austria's  independence from Germany. 
The first major move made by Germany towards drawing Austria 
within  its diplomatic  orbit    was the  signing of the Agreement of July 
11,   1936.     This "gentlemen's agreement" purported to re-establish nor- 
mal and  friendly relations between the two countries.    Associations of 
the nationals of one country were to be permitted within the borders 
of the other provided they be law-abiding and  refrain from mixing in 
politics.     No restrictions were  to be placed upon cultural exchange, 
including newspaper  circulation,  anc  all means were to be used to pro- 
mote friendship.    More  important, Austria pledged to conduct her for- 
eign policy "in the  light of the peaceful endeavors  of the  German Gov- 
ernment's foreign policy."3   An occasional exchange of views was to be 
made.    The Austrian chancellor was to grant a political amnesty and to 
appoint members of the opposition to 1 is cabinet.    NuseoLini, who might 
have been opposec to this agreement, officially expressed his satis- 
faction that Austria would now be kept out of foreign politics, which, 
2 Robert Langer, ItlBgj °f Territory (Princeton, New Jersey; Prince- 
ton University Press, 194?), p. 157. 
3 Documents,  OP. cit.. ser. D.,  vol. I, no. 152,  p. 280. 
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he said, removed the last handicap to good Italo-Geraan relations; 
while  Italy could legally contemplate no change in the Austrian status 
quo due to the Rome Pr otocols,   she pledged her aid to urge Austria to 
carry out the July 11 Agreement and promised  in case of conflict that 
she would not resume her "watch on the Brenner" with other countries.4 
Her Mediterranean policy was forcing Italy to become pro-German. 
Germany's motives in negotiating the July 11 Agreement were to 
exclude the Austrian question from international discussion, to wreck 
possible efforts to restore the Hapsburgs, and to promote "cultural" 
infiltration.    In a report addressed to Hitler reviewing the success of 
the Agreement after a year  in operation,  the Ambassador to  Austria von 
Papen declared that the July 11 policy had worked extremely well.   The 
rough spots  in Austro-German relations at the moment were due, he main- 
tained,  not to the agreement itself but  to the necessity of pushing 
Germany's legitimate interests.    He stated that 
the German-Austrian question has always been a psychological prob- 
lem, oarticularly with regard to world public opinion.    The less 
it can,   perhaps  be  solved by power  politics at the moment,  the more 
we must  prepare a psychologically correct  solution.    The policy 
of the Reich must  be made to utilize  every opportunity to make it 
clear that it not  only does not have annexBtioniat   intentions,  but 
that it  repudiates them even from purely historical considerations 
because  in the Austrian question it desires to exercise a "mandate 
granted it by the Austrian race itself.3 
As Nazi power increased, Austria's chances of diplomatic escape dwin- 
dled steadily. 
The Nazis conducted a campaign of furious subversion within 
Austria.    All means were used -propaganda;  economic pressures such as 
restrictions on tourist travel;  the use of terror such as the aiding of 
4 Ibid., no. 207. 
5 Ibid., no.  233,   p. 436. 
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the Austrian Legion, a paramilitary force near the border; and the har- 
boring of Austrian fascist refugees.    The attempted putsch of July 25, 
1934, if not due to the connivance of the German ambassador, was at 
least attempted with his foreknowledge and assent.6    After the failure 
of the putsch, the Austrian fascists wore forced underground and their 
••fighters" lost, the remnants being left to their own devices as Germany 
switched  her policy to conciliation and  formally recognized  the  inde- 
pendence  of the Austrian state.     The party was  splintered,  however,   into 
several groups, and an illegal armed underground   was formed  behind   cer- 
tain key "front personalities."    While Germany was ostensibly pursuing 
a "hands off  "  policy, Schacht earmarked 200,000marks    per month  for use 
in Austria. '    The opposition parties were given support also  in the 
hopes that the government would be forced to call on the fascists for 
aid.    Meanwhile,  the  German diplomatic position improved  greatly with 
the remilitarization of the Rhineland and with Italy's  Involvement   in 
Africa.    The July U agreement brought an amnesty for  the Austrian 
Nazis and  their first penetration  into th    government.    At that time 
also,  active party operation was resumed,  still with the use  of several 
g 
organizations,  both legal and illegal. 
Although the Austrian fascists were  instructed  to preserve  their 
outward  independence,  actually "its leaders to a large extent  shaped 
their policy in accordance with instructions from the Reich."      Party 
members were ordered to MM to Germany only when necessary and to avoid 
the appearance that they had any other source of instruction than their 
6 Conspiracy and ~ggre»sion.  OP.   cit..  vol.  I,  p.   A5U- 
7 Ibid., p. 463. 
8 Documents, OP. cit.. v.  I, nos.   167, 262. 
9 Ibid., no. 229. 
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own leadership.     Occasionally,  however, the Germans were embarrassed, 
as for instance on the occasion of the discovery of so!;e records con- 
cerning the payment  of lawyers for accused Austrian Nazis.10    SchuschnigfT, 
the Austrian chancellor,  complained  of this German support and declared 
himself disappointed by the July 11 agreement.    He announced his inten- 
tion of cultivating closer ties with the secession states,  although he 
made it plain that he would not work against the lieich.11    Early in 1938, 
Germany was further embarrassed by the discovery of the smug-li: g of 
inflammatory literature,  which Schmidt declared  to be  "the crassest case 
so far of interference in Austrian domestic affairs."12    Earlier, 
in November 1937 the Austrian police were on the trail of a secret 
Nazi plan containing details for a Nazi coup for the eventual coer- 
cion of the Austrian government  into  submission.    There was now di- 
rect and  indisputable evidence  of connections between the Nazis and 
German authorities  in Berlin,  and  on January 25,   1938,  the so-called 
Tavo memorandum advocating the  German invasion of Austria was seized. 
The Germans,  however, were not unduly worried, and even considered their 
chances for an "evolutionary" solution better since Austria knew how 
natters stood.    Their plan was  to get as many men into the Austrian 
government as possible, and,  once    in, to rely on popular support.H 
One reason for Germany's self-assurance was the fact that Italy, 
as she became more involved  in her  international  intrigues,  was forced 
to relinquish  her "protectorate" over Austria,  who was deprived  of her 
last supporter when the League sanctions drove Italy into Germany's arms. 
When Mussolini visited Hitler in  Sept.    •  W37, he declared himself to 
be disgusted with Austria's policies;  but  Germany agreed that Schuschnigg 
P) ibid.. T^Tza. n IbW... n°- 26^- 
12 Ibid.,  no. 275, p. A90. 
*3 Lukacs,  OP. cit.. p. 66. 
^ Documents,  OP. cit..  vol. I, ser. D.,  no. 285. 
should not be overthrown without a suitable successor.W 
To Anschluss a8 to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the 
military leaders were  strongly opposed,  believing that   Italy would  op- 
pose Germany a second time at the Brenner pass.    Again,  the High Command 
purge of February U,  1938, effectively annulled this defiance of Hitler's 
will.    The opposition of the West was negligible.    Although  it was 
recognized that Austria was Hitler's number one target,  there was lit- 
tle  it  could co without the  strong diplomatic sup; ort of  Italy or the 
Ententes,  except to go to war; but here the West was  inhibited by the 
fact that Austria was,  after all, a  "German"  state    and  that the moral 
issue  of Nazism versus Democracy had  not yet been drawn clearly enough 
to justify war,  particularly since many Western Europeans were   indulging 
in Utopian dreams of world  peace.    The "Democracies" were unable to 
generate enough public support on such short notice. 
In February, 1938, Chancellor Schuschnigg agreed to attend a 
conference  in Germany if Hitler  invited him,   if he knew the whole  agenda 
beforehand,  and if it were agreed  in advance that the published  communi- 
que'would reaffirm the July 11 agreement.    Upon arrival on February 12 
at Berchtesgaden,  the place  of meeting, the Chancellor found hirself 
"confronted by a  furious,  brutal,  yelling Hitler;  Schuschnigg,  whose 
personality was anythi.-g but dynamic,  could not withstand the  incredible 
psychological pressure put upon him."16   This unexpected  violent attack 
lasted about two hours.    Schuschnig    wrotel«fcr that Hitler "informed me 
that he Hitler, had decided to bring the Austrian question to a solution 
so or so, even if he had to imir.edlately use military force."1?    With 
15 Ibid., no. 256. l6 Lukacs, opt cit., p. 113. 
17 Conspiracy and Aggression,   vol.  I,  p. 482. 
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accusations and threats, Austria was given Germany's "final demands", 
with the warning that if Presicent Hildas die not approve within three 
days, military action would be taken. 
The Berchtesgaden Protocol was designed, as Schuschnigg said, 
to "cloak the treacherous blow with a thin rernant of so-called legal- 
ity."18    It called for consultation on foreign policy of common concern, 
and stated that National Socialism was compatible to Austria provided 
that  it did not conflict with the constitution.    The Austrian fascist 
leader,  Seyss-Inquart, was to be appointed Minister of Interior and 
Public Safety with power  to oversee National Socialist development. 
Guido Schmidt was to be Minister of Foreign Affairs.    The Austrian 
Nazis were to be granted an amnesty and freely admitted  into military 
service.    A Nazi,  Dr.  Wolf, was to be appointe;   to the Austrian Press 
Service  to insure good relations, and the signatories pledged  "moral, 
diplomatic, and press support of the desires and actions" of each other.19 
All negotiations concerning the  interpretation of the Protocol were 
to  be madu through Seyss-Inquart only. 
Schuschnigg returned to  Vienna, mace the required cabinet  chan- 
ges, and granted the amnesty.    The people's reaction was mixed.20   There 
resulted a heavy flight  of illegal capital,  especially Jewish.    On the 
eighteenth it was reported that 
on the basis of a detailed and comprehensive four-day observation, 
it must be stated that the breakthrough succeeded absolutely and 
is much deeper than is assumed  in many quarters  in the  Reich.    After 
the powers had  left Schuschnigg in the lurch, be  immediately saw 
his former supporters partly fall away, partly quarrel among them- 
selves,  and  fight furiously over the succession to the chancellor- 
r6 Lukacs.   os.  cit..   p. 113. 
■^ Documents, OP. cit.. ser. D.,   vol.  I, no. 295, p.   515. 
20 Ibid.,  no. 306. 
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ship.    In Legitimist circles ehaos prevails; all hope has been 
abandoned.^ 
There was also what was described as a strong and  sincere movement 
towards the  Nazi labor organizations.    The Berchtesgaden terms were 
carried out;   Nazis flooded the government.    "Now, perhaps for the first 
time,  in East Central Europe the classic methodology of modern totali- 
tarian aggression from within could be observed."22   The '/test, not 
knowing precisely what was in the Berchtesgaden Agreement, merely adop- 
ted a "wait and see" policy.    No great reaction was expected from it.2-' 
By February 20,  Hitler had already violated the  Berchtesgaden 
Agreement.    Schuschnigg called the Austrian Bundestag for the twenty- 
fourth.    On March 9 he announced a plebiscite on the subject of Anschluss. 
Hitler had the sudden unpleasant prospect of being hoist on his own 
petard, for "both in wording of the question and in the manner in which 
the plebiscite is to be carried out, Dr. Schuschnigg seems to have taken 
a leaf out of the Nazi book."2'*     As Rlbbentrop reported to the Ftthrer, 
the plebiscite planned by Schusctnigg must be called a fraudulent 
maneuver in violation of the letter and spirit of the 3erchtesgaden 
Agreement.    First, the forrulation of the question, which left no 
alternative whatsoever, was meaningless and a confidence game.    The 
main issue, namely, whether Austria should be more closely attached 
to the German Reich in some manner,  was evaded by the way the ques- 
tion was formulated.    For Schuschnigg knew very well that in previ- 
ous plebiscites the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people 
had voted in favor of a closer union with Germany.*'-' 
The voting age was raised to twenty-four.    A very short voting time was 
21 Ibid., no. 313. p.  535. 
22 Lukacs, op. clt.t  p. HA« 
2^ Documents, OP. cit.. ser. D., vol.   I, no. 305- 
24 Lukacs, OP. cit..   p. 112. 
25 Documents, OP. cit.. ser. D., vol.   I,  no. H7, p. 265. 
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allowed, every minute of which was under the close scrutiny of Schusch- 
nigg' s own police.    The ballot required a "yes" or "no" answer to the 
statement: 
With Schuschnigg for Austria.    We want a free and a German Austria, 
an independent and a social Austria, a Christian and a united Aus- 
tria.     We desire bread and  peace  in the country and  the equality  of 
all who stand for their people and their nation.2^ 
Only "yes*1 ballots were distributed.    Those who desirec  to vote "no" 
would Lave to furnish their own.    At first, "no" ballots would only be 
acceptable  if they bore  the voter's full name and a-.dress. 
Schuschnigg made a speech at Innsbruck in which he pledged 
adherence to the July 11 and Berchtesgaden Agreements but refuser to 
go further, and appealed to the nation. 
Italy advised Schuschnigg against the plebiscite and refused 
to ciscuss joint action with England and France.27    After all,  the 
Italian Foreign Minister Ciano  stated,  "what could   I do   ...No external 
guarantee can save Austria....A  state whose  independence  is assured  by 
a third  power  is virtually finished."28 
Germany saw the danger in a vote of confidence in the Austrian 
government, no matter how fraudulent.    On March 11, an ultimatum was 
submitted demanding that Schuschnigg postpone the plebiscite indefinitely. 
This was rejected,   but a  second was  sent demanding that Schuschnigg relin- 
quish the chancellorship to Seyss-Inquart.    Schuschnigg then yielded to 
the first ultimatum, whereupon a third was submitted repeating the demands 
of the second and threatening invasion at 8:00   ■.•'. that day if not com- 
plied with.    At 7:50, Schuschnigg yielded,  and Seyss-Inquart set up a 
*o Ibid., no.  3A0. p. 563. 
2° Lukacs,  OP.  cit..   p.  115• 
27 Ibid.,  no. 350. 
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"provisional government" and requested German troops to help preserve 
order. 
The German General Staff had expected a war with Italy and 
Czechoslovakia, but Italy had sold out and Czechoslovakia was unwilling 
to take on such a big task without the aid of England and France.    No 
real military preparation had been made by Germany,  such was the con- 
fidence of the Nazis.*9    Maneuvers were held near the border to create 
the impression of a large  undertaking, and  rumors were deliberately 
planted.     General Jodl recorded  in his diary that 
General Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for sham- 
ming military pressure, in order to coerce President Kiklas into 
ratifying the agreement.    By Hitler's orders. 
14. February—The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the im- 
pression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military 
pr cparat ions.30 
When the news of the ultimata was out,  Lord  Halifax excitedly 
talked of an  international police force to  insure an  impartial  plebi- 
scite.     Ribbentrop countered  with the statement that  the Anschluss was 
demanded by the Austrian people,  and that Schuschnigp; naturally would 
resign after attempting a fraudulent plebiscite, which had  been  imposed 
arbitrarily without consulting the Austrian  cabinet.     Schuschnigg had, 
at any rate freely agreed to the German solution at Berchtesgaden, 
where he had been swayed by the Fflhrer's clear explanations.    Schusch- 
nigg was guilty of a gross breach of faith.    A strong attempt was made 
by the Nazis to deny that there had ever been any ultimata.    Hitler 
stated that »I am now determined to restore law and order to my home- 
land and enable the people to decicie their own fate according to their 
^ Conspiracy and Aggression,  OP.  cit..  vol.   IV,  no.  1175-PS,  p.  357. 
30 Ibid.,  vol.   I, p. £85. 
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judgment in an unmistakeable, clear, and open manner."31 
The Anschluss was met with only very weak response.    There was 
an unfavorable but quickly suppressed reaction in Italy and some nervous 
speculation as to what  Germany would ao next.     England submitted  a 
softly-worded protest through Sir Nevile Henderson.    Only Mexico com- 
municated with iftr. Avenol, the Secretary General of the League,  for it 
was realized  that nothing short of war could  have changed  the German 
fait accompli, and Europe recoiled from that step.    The French reaction 
was indignant, perplexed, and uncertain, but on the whole fatalistic. 
Blame was heaped  on the lack  of domestic  cohesion,  policy weakness, 
England's aloofness from Central European problems, and the refusal of 
Italy, with whom France still desired a rapprochement. to join in a 
general protest. 
On March 14,  France renewed her pledge of assistance to Czecho- 
slovakia.    If that  country considered herself to be the object of an 
unprovoked attack,  then France would consider herself at war with Ger- 
many regardless  of the action of England.    Czechoslovakia tried to call 
a Little Entente meeting but Rumania declined,    lingland announced a new 
armament program.    Chamberlain stated that "once we had all got past 
this unpleasant affair (of Austria) ...it was to be hoped that we could 
jegin working in earnest towards a Geran-British understanding."32 
The first mjor step  in appeasement had  been taken on March U,  when 
Germany was offered full sovereignty of certain Congo colonies  if she 
would accept certain restrictions.    Now these  offers were repeated.33 
Prime Minister Eden had resigned a week after Berchtesgaden, and his 
iL Documents,  OP.   cit..   ser.  D.  vol.   I,   no.  352,  p.  575. 
32 
33 
Lukacs,  op. cit.. p. 118. 
Documents,  OP.  cit..   ser. D-» vol.  I,   no.  400. 
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successor Chamberlain would not back French resistance.    On the whole, 
the Western Powers failed to demonstrate any strength or any deter- 
mination to regain the diplomatic initiative.    Only Mr. Churchill 
spoke anxiously in the House of Coumons about the real threat of 
force.    None of the central-eastern European capitals were able to 
see a rehabilitation of the West's faded diplomatic prestige.    The 
French and British envoys were either silent or non-committal; many 
of them could but grit diplomatic teeth and hope some kind of mi- 
raculous wise new course  would be charted  in their raspective For- 
eign Ministries.34 
To the  English overtures,  Hitler replied that his  prerequisite 
to cooperation was the absolute abstention of any thir    | ow :   f: on 
meddling in Central Europe.    He compared this area to the British po- 
sition relative  to the Empire  and  to Belgium and  Holland     and the Aus- 
trian question to England's troubles with Ireland.    When England spoke 
of a redistribution of colonies between 50° and the Zambezi River, he 
blandly asked  why Gerirany's former  colonies weren't returned to her." 
The Anschluss was a great victory for the Nazis.    Versailles 
had been attacked in its weakest spot, and was now upon its deathbed, 
and the  European continent had been cut  in half by the Nazi bloc.    Ger- 
many fell heir to Austria's Balkan and Danube trade, together with all 
the assets and holdings of the Viennese banks.    Through the liquidation 
of foreign and non-Aryan proDerty,   Germany obtained some 18,000,000 
pounds in gold and foreign exchange)36 and although Austria represented 
a food liability, Anschluss was a net gain in raw materials,  in labor 
supply,  and in communications.    In addition to mines and heavy industry, 
about seven millions more Germans were added to the Reich,   but only a 
few more hundred miles of frontier.    Germany was able to draw a much 
greater proportion of the Central European trade, especially since she 
obtained  control of the port of Trieste which was an outlet from Czecho- 
JH Lukacs.   OP.  cit..  p.  138. 
35 I/ocuments.  op. cit.. ser.,D., vol. I, no. 138. 
36 D. Graham Hutton, foirvav after Munich (Bostor:   Little, Brown,  1939), p. 117. 
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Slovakia, South Poland, South Germany and Austria.    The absorption of 
Austrian trade was a heavy blow to Czechoslovakia and also to  Italy, 
who was bound even more closely to Germany through her economic ties 
with Austria. 
Over and above the economic gain, Anschluss was a strategic, 
political, and moral victory for the Germans.   As General Jodl said 
later in a speech on foreign policy, 
the Austrian Anschluss...brought with it not only the fulfillment 
of an old  national aii..,  but also had the effect  both  of reinforcing 
our fighting  strength and  of materially strengthening our fighting 
position.    Where as up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia 
had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany—a wasp 
waist in the direction of France ana an air base for the allies, 
in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by 
pincers .37 
Anschluss greatly altered the strategic situation of East Central Eu- 
rope.     Vienna was a main center for the com.- unications  of the Balkans, 
both as a railway terminal and in her command of the Danube Valley. 
Germany now had frontiers with  Italy,  Hungary,  and  Yugoslavia, 
with the alpine passes which were the key to the Hungarian plain.    To 
reassure Italy, Germany proclaimed an immediate guarantee of the Bren- 
ner Pass.    The German move had caught Italy with her hands full of her 
own ambitions, and at a time when she was estranged from the West. 
In the circumstances Mussolini had no choice but to fa ire bonne 
figure au mauvais .jour.     But  in effect the Anschluss meant a 
shifting of the Axis relations  in which  Italy was  passing from the 
position of equal partner to that of prisoner.    Her  Influence in 
Central Europe  suffered a severe  setback,  a condition of which 
the smaller  states of that region showed  awareness.3° 
Central  Europe reacted by trying to make  peace with  Berlin. 
Their struggles were now no longer local but  involved  in the  Great  Power 
politics of Europe.    GnEarch 23, Rumania was forced to sign a treaty 
subordinating her economy to Germany's.    On April 7, Mussolini invaded 
g* Albrecht-Carrie\op. cit..  p.  519. 
" De Mendelssohn,  op. cit..   p. 39. 
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Albania.    On the thirteenth, Britain and France extended unilateral 
guarantees of independence to Greece and. Rumania. 
On April  10,  amid mass frenzy and enthusiasm, Austria voted 
99.75% approval of union with the Reich.^    Nothing succeeds like success, 
and not the small Slavic states alone took notice of this event; the 
fall of the last free German political unit had a tremendous effect 
noon Central Europe's scattered German minorities.    The Reich could 
now truly claim to  be the fatherland of the race. 
The effects of the dynamic German successes were evident:  cabinet 
ministers began dreaming of high, windswept balconies, military 
parades, and patent leather boots;  foreign ministers,  imitating 
the former champagne salesman,   Ribbentrop, created military uniforms 
of their own,  with glittering medals and high waists, thus shedding 
the morning coat together with al]   other vestiges of the  "decadent 
bourgeois    past."    Mas Europe finished?  To many it seemed so.^° 
In five years Germany had thrown off the disgrace of defeat,  bjrst her 
political frontiers, and achieved a domination undreamed of by the 
Kaisers.    The powers of Europe rushed to preserve the pence, as the 
Reich worked to secure her Lebensraum. 
^ William L.  Langer,  ed., An Encyclopedia of World   History (Bostor: 
Koughton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 1009. 
uo Lukacs, OP. cit..  p. 123. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE METHODOLOGY OF WORLD CONQUEST: THE MUNICH CRISIS 
Czechoslovakia, unlike Austria, was a strong state economically. 
and completely independent of Germany.    She was also  outstanding,   from 
the point of view of the West,  because of all the Central European na- 
tions she most firmly and consistently espoused the liberal traditions 
of Western Europe.    The fall of this nation was a strategic victory 
for Nazisn:    as well as a tremendous prestige builder.    The British Am- 
bassador in Prague pleaded for the maintenance at all cost of this 
country's independence, for "the Czechoslovakians, unlike the Austrians, 
know what they want, and,  if sufficiently backed, would probably be 
prepared to fight for it.1"- 
Czechoslovakia had within its boundaries a trojan horse, so to 
speak,  in her large Sudeten German minority, a horaogerv> 5us anr compact 
unit of three and one-half millions in a total of about fifteen mil- 
lions,  which composed the largest group of Germans outside the  Reich.' 
When the nation was created in 1919, these Sudetens had desired to go 
to Austria. 
It is useless to deny that the new State was created against the 
will of its German citizens, and indeed it rested upon two conflic- 
ting principles—in Bohemia upon the historic "State Rights" of the 
Crown of Saint  Wenceslas,   in Slovakia upon nationality and  self- 
determination.     In the name of the first the Germans were  included 
in Bohemia,   in the name of the second the Slovaks were excluded 
from Hungary.3 
■ Lukacs.   op.   cit..  p.  128. 
2 R. W. Seton-Watson, From Munich to Danzig (London:  Methuen, 1939),  p. 24.. 
3 Ibid.,  p.  27. 
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The mountains of Bohemia did form the logical natural boundary for the 
Czech state, and the Sudetens had traditional and economic ties with 
their Slavic neighbors.    Although there were bad feelings when the 
Sudetens found themselves incorporated,  on the whole their rights were 
respected and one may even say that they possessed the fullest minority 
rights in Europe, these rights including proportional representation, 
schools, use of the German language, and an unobstructed press.    The 
furor tended to die down.    The Czechoslovak government was committed 
to the conciliation of the Sudetens, and whatever friction occurred 
arose from local recalcitrance and from slow, obstructionist local of- 
ficials.    Such petty discrimination kept Sudeten resentment alive.    Their 
leaders insisted from first to last upon their right to self-determination, 
which was so much a matter of principle that they rejected even the more 
generous offers of cooperation with the Czechoslovak government. 
The development of fascism among the Sudentens was to a large 
extent  indigenous and paralleled that of Germany.    The effects of Hitler's 
coup of 1933 were profoundly disturbing.    The Sudetens felt that they 
must preserve their cultural ties with Germany at all cost.    The Czecho- 
slovakian gendarmerie reacted strongly, and the Sudeten fascists disbanded 
their organization for a year voluntarily to avoid the use of force.    No 
defense laws could keep out the flood of German wireless propaganda, however, 
and substitute societies began to form,  such as the gymnastic society or 
Turnverband headed by Konrad HenJein.    In 1933, Henlein founded the Sudeten- 
deutsche Heimatfront which wag at first fairly contented and antifascist. 
By 1935, the party was polling a considerable percentage    0f Sudeten German 
votes and was becoming far more radical in outlook and total in administration. 
In general, the party became more aggressive as the economic crisis extended 
1C4. 
itself among the Germans.    The rise of nationalist passions was very 
closely allied to economic distress as Germany restricted her tourist 
trade in the area and as German autarky deprived Sudeten manufacturers 
of an important market. 
The Sudeten Deutsche Partie. needless to say, was in continuous 
close contact with Germany.    Henlein received heavy German financial 
aid from 1935 on.^   Before Anschluss, however, Henlein worked mainly 
towards organizing the Sudetens and for the redress of certain specific 
grievances against the Czechoslovak government.    In recruitment of sup- 
port, Henlein could rely upon the whole gamut of political passions 
and group pressures. 
The Henleinists made the most of...Central European circumstances. 
They not only announced that everything across the frontier in Ger- 
many was excellent, plenty of work with plenty of pay...they also 
succeeded in surrounding the doubting voter with a sense of shame 
and fear—shame that he could hesitate to back the rescuers of his 
people,  and fear lest,  according to the rumors  freely circulated, 
Hitler  should march in any day and activist  heads should  roll. 
The effect of whispers such as these was greater, perhaps, than 
anything actually circulated in print. 
On March 28, 1938,  Henlein had a personal interview with Hitler in which 
*he was advised to refrain from accepting the concessions of the Czech 
government    and gradually to increase his demands upon it.    The legal- 
ization of aned military groups was suggested as a good bargaining 
point to which the Czech government would never agree.    Most contact 
between Germany and the Sudeten Party was carried on through the German 
legations.    Eisenlohr, German Ambassador in Prague, declared German 
foreign policy to be the -sole determining factor for policy and tac- 
tical procedure of the Sudeten German Party." 
4 Conspiracy ana Aggression,  vol.  I,  p.  549. ru^^A a    ■    IQ^RI     n    20«; 
5 Elizabeth Wiskemknn, figgi and  Germans  (I^ndon,   Oxford U.  P.,1938),   p.  205. 
Docume mts.  OP.  cit..   ser.  D.,   vol.   II,  no.  86,  p.  170. 
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Germany,  in her dealings with Czechoslovakia, adopted two min 
propaganda lines: Czech collaboration with Russia and her mistreatment 
of her German minority.    Plans for an attack upon Czechoslovakia were 
drafted as early as June, 1937.    In November of that year, and in April, 
1938, conferences were held upon the subject.    Even up to the time of 
Anschluss. Czechoslovakia might have obtained fairly good terms by re- 
orienting her foreign policy and submitting to German leadership.    VJhat 
the Nazis feared most of all was the existence of a Western citadel in 
the heart of the Lebensraum area.  "Ever since the middle of the Nine- 
teenth Century the policy of Prussia was directed toward forestalling 
the rise in Central Europe of an economic system which would consoli- 
date itself outside German control and leadership.1*7    But on April 21, 
1938, the German High Command drew up the definite plan for attack on 
Czechoslovakia,  "Case Green."    Three possible methods were discussed, 
that of surprise attack, that of "justified" attack coming after a 
period of accel   jrating diplomatic  clashes,  and that  of a  lightening 
attack as reprisal  for some incident,   such as the assassination of some 
Gerran diplomat.    For success of the plan,   close cooperation with the 
Sudeten "fifth column" was considered vital.°    Plans were also made on 
toy 20 for a heavy propaganda campaign to foster defeatism.    On June 
24, the final directive was issued. 
Hitler was sure, and the army not so sure, that the West would 
not intervene. But Hitler commanded the allegiance of the masses, and 
the General Staff was committed to secrecy. General Beck particularly 
protested that Anschluss had made strategic danger from Czechoslovakia 
negligible, and resigned from the General Staff in protest.    It  is said 
' Hanc.  op.  citT.   p.  111. 
° De Mendelssohn,   op.  cit..  p.  45 • 
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that Hitler's success at this tine broke up a plot which was forming 
against him under General Kadler and other military personnel. 
The German diplomats, knowing the Western aversion to war, were 
constantly telling France and England that the Sudetens must be paci- 
fied if war were to be avoided.    The British suggested an impartial 
committee of inquiry, a proposal which was rejected by Germany.    The 
Runciman Mission was sent from England, however, to pacify, to stall, 
to mediate,  and to observe.    There were  rearmament debates  in Parliament. 
Von Lirksen,  Gem an Ambassador in Great Britain, reported that there 
existed a growing public interest, that Germany was becoming the enemy, 
and that the people were psychologically becoming ready to fight.    "To 
regard  the excitement  of the last few weeks as a mere bluff," he  said, 
"might turn out to  be a fatal error.""    Officially, however,   the 
British government was for peace at any price.    Chamberlain reflected 
this feeling when he called Czechoslovakia a "far-away country about 
which we know so little."1      Henderson  immec lately favored  federalism 
as the answer to the Sudeten problem. 
In France,  the extreme Left desired war,  while the extreme 
Right took the attitude that nort Locarno, mort l'accessoire de Locarno. 
France was bound to Czechoslovakia by a definite treaty; now she must 
decide whether to take the initiative in the fulfillment of that agree- 
ment or to follow England's lead.    Russia declared herself willing to 
abide by her treaty obligations if France were;  but Poland and Rumania 
separated Czechoslovakia from direct Soviet aid.    The French attitude 
was the key to Russian action, and the new Daladier government favored 
conceding to Henlein's demands.    Furthermore,   it was a policy of the 
9 Documents,  on. cit.. ser. D., vol.  II, no. 2U-, p. 393. 
10 Albrecht-Carrie',   on.  cit..  p.  523. 
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Chamberlain government to keep Russia out of European politics. More 
and more France looked to England, who favored genuine compror.ise, re- 
vision by plebiscite, a four-oower understanding, and colonial settle- 
ment. The German diplomats warned their Foreign Office that England 
would fight if force were used in Europe. In a document analyzing the 
English position, Ribbentrop scribbled a characteristicly contemptuous 
marginal  comr.ent:   "Secret Service Propaganda!n^- 
After Anschluss,  almost all Sudetens were behind  Henlein.    Most 
desired only regional autonomy, but a few had an inkling of the trend 
of the fascist plans.    The tarty inspired  fanatic enthusiasm.    Since 
Anschluss. Henlein had gradually increased his demands to the Czecho- 
slovak government.     On April 2U,  1938,  Henlein made a speech at Karls- 
bad demanding autonomy for the oolitically united Sudetens.    At the 
same time Germany began an extensive anti-Czech press  campaign.    The 
Karlsbad sueech cei.unded complete equality, recognition of a self- 
governing settlement area and measures  for the protection  of the Sudet- 
ens living outside that area, removal of and compensation for the 
wrongs committed  by the Czechs,   German public  servants  in the German 
area, and complete freedom to uphold the fascist ideology.12    Follow- 
ing the Karlsbad speech, negotiations drag/red and tempers rose.    Hen- 
lein was instructed to reject all settlement until German military 
measures cculd be  completed.    The Sudeten population was  reported   in a 
state of high excitement, talking not of autonomy but of Anschluss. 
By the middle of Kay the Kenleinist aim was no longer autonomy but a 
plebiscite.1^   When the leader requested orders as to what he should 
1 Uocunents. OP.  cit.. ser. D., vol.   II, no. 270. 
12 Ibid., no. 135. 
J3 Ibid., no. 158. 
■^ Ibid., no. 16^. 
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do if Czechoslovakia gave in and consented to all demands, he was told 
to accept the Czech capitulation and t» make the counter-demand that 
Czechoslovakia reorient her foreign policy to conform with Germany's. 
It was doubted if such a demand would be accepted.15    Germany was play- 
ing for time.    Speed was considered vital, not only to make the world 
see how weak the Czech state was,  but to discourage others,  especially 
Hungary and Poland, who might be tempted to partake of the booty.    Hen- 
lein negotiated and rejected four separate plans of settlement,  even 
inducing his own Karlsbad points. 
By the second week of September Germany felt strong enough to 
resort to overt action heralded  by a speech delivered  by the 
German Chancellor at the close of the National Socialist  Party 
Congress at Nuremberg on September 12, 1938.    He gave a lurid de- 
scription of the "tortures" to which the Germans living in the 
Czechoslovak Republic were subjected....10 
Widespread disorders resulted from this speech,  forcing the Czech 
government to declare martial law. 
The following day, Sept. 13, the Sudeten German Party submitted 
an ulti::atum demanding the withdrawal in six hours of Czech police from 
all areas containing a majority German population,   declaring that unless 
this demand was acceded to the Party would not be  responsible for the 
ensuing disorders.     On the fourteenth,  the negotiations were declared 
ended.    On the fifteenth,  the party demanded  nothing short of return to 
the Reich.    Henlein and the other leaders fled across the border. 
On April 28 and 29, shortly aftor the Karlsbad speech, Daladier 
and Sonnet flew to London to confer on the Sudeten question.    No new 
commitments, no new obligations were undertaken.    Since February France 
had  given Czechoslovakia ten assurances  of her support.    Some reservists 
E Ibid.,  no. 237. 
10 Robert Langer, OP. cit.. p.  209. 
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had been called up on September 7, but even after Hitler's Nuremberg 
speech she did nothing more. 
^eiStPd
tthS+°\
Septemb^r ? ft*nee decided *e*inst mobilization indicated that she was eliding down from her previous position, 
ana throwing herself into the arm  of the  British inner" cabine?. 
I? L™T^to  acceptance by her of the Chamberlain conception 
of Germanic >,itteleuropa, and incidentally the open surrender of 
her twenty years'   postwar policy.!? 
France agreed to England's proposal of a personal conference 
with Hitler. Therefore, on September 15, Prime Minister Chamberlain 
met the Ffthrer at Berchtesgaden. 
Chamberlain was already an old man and was moved by the conviction 
that there was no problem in the world that could not be settled 
by two decent,   sensible men in a decent,  sensible,  heart-to-heart 
talk.    Hitler, of course, was not concernec with the honest solu- 
tion of any problem at all,  or even a compromise.     Hitler simply 
wanted the destruction of Czechoslovakia.12 
At the conference,  it was agreed that Czechoslovakia should be pressured 
into agreeing to a plebiscite and to relinquishing the Sudeten area.     On 
September 19, Daladier am.   Bonnet flew to London, and the next day a 
note was submitted by the British and French ambassadors in Prague 
stating that they were 
both convinced that,  after recent events,  the point has now be  n 
reached where the further maintenance of the Czechoslovak State 
of the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Deutsch cannot,   in 
fact,  continue any longer without imperilling the   interests of 
Czechoslovakia herself and  of European peace.     In the light   of 
these considerations  both Governments have been compelled to the 
conclusion that the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czecho- 
slovakia's vital interests cannot effectively be assured unless 
these areas are now transferred to the Reich. ° 
Italy offered troops to police the contested areas before the plebi- 
scite.    Hungary,  upon German request,20 and  Poland, acting independently, 
demanded plebiscites in areas containing their national minorities, 
■j-' Hanc.  op.  cit.. p. 1S6. 
J Walter Goerlitz, History of tie German General Staff (New York : 
iTaeger,  1953), p. 337. 
Z  iiOCUT" 
^ Ibid 
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documents, OP. cit..   ser. D., vol. II, no. 523, P. 832. 
U ..  no.  554.     If necessary,  Hungary was to threaten to  leave the 
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claims to which Hitler premised full support.    Yugoslavia, a member of 
the Little Entente, practiced a benevolent neutrality towards the Axis 
and declared that she would not fight unless Hungary made an unprovoked 
attack.    Also on the nineteenth, the Ger:^n Foreign Office notified the 
Prague Embassy:  "Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein's request, 
to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their 
deiisnds for autonomy tomorrow.n2^ 
On the twentieth, the Czech government suggested arbitration 
and attempted to invoke the Czech-German Arbitration Treaty of October, 
1925, part of the Locarno system.    She was denied a hearing.    The fol- 
lowing day, 
the Czechoslovak Government, forced by circumstances, yielding to 
unheard-of pressure and drawing the consequences from the communi- 
cations of the French and British Governments of September 21,  1938, 
in which both Governments expressed their point of view as to help 
for Czechoslovakia in case she should be attacked by Germany, ac- 
cepts the  Anglo-French proposals with feelings of pain....It notes 
with regret that these proposals were elaborated without previous 
consultation with the Czechoslovak Government. 
On the twenty-second, the Hodza government resigned,   being replaced by 
one headed by  General Jan Sirovy. 
On September 22 and 23, Chamberlain met with Hitler again,  this 
time at Godesberg.    Hitler said "it pains me terribly, but this will not 
work anymore,"2* and presented to a dismayed Chamberlain further demands 
for the immediate unconditional cession and total evacuation of all 
areas  containing a  50$ German population.    A plebiscite was to  be held 
later, but unless these demands were accepted by October 1 there would 
be war.    A boundary shoula be drawn first, and   ihen the malcontents on 
either side allowed to move.    Czechoslovakia must also give up her un- 
1 Conspiracy anu Aggression,   OP.  cit..  vol.  I,  p.   551. 
^ Robert Langer,  op.  cit..  p.  213. 
*3 Lukacs,  OP.  cit.. p. 155. 
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friendly alliances and settle her disputes with all her neighbors. 
Then only would  Germany consider negotiating a nonaggression pact or 
guaranteeing the new frontiers.2^ 
Hitler claimed that in fourteen days 120,000 refugees had 
poured across the border into Germany.    Chamberlain in despair reminded 
the Ftihrer that the principle of cession had already been granted by 
Czechoslovakia.    Would Germany,  for merely the difference of a few 
days,  spoil all her chances of collaboration with England";   News  of the 
Czech r.obi. ization came at that point  in the conference,  and Ribbentrop 
declared that Chamberlain should not think that his efforts to keep 
the peace had  failed with the Fuhrer.    ^uch an accusation should  be 
laid at the door of Prajue.     3ut tie  German ultimatum was recast   in 
the form of a memorandum.  -* 
The period from September 24.-29 was a ti-.e of acute international 
crisis.    The  semi-military government  under Sirovy rejected  the Godes- 
berg demands.    France, Hungary and Poland were partially mobilized, as 
was the British fleet.    Rumania strengthened her borders and appealed 
to Italy not to let Hungary do anything which might force Rumanian 
intervention.    Russia  blasted the West and called  for collective secu- 
rity, but made no appreciable! military movis.    Neither was there any 
in Prague.    The Western plan as submitted at Berchtesgaden had ignored 
the Polish and Hungarian minorities but now Western pressure got Prague 
to agree to cede the Teschen area to Poland.    Sir Nevile Henderson 
stated that 
if His Majesty's Government do not at/this eleventh hour advise 
Czechoslovakia in the name of humanity and of the Czechoslovakians 
themselves, since we cannot in practice help them, to make the 
% Documents,  OP.  cit..   ser.  D.,  vol.   II,   no.   562. 
25 Ibid., no.  533,584. 
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best terms they can with Berlin, we shall be exposing Czechoslovakia 
to the same fate as Abyssinia.    Moreover,  if we do not seize this 
last chance of pinning Herr Hitler down to his public statement 
yesterday that the Sudetens are the last of his territorial claims 
in Europe, we shall be exposing Central Europe to even worse things 
in the future.26 
The French premier expressed the sentiments of the Western nations 
generally when he said "how horrible, fantastic,   incredible it   is that 
we should  be digging trenches and trying on gas masks because  of a 
quarrel in a faraway country between people  of whom we know nothing."27 
If Germany had attacked at that time, nevertheless, England and 
France would probably have declared war.2**    The French officials flew 
to London again on the twenty-fifth,  and only ],aladier fought the  issue. 
A note was sent to Czechoslovakia saying that they no  longer expected 
her to remain passive.     On the twenty-sixth,   Italy cabled  asking for a 
delay and a four-power  conference,  and  on September 28—Saint Wenceslas' 
Day—Hitler agreed.    His acceptance was due partly to some  of his ad- 
visers, partly to international pressure.     It was the last time Hitler 
listened to  Italy. 
Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Dalacier were present at 
the Munich Conference on September 29, 1939.    Neither Czechoslovakia 
nor Russia was   invited. 
On the eve of the Munich Conference the situation was no longer 
uncompromised.    It was dominated by the efforts of the British 
Government which was determined, under Neville Chamberlain's 
leadership, to keep the empire out of war at any price.     It was 
dominated by Lord Runciman's report  which favored  the Sudeten 
Germans and by the decisions made in London and accepted reluc- 
tantly in Prague which settled the main poLnts  concerning the return 
to Germany of  the contested districts.     It was dominated by the 
false position in which the Czechoslovak Government was unfortunately 
placed.    Finally it was dominated  not only by the anxiety to spare 
England the horrors of war but quite as much by the Franco-British 
2° Lukacs.  OP. cit.   p.  159. The  speech referred to was the Sportpalast 
speech of September 26. 
27 Ibid., p. 160. 
Documents,. opf  cit..  ser. D., vol.  II, no. 657. 
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desire to gain time and to profit thereby in order to complete 
preparations  for armaments which were held to  be  insufficient  or 
faulty. & 
The whole  conference took  place  in an atmosphere of half-sincere 
optimism.    It was realized that nothing could keep Germany out of 
Czechoslovakia,  and that,  once  in,  nothing short of an extended war 
could get her out.    All hopes were pinneo upon the fact that Hitler 
would keep his word.     3y then,  however,   it was realized  that there was 
more behind the  Nazi demands than mere  zeal for the  ingathering of 
the VoJLk. 
Thus, to avert war at an inauspicious time, the Czechs were being 
driven  into the abyss,  and  they were blamed  for not moving faster. 
Possibly Czechoslovakia was doomec either way;   but except for M 
Daladier, no one seems to have piven sufficient thought to the 
worse situation which would arise when Hitler took up the next 
point  in his programme.30 
The conference lasted twelve hours in all. Germany was granted 
the cession of the entire Sudeten German territory, subject to correc- 
tions by a later plebiscite. The evacuation was to begin on October 1 
and be completed by the tenth. The disputed areas were to be examined 
by an international commission, which was to draw the final frontiers. 
There was to be no dismantling of installations. The Polish and Hun- 
garian minority questions were to be settled within three months, pen- 
ding which a second congress would meet to guarantee the new frontiers 
against unprovoked attack 31 
Peace  had  been saved  by the agreement  of four Great Powers,  an agree- 
ment the cost  of which was to  be  borne by a fifth smaller one whom 
the four had  "induced" to acquiesce  in the necessary consequences; 
Munich was the precise implementation of the Four-Power proposal 
that Mussolini had made  in 1933.    The directorate of  Europe had  come 
into effective  existence and  others must take notice  of  its  collec- 
29 Andre' Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years (New York : Harcourt Brace 
and Co., 1949), p. 268. 
3° L.  3.  Namier,   Europe  in Decay  (London4 Kacmillan,   1950),  p.  178. 
31 Documents, op.   cit.. ser. D., vol.  II,   no. 669. 
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tive power and will;   it had indeed the power to preserve the pence 
so long as  it  continued to function.    Here was  confirmation,  if any 
were still needed, of the demise of the French system and of the 
Versailles arrangements.-*2 
Upon the periphery of this "directorate," observing and ignored, 
lay the Soviet Union.    Germany hac   plainly stated that her goal was to 
isolate this enigmatic nation, yet the West had deliberately cut her 
out  of the settlement.    The Chamberlain circle had  deep personal ill 
feelings towards the Socialist Fatherland and spurned all Russian offers 
to confer.    It was universally believed that Stalin's purges had greatly 
weakened the Ru.-sian military establishment.    Partly due to allied war- 
time propaganda,  partly due to Russian insinuation,   it was formerly 
believed almost universally that Russia alone woulc hove stood faithfully 
by her obligations to Czechoslovakia,  if only she ©uld have been sure of 
Western support.     In all  probability,  however,  Russia would have  been 
as little likely as .'England or France to intervene in case of an iso- 
33 lated German-Czech war.        Even so, Russia was given no chance to prove 
her intentions.    She constantly urged France to greater effort*, but 
since a war  in the West would have been so obviously to her advantage 
her moves created only suspicion.     It is true also that the Russo-Polish 
Fact of 1926 forbade  Russia to crosc Polish territory without  permission, 
which she  was unable to secure,  either from Poland  or from Rumania.    All 
Russian aid,  therefore,  could  have been given only conditionally and 
would have probably been of dubious weight in holding back a Nazi of- 
fensive.     But  it  is equally true that Russia,   in her statements  on the 
problem,  avoided concrete  statements of intent during the whole  crisis 
period.    The diplomatic corps  in Moscow was virtually unanimous   in the 
-"L Albrecht-Carrie',  OP. cit.. p. 526. 
33 c. f. Lukacs, OP. cit..  pp.  166-189 for an excellent treatment of 
this subject. 
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opinion that Russia was unwilling to con.it herself.    There was little 
mention of the crisis in the Russian press, and no ,obilizatioB.    There 
was the dinarche to Poland, the threat to denounce the Russo-Polish 
Nonaggression Pact if the Czech border were violated; but such a denun- 
ciation did not carry with it any obligation to fight. 
Stalin later claimed that Munich had driven him into making a 
settlement with Hitler.    It was justifiable, however, to doubt whether 
any Russian offer to move into Central Europe could have been regarded 
as unselfish altruism.     The piper would  have  to be payed  by whichever 
side Russia took.    To have acauie«?p°ri  in ° c„,; + acquiesced  in a Soviet encampment upon Central 
Europe would have done as much da»ge  to tt B1O  .       ■   .^stern 
liberal democracy as the Munich Conference did; nevertheless, by refus- 
ing to allow the Soviet Union even token participation in the discussions, 
the West left her with a  completely free hand  to look to her own advan- 
tage    and with an excellent propaganda weapon.    Meanwhile,   she remained 
in the eyes of many the only bulwark against Nazism. 
There was great joy in the Western camp until it was realized 
what price had been paid for peace.    Sir Samuel Hoare of Hoare-Laval 
fame,  in speaking of the results of the Munich Conference, declared that 
3ritain had made a very great achievement in substituting "for unlimited 
and uncontrolled military invasion a limited and controlled cession of 
territory under the supervision of an international body."34    Another 
more realistic,  observer was able to see that "we have now obtained, by 
peaceful means,   what we have fought four wars to prevent happening,   namely, 
the domination of Europe by a single power."35    In reality, the most con- 
crete result of Munich was the virtual elimination of Western influence 
upon the European continent and the absolute domination of the whole 
3* R. W.  Seton-Watson,  op.  cit..  p.  124. 
35 Ibia..  p.   1^0. 
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Danube area by Nazi Germany. 
Also important was the fact that Hitler was fully and completely 
confirmed in his contempt of the West and in his conviction that, even 
if it were to offer resistance to his plans, he would win a resounding 
victory. 
The importance of the difference between democratic and totali- 
tarian systems must be stressed  in this connection.     In the Nazi 
book,  and purely in terms of power, the Anglo-French consent to the 
annexation of Sudetenland could well imply their acceptance of the 
Prague coup, since the former event had effectively destroyed the 
significance of Czechoslovakia.     3ut,  especially in British eyes, 
there was all the difference between l.unich (an implementation of 
self-determination) and Prague  (the denial of it).    There could be 
no justification for the bartering of the independence of the Baltic 
states other than crude considerations of power.    Relevant as these 
might be, they would have arroused a storm of moral ind it-nation in 
Britain.    Thus, fundamentally divergent ideologies lead to authentic 
misunderstanding and consequent recriminations.3° 
Thus also it may be said that "the Munich Conference,  which represents 
the summit of Hitler's political success, begot in him that overweening 
self-confiaence which was to prove his undoing."37   Kunich, on the other 
hand, seemed to have an immensely sobering effect upon the policy of 
the West.    It was as if a dousing with the cold fact of the immensity 
of Nazi egotism finally snappeu it out    of its state of almost hypnotic 
appeasement.    "War has been averted,  for which the world is immeasurably 
grateful," said Anthony Men early in October; "but let it be remembered, 
it has been averted,  not at our expense,  not at the expense of any Great 
Power, but at the cost of grave injustice to a small and friendly nation. 
Suffering innocence has always had a tremendous impact upon the Western 
world ever since a religion was foundec upon such suffering as the sal- 
„33 
vation of a  sinful mankind, It was remembered that Czechoslovakia was 
not even heard in her own defense, 
53 Albrecht-Carrie',   OP.   cit..  p.  538. 
37 
38 
Goerlitz, OP. cit.. p. 3^0 
Robert Langer, OP. cit.. p. 217. 
Map IHiwtratini tne Gtrmari Memorandum 
PttMnted at i<\te,t*rg, September Z3, 1938 
TS* Sudeten Germ»h -territory to 
be ceded 
Addlti'ov\»l plebiscite areas 
(Munich-- 
Territory to be occupied by G*r- 
wuh troopt from October 1 on*«rd) 
*T 
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The Munich decision gave Germany a large   Increment  in manpower, 
industry,  resources,  and  space,  and eliminated a  strong potential enemy 
from her path.    The new frontier was in actual fact not ethnic,  but 
strategic.    The gain vis a  vis Poland was tremendous,  completely   out- 
flanking that  country's main defenses.     Nazi propaganda  In Central Eu- 
rope doubled anc- trebled  in weight.    Hitler once i.ore triumphed   over 
his own generals, who bad become restless.     It might be argued that the 
allies gained relatively more by securing: needed tioe in which to arm 
themselves;  that while Britain and France wore divided at Munich,  they 
were united and determined later.    The argument for ethnic self-deter- 
mination was a telling one.    The attack upon Czechoslovakia was  by no 
means a  clear case of aggression,  as were Hitler's later escapades. 
Munich was true to the soirit of the times, to the sick fear of war on 
the nart  of the masses.    Yet  only a very few of their responsible lea- 
ders really believed that Hitler's numerous outspoken protestations of 
a desire for war, were mere bluff.    The West lost the Czech military 
force,  which was not  so  inconsiderable,  while the  remainder of the 
country was left thoroughly indefensible.    Although outflanked by Anschluss, 
Czechoslovakia had still possessed her mountain fortifications which 
were such a near copy of the Maginot Line.    When Czechoslovakia was 
"removed from the arc of mountain states protecting the southern section 
of Central Europe, all the three old military routes to the Lanube basin 
would be open: the western,  Germanic route,   and northern,  Mongolian- 
39 
German route,  anci the eastern,  Mongolian route." 
Thereafter, Hitler renewed the totalitarian offensive throughout 
the Balkans. 
39 Schacher.   OP.  cit..  P«  8£. 
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All over central-eastern Europe, the greatest indirect effect of the 
Czechoslovakian affair was the rise  of Nazi prestige,   especially 
among the Nazi-type movements of the central-eastern European states. 
With the exception of Yugoslavia,  where wide  indignation against the 
foreign policy of Stoyadinovic was growing, people cowered while the 
Nazis crowed.     In the economic and financial field, 1938 witnessed 
the peak of German penetration both  in the Baltics and  in the 3alkans. 
After Munich, many of the disillusioned were b turn to the Communists: 
as the prestige of  the West fell to  great depths, the glorious 
image o** the  "Eastern Defender"  rose again on the horizon.     In Greece, 
Bulgaria, and  in Yugoslavia, the underground Communist party was 
rapidly increasing  in strength. 4-0 
For the West, Kunich wr.s moral suicide. 
The major objective of Chamberlain's diplomacy had  been ra :>t»ro- 
chement with Germany.    The Anglo-German declaration eschewing war in 
the relations  of the two countries seemed  to be the culmination of this 
policy.    3ut just  as Munich was,   in effect, the end  of appeasement,   so 
it might also  be  called  the point of no return for Hitler's method of 
bluff and force.     "Munich...foreed his hand.    The suspicions of the world 
were aroused,  and  he had  to act quickly if he was  to preserve and  exploit 
his superiority. "^ 
Before  the defeat of the  West,  reliance upon French support was 
one of the most stable and unquestioned facts in Eastern European politics. 
Except for continuing and accelerating Britain's progress of rearm- 
ament, neither 3ritain nor the French Government did anything to 
counteract  the dangers which so sudden a change  in the balance  of 
power in Central Europe was certain to create.     Germany's success 
was so sweeping that it acted as an almost irresistable  stimulus to 
further demands and further action.    The precedent which one case 
of territorial revision had established was in itself a  new incen- 
tive to push the change  of other boundaries which from th* point 
of view of self-determination had  equally good  justification.     In- 
stead of balancing these unsettling factors by  immediate and unmis- 
takeable diplomatic   counter-moves,  the  British Government rejoiced 
over the establishment of "peace  in our time," with such satisfaction 
and optimism as to  create the  impression that further  "Kunichs" 
would be acceptable  if they were presented as the necessary price 
for continued peace.** 
4y Lukacs. op. cit.. p.  165. 
@-  Le Mendelssohn,   o-j.   cit..  p. 
42 Wolfers, OP. cit..  p. 290. 
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A huge fortified fascist citadel was being formed in Central Europe. 
Lebensraum seemed to be closer than ever before in the whole history of 
the idea.    Yet  "in proportion as Central Europe is organized on a basis 
of racial unity, political and religious intolerance, ona  super-central- 
ized  civil and military administration, anc  therefore becomes a  standing 
menace to the  liberties  of the rest of the world,   in exactly the same 
proportion will that ancient tendency of European balance acquire  fresh 
momentum."^    Western Europe had been pushed against the wall by the 
fascist advance.    Now it must fight or be crushed. 
*»  R.  W. Seton-'Jatson,  pp. cit..  p.   139. 
PART IV 




THE LIQUIDATION CF PRAGUE: THE END OF APPEASEMENT 
After the Hunich terms were carried out, Czechoslovakia was 
completely paralyzed. All her railroad lines running from west to 
east crossed Nazi-dominated territory several times. Also in the 
German area were the Northern Bohemian coal fields, upon which the 
Czech industries had relied and for which they were now forced to pay 
stiff German prices.  There was no tariff between Sudetenland and the 
rump state, but Czechoslovakia was to allow no industrial expansion 
without the permission of Germany. 
All the Czech currency in the Sudeten area was called in and 
exchanged for German marks, and the old money w s thenupon presented 
to the Czech government with a demand for payment in gold and foreign 
1 
exchange, delivery of which was nade early in March, 1939. Part of 
the Czech currency was used to lake strategic purchases; very valuable 
properties were acquired without the use of a bit of Nazi foreign 
exchange or gold—without, in fact, Germany's spending anything of her 
own. The liquidation of the Sudeten branch banks placed the financial 
system of Czechoslovakia under heavy strain.  Along with gold and foreign 
exchange, Germany commandeered all usable supplies and as many key 
economic positions as could be obtained. Czech state property in the 
Sudeten area became Reach property, and steps were taken to integrate 
1 Documents. IV, no. 38., p. 201. 
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Czechoslovakia's economy with Germany's. This same technique of 
financial "Aryanization" was used in all German-occupied territories. 
"Financial Aryanization" was a new method of international spoliation 
against which there was neither economic nor military defense. 
Czechoslovakia was larger and more populous than Austria, and 
afcreditor nation which was able to export both foodstuffs and manu- 
factured goods. Her arms, steel and fuel output accounted for more 
than half of the war power of East Central Europe, exclud"ng Germany, 
2 
and Czechoslovakia was the chief source of supply in that area.  At 
Munich, Czechoslovakia lost not only her expensive system of mountain 
defenses but also almost every advantage given her in 1918 to make her 
economically viable. Complete economic cooperation with the Reich was 
imperative. It was so impossible for the-  rump state to exist of itself, 
Germany had her so completely by the throat, that Hitler could very 
well consider Munich to have been a mandate to rule the rest of the 
country. The use of force was absolutely unnecessary. The whole situa- 
tion fitted in with Hitler's schemes. 
In March of 1939, Hitler claimed that "Central Eu.-ope was a 
definite compact economic unit which could live only if it were com- 
3 
pletely at peace." As a result of Munich, Germany's drain on the 
resources of East Central Europe and Italy greatly increased, as did 
her control over the area's vital communications. Germany alone was the 
2D. Graham Hutton, Survey after Munich. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939), 
p. 125. 
3 Documents. IV, no. 202, p. 244. 
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dominant econo-ic power of the region, and furthermore her assault upon 
the economic sovereignty of the Central European nations continued to 
go unopposed.    Weeks after M nich, King Carol of Rumania was in London 
making a futile attempt to obtain aid.    Carol's abdication wa^ forced 
in September of 194.0 and  thus 
the last potential major enemy of the  Axis disappeared down 
the chute  of history,  and  the  situation appeared  more and more 
promising to Hitler's advisers.     Hungary and  Bulgaria were meek 
followers  of Hitler,  and Yugoslavia was expected  to succumb 
sweetly  to German pressure and Greece  to Italian coercion.4 
By  October  of 194-0,  German  troops were in Rumania,  and by November she 
had  joined  the  Axis.     Lebensraum,  from the time  of Munich,   seemed almost 
a fait accompli.     As a result  of Munich, 
the remnant of Czechoslovakia became a  semi-feudal  state under 
the control of the Third Reich.    The French alliance, the Rus- 
sian alliance, the Little Entente died.    After Munich, even 
Italy was forced  to play a  subordinate role  in Europe and  seek 
her territorial expansion  in  Africa and  the Mediterranean.5 
Detailed plans were made almost at  once for the forcible  in- 
corpora4ion  of the rest of Czechoslovakia.     The directive for its 
liquidation was  issued  on  October 21,  1938.      These steps were taken 
solely on the basis  of  t.he will-to-power of the  Aryan  "superman," for 
formal  sovereignty of the area could make  but little practical dif- 
ference  in  the extent of German control.     On October 14.,  the new Czech 
Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky admitted  his  country's past -'stakes, 
promised a complete volte-face in his country's foreign policy, and 
asked  for a  German guarantee of her new frontiers  and  a  probationary 
period in which to accomplish the new orientation.' 
' Joseph S.   Roucek,  Balkan Politics   (Stanford,   Calif.:   Stanford  U.  Press, 
1948), p. 264. 
I Fifield, op. cit..  p. 61. 
6 "The aim is the  speedy occupation of Bohemia and Moravia  ifld  the 
cutting off of Slovakia." Documents,  OP. cit.. ser. D, vol.  IV, no. 81, p.  100. 
7 Ibid., no. 61. 
tin. 
Czechoslovakia realized  that her only conceivable path  lay in cooperation 
with Germany and her best hope of safety lay in getting Germany to 
make a definite settlement.     In December,  Hencke,  the charge d'affaires 
In Prague, wrote that 
leading men in Prague realize that future far-reaching demands 
will be made by Germany in the field  of foreign policy,   mili- 
tary affairs,   and  econorics.    Th°y hone,  however,  that  their 
country can ~eta:n her outward  independence a"d   that some form 
may be found  for the vassal-relationship which they can  justify 
to their own people.    The 6zech public will prefer any clear 
solution wh'ch leaves the country In possession  of formal 
sovereignty to the    resent state  of uncertainty. 
Hencke believed  that discretion and fear would  /revent disloyalty, 
especially among the higher officials.     But this guarantee which 
Chvalkovsky desired wts refused again and again upon the pretext 
that Czechoslovakia must settle all her differe ces first,   "clarify 
9 
her internal developments" and improve her relations.     Chvalkovsky 
protested  in vain that he could not consolidate  the nev; policy inter- 
10 
nally until he was guaranteed  externally. 
It was felt to be t'esirable to avoid creating the impression 
that Germany was interfering in Czech internal affairs, and  the policy 
was to take as many matters as possible out of the hands  of  the 
international commission which was created at Munich to supervise the 
da wing  of the new frontier.     S'nce Czechoslovakia could  still hold back 
an estimated  25 German divisions  in case  of war,   it was  considered  vital 
to  insure her neutrality. 
8 Ibid., p. 182, No. 150. 
9 Ibid., p. 175. 
10 Ibid.,  p. 176. 
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Germany had been fostering Slovak separatism from the very 
start, because "an independent Slovakia voulr be weak constitutionally 
and would therefore best further the German need for penetration and 
11 
settlement in the east."   Self-determination was to be exploited 
to the full, and Hungary and Poland had to be kept at bay but not 
opposed outright .  At first, Hitler considered using the Carpatho- 
Ukraine as a propaganda basr against the Ukrainian minorities located 
in Poland, Russia, and Rumania; but after Ukrainian nationalist leaders 
had set up a government in the expectation of German support he allowed 
Hungary to arch in an' take over the region, establishing a common 
frontier with Poland. On March 13, 1°39 the German government invited 
Sidor Tiso, Premier of the Slovakian department of Czechoslovakia whom 
Prague had just deposed for insubordination, to Berlin to speak with 
Hitler. On the fourteenth, Tiso issued the following: 
In the name of the legal Slovak government I have the honor to 
inform "our Excellency that the sovereign Slovak nation has 
today thrown off the intolerable Czechoslovakian yoke and, in 
accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the 
population, the independence of our state has been proclaimed. 
Independent Slovakia is determined to live in peace and friendship 
with all her neighbors.  In the early stages of her development, 
however, the young state requires strong protection.  In the 
name of the people and of the Government of the new Slovakia, I 
request Your Excellency, as the Fflhrer of the great German Reich, 
which under your rule has always supported freedom and the self- 
determination of peoples, to take over the guarantee for the existence 
of our state and to take immediately all necessary measures for the 
protection of its frontiers. 
11 IMA, ,  ,       r No. U5,  p. U6. 
12 M.I      • No« 209» P* 250« 
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The same day Ribbentrop was able to say to the Italian ambassador that 
the Czechoslovakia!! state is breaking up.    Slovakia has declared 
her independence.    The rump territories of Bohemia and Moravia 
are  in a desperate state.     Chaotic  conditions  prevail   *n the 
German-language  enclaves.     Incidents have also been reported 
from the  north.     There German troops are about to  occupy certain 
areas.     The fate  of our fellow-Germans  In Bohemia  and  Moravia 
is causing us  great concern." 
On the same day also,   President Hacha  and  Foreign Minister 
Chvalkovsky went  to  Berlin to talk to  the Ftihrer.     On "arch 15,  at 
6:00 A.M.,   the  invasion of  Czechoslovakia be^an.     Great Britain,  disliking 
to interfere but concerned with the general state of peace, deplored 
"any action  in Central Europe which would  cause a  setback  in the growth 
of this  general confidence  on which all  Improvement in  the  economic 
situation depends...."1*    WeizsScker of the German Foreign  Office  "spoke 
rather sharply"  to the French  Ambassador and 
told him not to mention the Munich  Agreement,  which he alleged 
had been violated,  and  not to five us any lectures.     Munich had 
contained  two elements,  namely,  the maintenance  of peace and 
French disinterest in the Eastern  European questioo.     France 
should  at least turn her eyes westward  to her empire and  not 
talk of matters whe^e,  as experience had sV>own,  her participation 
had  rot served  th° cause of neace.-'--' 
German troops were then flooding across what was left of 
Czechoslovakia.     Hitler Issued  the following proclamation: 
In the name of the Ftihrer and  Chancellor the decree  of March 16, 
1939,  regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia  is hereby 
proclaimed. 
For a  thousand years the provinces of Bohemia  and Moravia formed 
a part of the  Lebensraura of the German people;   they were arbi- 
trarily torn from their ancient historical  setting by force and 
13 Ibid., no. 224, p. 261. 
U Ibid., no. 234, p. 275. 
15 Ibid., no.  233, p.  273. 
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folly and,  by their ultimate fusion  into the artificial structure 
of  Czechoslovakia,  became a center  of constant unrest.   ..It showed 
its   'nherent  inability to survive and has therefore now fallen a 
victim to actual dissolution....It  1s  therefore  in keeping with 
the  law of self-preservation  that the German Reich  is  now resolved 
to  intervene decisively to rebu'ld  the  foundations  of a reasonable 
order in Europe and  to  take th-   necessary steps for  this purpose. 
For in the thousand  years of history it has already  -roved  that, 
than  s to the g-eatness  and  the qualities of the  German people, 
it alone  is called  up to •ndertake  this task.     Inspired by the  solemn 
c'esire to serve the real   'Interests  of the nationalities living in 
this area,  to  Insure an  individual  national  life to the German 
and  Czech peoples,  and  to -romote  the  nodal welfare of "ill,   I, 
therefore,  in the name  of the  German Reich decree...a  basis  for the 
future coe-'l stence  of th«  Inhabitants  of these areas.-'-" 
Bohemia  and  Moravia became part of the  Greater German Reich,  giving up 
control  of their  German  citizens,   their foreign affairs,   transportation, 
post,  telegraph,   and  customs to Germany.     They were autonomous and  self- 
coverninp under a   supreme head wMch had  to have the confidence of Hitler, 
and  "in  conformity with  the political,  military,  and  economic require- 
ments of the Reich."17 
The march   into  Prague took place while  President Hacha was  in 
Berlin,  where he  signed  his  country away under  threat of the bombing of 
his capital.18 ' Even for Mussolini,  the move came as a surprising uni- 
lateral fait accompli.     Many of the career experts of  the Foreign Office 
were completely caught  off guard,  and  most informed Germans were 
stunned.11?    The move was  a tour de force,  a  gratuitous piece of brazen 
16 Ibid., no. 2^6, p.  283. 
17 Ibid., p.   28°. 
18 The Communique' released at the  time  states that  "both  sides  gave 
expression to their mutual conviction that the aim of all  efforts  in this 
part of  Central Europe  should be the safeguarding of calm,   order and   peace. 
The Czechoslovak  President declared  that in  order to serve  this purpose, 
and in  order  to secure final  pacification,  he placed  the destiny of the 
Czech people and  country with confidence in  the hands  of the Fflhrer and 
the German Reich."    Robert Langer,   Seizure of Territory  (Princeton,   V.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 194?)* p.  219. 
19 U. S.   Library of Congress,  OP.   cit.,  p.  50. 
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assault.     Germany's  control over truncated  Czechoslovakia was  to all 
practical purposes, virtually     ie occupation of Prague,  was a mere 
footnote to ffunich.     But it marked a definite transition  in Nazi 
foreign policy,  the abandonment of the well-exploited desire for 
German ethnic unity and the first bold adoption of Lebensraum as an 
apology for expansion. 
On March 21 the territory of Memel was demanded  of Lithuania. 
The West was merely perplexed,   and did nothing.    Nothing at all would 
ev-^r have been done,  if Hitler had been able to restrain himself at 
that point and to consolidate his far-flung but ill-digested gains. 
England had,   in January,  declared voluntary military service,     and 
had drawn closer to France.    But the fall of Prague completely changed 
the whole scene.    The-   eyes of the most backward diplomat in the 
British and French Foreign Offices were opened now to the danger of 
an actual Lebensraum. for here at last was an act of aggression open 
to all the world.    There began to be something approximating Western 
unity of opinion.    Coulondre said,  "Germany is still the nation of 
20 
scraps of paper."      Appeasement was dead.    The German move this time 
resulted in an immediate Western reaction.    England took the lead in a 
new policy of action and definite commitments the like of which, para- 
doxically enough, France had advocated from the very signing of 
Versailles;  and to this paradox was added the ironical fact that, when 
the Wst demonstrated its first determination to stop Hitler,  the 
nations of Eastern Europe were extremely sceptical. 
20 Lukacs,  OP.  cit.. p. 204. 
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Hitler was also sceptical.     Allowing ti"ie not even for a 
token breathing space to give the Western Powers a  chance to calm 
their newly-ruffled  feathers,   the Fflnrer turned  the weight of  Ger.-n»n 
pressure upon his next target —Poland.     On the Very clay of the 
Kernel ultimatum,  the  Polish ambassador was given certain proposals 
for the return  of Danzig to the Reich. 
■ 
CHAPTER II 
THE LIQUIDATION OF WARSAW:    THE BEGINNING OF WAR 
Poland had meanwhile continued to pursue its old ambivalent 
foreign policy, veering now towards Germany, now towards the West, 
unable to get along with Czechoslovakia and refusing to cooperate 
with her hereditary enemy Russia.     Poland had always spurned the 
League except in the very earliest days before the rise of Hitler, 
yet her safety lay with the League powers.    Poland had been resurrected 
at a time when both her neighbors,  Ger-any and  Russia, were paralyzed; 
her temporizing policy iade  sense,   or was -ossibly more understand- 
able,  at that  time.     But Poland's history showed dramatically that 
when her neighbors were strong and could agree among themselves,  she 
was in very grave danger. 
A week after Anschluss  Poland had  seemingly rushed  to ape the 
Nazi success by presenting an ultimatum to Lithuania which very nearly 
resulted  in war.    The rationale behind this move w-.s  in part to get rid 
of as many enemies as possible in the face of growing German power, but 
it was a harsh ultimatum and  resulted  in the loss  of much Western sympathy. 
The ultimatum was accepted on March 19, and the affair blew over. 
Poland was always plagued by the nightmare of a German-Russian 
war over her territory.    France's nonaggression pact of 1932 with 
Russia and the Four-Power Pact of 1933 had made Poland, who was ebul- 
lient in her newly-released nationalism, suspicious of the intentions 
of the West.     She was  self-confident,  yet feared an international set- 
tlement  in which she would be left out.     Hitler was locking for a way 
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out of his isolation,  and the result was  the ten-year nonaggression 
pact of June 26, 1934-.    After the signing of the pact, a sort of un- 
official collaboration existed between the two countries.    Their 
interests were in many cases parallel. 
Poland  never opposed Hitler.    When Czechoslovakia was beaten to 
her knees by Germany,  Poland was quick enough  to step in and  demand  the 
hotly-contested Teschen mining area.    Again, part of her motive was 
to keep Germany from obtaining control of that Important road and rail 
center and  of the Moravian Gap.     Yet if the '.'test had  stood  firm at 
'touch the chances are  that the pressure  of Polish public  opinion 
would have forced  the government to take   its stan"  with the West 
against Germany. 
The German Foreign Office recognized this cynical element in 
Folish policy,  and counted on it.     In case of an isolated German- 
Czechoslovakian war,  it was agreed among German observers that Poland 
1    - 
would probably wait and join the winner.     Cne diplomat stated that 
"Poland will not obstruct in any way the efforts of the German dis- 
tricts in Czechoslovakia toward a rapprochement.  or even for  complete 
unity with Germany,  if the present frontiers between Germany and Poland 
are declared  inviolable and  if all plans  for mutual  collaboration and 
2 
for political security are reconciled." 
On Poland's part, the basis of her policy was not love of 
Germany but 
a combination of territorial greed, fear of Revolution on the 
part  of the landowners and  colonels,  mistrust of the  strength 
Documents, ser. D.r, vol. II,   no. 277. 
Ibid-,  no, 271.. 
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and will to resistance of the Western Powers, and the supreme 
confidence of Colonel Beck in his own Machiavellian genius. 
This policy played an extremely important part in the German 
plan for Eastern Europe. 
Between Anschluss and Munich, however, Poland did make a few 
efforts to weld the Baltic States together under her leadership.  She 
had always enjoyed extremely good relations with Hungary, tfid saw in 
the liquidation of Czechoslovakia an excellent chance to obtain a 
common boundary with her ally. Hitler at first opposed such an at- 
tempt, desiring to use the Carpatho-Ukraine, which separated the two 
countries, as a "Piedmont" with which to foster separatism among the 
various UkraViian minorities.  Later, however, he allowed Hungary to 
take the territory, realizing the futility of the opposition against 
him: 
There were people in both capitals /Warsaw and Budapest/, of strong 
anti-German feelinfs, whom hatred of Czechoslovakia had so blinded 
that they genuinely believed that the destruction of the Republic 
and the erection over its corpse of a Hungero-Polish frontier 
would form a strong barrier to Geraan expansionism towards the 
East.  Now that the modern forts of the Bohemian mountain fast- 
nesses and the Skoda armament works were in German hands, an 
impregnable line of defense was to be created from nothing across 
the plains of Pannonia and Galicia.^ 
In reality, Poland was the most immediate sufferer from the Munich 
crisis.  The German-Polish frontier was greatly lengthened and the Poles 
were outflanked. The gigantic propaganda efforts expended by the Reich 
in the Carpatho-Ukraine had stirred up the Polish Ukrainians. Further- 
more, the alliance between Poland and Hungary went no deeper than the 
community of interest felt by the agricultural aristocracy of each, and 
Hungary was more and more und?r the influence of Berlin. 
3 Seton-Watson, H., on- cit.. p. 389. 
U  Ibid., p. 395. 
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Hitler never had any intention of stopping at Prague. The 
question of Danzig, of course, and of the Polish Corridor ranked high 
on the Nazi list of objectives. They had been taken away as a result 
of the hated Versailles Diktat, and contained a considerable German 
minority.  The Free City of Danzig, autonomous within the customs 
area of Poland, commanded the mouth of the Vistula and Polish Pomorze 
and Poznania; and until the port of Gdynia was built up it was vir- 
tually Poland's only good outlet to the Sea. The population of Danzig 
was almost pure German, and as such it had long since beer, wooed and 
won by Nazi propaganda.  Its relations "ith Poland were tense and often 
to the boiling point. 
Hitler began baiting Poland over the Danzig question as early 
as September, 1^38.  The discussions then were fairly friendly and the 
Polish government refused to make concessions. On October 2Ut  1938, 
Ribbentrop proposed the return of Danzig to the Reich and the con- 
struction of an extraterritorial highway and railroad across the Cor- 
ridor which would link Bast and West Prussia and Danzig. From October, 
1938 to March, 1939, both sides engaged in a series of diplomatic moves 
and counter-moves. Germany proposed a solid Central European diplomatic 
bloc consisting of Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, which the West 
would not dare oppose. The Hungarian minister Cslky was impressed; but 
Beck was not, and strangely enough veered towards Russia. Moscow was 
anxious for the Ukraine at that time, and the Polish-Soviet nonaggression 
pact of 1932 was reaffirmed. 
Up to March 15, 1939, relations with Germany were on the sur- 
face cordial.  On January 30, there had been a goodwill speech by Hit- 
ler. On March 15, Poland was invited to join the Anti-Comintern Pact 
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and the question of Danzig was raised again. Almost immediately after 
the occupation of Prague, the German screws Vegan to tighten.  On March 
21, the day of the Kernel ultimatum, Ribbentrop offered the Polish 
ambassador Lipski a guarantee of the Corridor and again suggested an 
extraterritorial railroad and highway and the return of Danzig.  Cn 
March 26, the Polish reserve was called, and Lipski rejected the 
German proposals. 
On March 31, Chamberlain made a speech to the British House of 
Commons in which he pledged every support within the power of the 
country, if Poland were forced to defend herself militarily from an 
attack by the Reich. Fourteen days after the fall of Prague, Britain 
gave her guarantee to the country which lay next in the path of a 
greatly strengthened and arrogant Germany.  France gave a similar 
guarantee on the sixth of April. 
This suddenly removed that which ever since the days of the Ruhr 
had been the one insuperable obstacle to a "politique dd force" 
on the part of France, and a main reason for the spread of a 
soirit of resignation. Even though some French statesmen might 
still have preferred to remain passive, France could hardly do 
so when Britain entered upon a course for which the French had 
pleaded for over twenty years.  It wes not without irony that 
Britain turned to the one-time French point of view just at the 
moment when some prominent French stateTnen were recommending its 
abandonment and the French had lost most of the defences which 
she had sought to build up for the nurpose of pressing this policy 
effectively. 
But Germany protested to Poland that these guarantees were in substance 
an unfriendly alliance and incompatible with the nonaggression pact of 
1934., which was thereby null and void. 
The guarantees did nothing to stop the Reich, for even at that 
moment plans were being made for the invasion of Poland, which bore the 
5 Wolfers, OP. cit.. p. 68. 
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code name of "Case White." Hitler's directive of April 11, 1939, stated 
that "oJr policy aims at confining the war to Poland, and this is con- 
sidered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British 
6 
restraint as a result of this."      The international situation of 1939 
was extremely unsettled:    The Anglo-Franco-Italian Mediterranean rivalry, 
tensions  in the  Near and Middle Fast, French unrest,  Imperial weakness 
and the Irish conflict, all seemed to be greatly in Germany's favor. 
Therefore, Hitler pressed on confident!-', seemingly unaware of the new 
spirit of opposition forming in the West.    Admiral Canaris,  chief of 
the German counter-intelligence, had warned that Britain would open 
hostilities  if  Poland were attacked.     It seems unsure exactly to what 
extent Hitler believed that he could continue his method  of bluff and 
threat and remain unscathed.     Some authorities think that he  seemed 
7 
to discount all danger of military opposition from the West.     On  the 
other hand, when Hitler first informed his General Staff of his in- 
tention to attack, he added,  "we connot expect that the Czech affair will 
8 
be repeated.    It will be w-r."    At least, by the end of March or the 
beginning of April, Hitler knew that Poland was not going to submit to 
his demands and that therefore he ran a definite risk of w?r with 
England and France.     One thing is sure, however. Hitler, whatever he 
thought the chances were of Western resistance, pressed ahead his plans 
with fanatical singleness of mind:    "We shall hold our position in the 
West until we have conquered  Poland;" he  said.     "Our enemies are lit- 
9 
tie men.    I saw them at Munich." 
6 DeMendelssoh^ OP. cit.. p. 82. 
7 c.f.   Ibid., and Namier,   op, fll&i 
8 Angelo Rossi',   fltf Russo-G^rman Alliance■(Boston;   Beacon  Press, 
1951), p. U. ... 
9 DeMendelssohn,   OP.   cit..  p.  104. 
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Cta May 23, 1939, Hitler informed his General Staff that Foland 
must be attacked at the first favorable moment.    The Pole, he main- 
tained, would always place himself on the side of Germany's adversaries. 
But there was, he said, more than the question of safety:  "Danzig is 
not the subject of the dispute at all.    It is a question of expanding 
our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies,  of 
the settlement of the Baltic problem."      It was vital to secure a 
good food supply because of the danger of blockade.     Poland would be 
a good source for the recruitment of labor; but if she wer^llowed to 
maintain her  independence,   she would be a permanent source  of weakness 
against Russia    and would be a constant danger if Germany were engaged 
in a war  in the  West,   where a quick outcome was doubtful.     There was 
therefore no question of sparing Foland. 
Success in P0land depended on keeping the West -ut.    And after 
this victory?" co.e the Low Countries and after that, Englanr •:     "The 
aim will always be to force  England  to her knees."       As far as Hitler 
was concerned,  there was no turning back. 
* 0+arrlHnv stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. 
convictions and male agreeable gestures      They nrestige. 
in the language of *«»Jg*»-     S^TttTSK will  noijnter- 
At last,  the L^b^nsraum was within reach,  and  this was an hour of 
triumph.     In  the  same  soeech,  Hitler declared  that Ger,any 
10 Documents., Vol. I, p. 931. 
11 Ibid., p. 936. 
12 Ibid., p. 399. 
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need not be afraid of a blockade.    The East will supply us with 
grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc.    It is a big arm, which demands 
great efforts.     I am only afraid  that at the last minute  some 
Schweinhund will make a proposal for mediation." 
By the middle of August, when all preparations were virtually 
completed,   Italy was  informed  of her ally's intentions,  which were to 
attack immediately if Poland  offered  another  provocation.,   or  if  she 
did not Take her political position clear by the last of August. Ciano 
asked Ribbentrop what was wanted, Danzig or the Corridor.    "Not any 
H 
longer...," was the reply.     "We want war." 
It was ah hour of triumph for Germany also because,  dizzy 
with  success  beyond  all expectation,   she was presented  with the 6udden 
possibility of an alliance so tremendus that the West would be 
crushed beneath  it*  weight:  an alliance with Russia.     This possibility 
was all the wore surprising since Hitler had been consistently and 
loudly anti-Conmunist,  utilizing the crusade against "Jewish Bolshevism" 
as a major propaganda weapon.    The Anti-Coi^intern alliances were the 
fruit of this policy.    Russia, for her part, had been]jally of France 
ard Czechoslovakia and by her United Front policy had been the only 
consistent opponent of Fascism. 
Since World War I, the two nations had signed the Rapallo 
Treaty of April 16,  1922, which had enabled Germany to evade the mili- 
tary restrictions of Versailles.    When Hitler had come to power, he 
had not repudiated this treatyi but relations had chilled until the 
Munich Conference, from which Russia had been deliberately excluded. 
13 Ibid,., p. 400. 
U DeMendelssohn,  on.   cit. .  p.   Uo. 
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After the Munich triumph, Hitler had hesitated, but not from 
any feeling of diffidence: He was uncertain where to turn next.    If Po- 
land could be neutralized, he could turn West, where he was convinced 
that his major battle lay.     "Until March 1939 his principal aim was to 
solve the problem of Danzig and the Corridor in agreement with the 
Poles by offering them a share  in the corning struggle to partition the 
Ukraine.    The  offer was made and  renewed  to Poland in October 1938,  and 
in January and 'arch,  1939." •*    Russia,  on the other hand,  was hesitat- 
ing also.    Her policy of collective security and cooperation with the 
West had failed.     In a  speech made in June, 1938,  Litvinov washed his 
hands of European developments from which the U. S.  S. R. had been 
excluded and  reserved freedom of action,  although  it was  stressed  that 
Russia was prepared for collective cooperation. 1°   This was s striking 
attempt on the part of Russia to be objective towards German policy. 
So matters stood.    In a speech on March 12, 19 39,  before the 
Eighteenth Party Congress,  Stalin gave the first public hint of senti- 
ment for a Russo-German rapprochement.    Although Hitler had recalled an 
economic mission on its way to    Russia not two months before, Russia 
almost immediately put out feelers for an economic settlement.    They 
were well received.    The mutual vituperations of the two totalitarian 
states began to become more moderate.    On the seventeenth of April,  the 
first important contact was made and the economic talks began to take 
on a political tone. 
The West had been negotiating for some sort of alliance with 
Russia ever since March.    Stalin, who was sure that war was inevitable, 
found himself in the enviable position of being courted by both sides, 
B  Egg; gSg  ft, fiBHteflMMM Alliance  (Boston,: Beacon, 1951), p. 6. 
16 Documents,   OP.   cit..  ser.  D.,  vol.  I,  no. 627. 
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and knew that it was well worth his while to bargain for the best ad- 
vantage. National Socialism was an enemy from the start, but Russia 
also feared that the West would attempt to play tertius gaudens. to sit 
back while two alien ideologies defeated each other in desperate war- 
fare.  The Russian method, therefore, was to dangle the prospect of her 
favors before the eyes of both sides, and to await the highest bidder. 
On the nineteenth of April, the Soviet Union put the Western negotiators 
off by insisting upon a guarantee of Finland and the Baltic States, whether 
these nations would or no, and also upon the right to send troops into 
Poland, which suggestion Poland fought bitterly to the very beginning 
of the war.  The West was much disconcerted, for while they were seeking 
peace and the status quo in Europe they suspected that Russia also was 
seeking territorial gains. 
The Western Powers had a choice between a Four-Power Pact with the 
Dictators, and a new Triple Entente with the U. S. S. R.; either 
entailed the sacrifice of at least some of the smaller states in 
East-Central Europe which, in 1919-1920, they themselves had helped 
to create or aggrandize at the expense of Germany and Russia, and 
on which the French "system" of the 'twenties was based. An agree- 
ment with the Dictators was bound greatly to 'ncrease their mili- 
tary power and resources; and agreement with the U. S. S. R., to 
favor the spread of Bolshevism.  The OM alliance was unpleasant 
and unsafe, and the other even more abhorrent—but nothing was 
gained by a refusal to acknowledge and face the dilemma. The Wes- 
tern Powers swayed uneasily between the two alternatives and even 
when the pendulum swung away from the Dictators they would hardly 
admit, fiace the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935, that it was swinging 
towards the Bolsheviks.17 
'When the West began to court the Soviet Union in earnest, both the 
Fascists and the Democracies were compromised, each firmly settled 
as to his own line of action and each unwilling or unable to turn back, 
whereas the Communists were free agents. When the West gave its uni- 
lateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania, it unwittingly deprived itself 
of its bargaining power vis a vis the Soviet Union, but not even well- 
x7 Namier, o£l_^it., p. 240. 
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informed Western statesmen knew of the secret Russo-German talks. 
Russia was evasive in her dealings with both suitors during 
April and May. But on May 3 Litvinov, genial champion of collective 
security, was dismissed and the hard-boiled Kolotov was appointed 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs in his stead. By the last of May, under 
Ribbentrop's urging, Hitler decided to approach Stalin in earnest. 
Russia used the Bulgarian ambassador to Germany as a go-between 
to communicate the Soviet interest in a non-aggression pact, hinting on 
June 15 that "if Germany would declare that she would not attadk the 
Soviet Union or that she would conclude a nonaggression pact with her, 
the Soviet Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with 
England."18 On June 29, England gave in to Russia's demands that she 
be the guarantor of the Baltic States, but Russia promptly brought up 
another point concerning indirect aggression. All during July, there 
were nervous negotiations being carried on. England and France sent 
military missions to Moscow. The early weeks of August were apparently 
decisive.  On the fourteenth, Germany was to send a negotiator.  On 
that day, Hitler said that "there exist no real conflicts on interest 
between Germany and the U. S. S. R. The living spaces of Germany and 
the U. S. S. R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements 
they do not conflict. Thus, there is lacking all cause for an aggres- 
sive attitude on the oart of one country against the other."39 The 
German sense of urgency was apparent, for by July the plans for the 
invasion of Poland had been completed. The date was set for the latter 
part of August, and Hitler was impatient. Ribbentrop was sent to 
Moscow with full power to negotiate. By August 21 the last details 
» R. Sontag, ed., and J. S. Beddie, F^i-Sovlet relations, 1939-41 
(Washington,: Department of State, 1948), p. ■»• 
*9 Ibid., p. 50. 
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had been decided including a definition of spheres of interest in East 
Central Europe;   on the following day, the German General Staff was. 
told  of the  Impending attack upon Poland,  and on the twenty-third 
Ribbentrop flew to Koscow to sign the pact. 
The text of the treaty pledged nonaggression,  consultation, and 
the arbitration of differences.    Neither country would harbor groups 
hostile to the other.    This treaty was to run for ten years, renewable 
foi  another five years if neither party denounced it.    But to this 
nonaggression treaty was added a secret protocol defining both countries' 
"respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe."    The German sphere 
was to extend to the northern boundary of Lithuanif . and through Poland 
along the Narew, Vistula and 3an Rivers.    The exact nature of the par- 
tition,  and the question of whether or not an independent  Poland was 
to be allowed to stand, were to be decided later.    Russian interests 
in Bessarabia were rec&gnized, and Germany declared herself disinterested 
in the area of south-eastern Europe.    Germany had gained, by this treaty, 
a militarily secure eastern boundary and a benevolently neutral neighbor 
which could supply an embattled Reich with many urgently-needed raw 
materials.    In a trade agreement which was signed on August 29, Russia 
received 200 million Reichsmarks credit for the purchase of German 
Machinery and industrial installments; and she was to pay for these 
purchases by means of deliveries of such raw materials as lumber, cotton, 
feed grain,   oil cake, phosphate, and petroleum.20    This treaty "limited 
to Poland's own resources the opposition which Germany might meet in 
the  East."21    Russia,  for her part,  received  considerable booty without 
any obligation to fight. 
*u Ibid.. P.  84. 
21  Carr,   OP:  cit..  p.   277. 
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England had by then gotten wind of the pending German-Russian 
agreement.     Cn August 22 Chamberlain had warned that England would use 
all her forces in the defense of Poland.    On the following day, the 
same day on which Ribbentrop flew to Moscow, Poland yielded upon the 
point of passage  of Soviet  troops over h«r  territory.     It was  too late, 
of course.     The news of a rapprochement between two supposedly implacable 
enemies hit upon the West with greet force,  and everyone recognized 
that a diplomatid revolution of major proportion had  taken place.    Never- 
theless,  the die was cast as far as Western policy was concerned.     On 
August 26 the Anglo-Polish mutual assistance  treaty was  signed.     After 
these events,   "only the complete  surrender  of the Western Powers  could 
have prevented  the outbreak  of war. "^ 
In speaking  of his handiwork,  Hitler  said  that  "the  conclusion 
of the nonaggression pact marked the turning point of the whole German 
foreign policy,  and  the two governments will now together deprive the 
the most dangerous part of  Europe of its menace." '    He also remarked 
that "a beginning has been made for the destruction of Britain's 
hegemony.     I have made the political preparations.     The way is new 
open for the soldier. »24 
The British Prime Minister said that "whatever may prove to be 
the nature of the German-Soviet agreement,  it can not alter Great Brit- 
ain's  obligations to Poland,  which His  Majesty's Government have stated 
in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to ful- 
fill."    Hitler replied that Germany,   "like every other State, possesses 
certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce."25 
23 
2 Rossi, OP. citT. p. 43. 
Hanc, op. cit., p. 227. 
2* De Mendelssohn, OP. cit.. p. 104. 
25 Conspiracy and Aggression, OP. cit.. vol. I, p. 705. 
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Hitler had gone as far as he could go in his method of bluff; 
but he was fully prepared to rely entirely upon sheer physical force 
to obtain his desires; in fact, he welcomed its use.     "Nothing could 
inconvenience him more than complete Polish acquiescence  in all his 
demands. "2^    On August 24,  Hitler told  Sir Nevile Henderson that the 
Polish question was  closed,  that if England would stay out then Ger- 
many would guarantee  the British Empire.     He denied  all  intention of 
molesting his western borders.     Britain  countered  on the  twenty-eighth 
with a proposal for direct talks under her mediation, and offered to 
guarantee  the settlement reached.    Poland agreed  to negotiate  on this 
basis.     The Reich was  then in somewhat of a quandj-y,  for to refuse all 
negotiation would be  bad propaganda;    yet if discussion  took  place  in 
which Poland  agreed   to the German demands,  the Reich would  thereby be 
deprived  of all excuse to attack.    Therefore,  Hitler accepted  the 
British proposal but repeated that the  cession  of Danzig and   the Cor- 
ridor and a  rectification of the  Silesian frontier vere his minimum, 
and demanded  that a  Polish delegate with full powers  of  regotiation 
be sent him by the following day.    This demand was virtually impossible 
of fulfillment,  for 
if the Hitler-Ribbentrop proposal had been accepted there would 
have arrived in Berlin the following day an unfortunate Polish 
official with no  idea of what he was going to be asked  to sign, 
no knowledge of how far he could go without breaking faith with 
his own government, an'' only the certainty thit he would be bul- 
lied and bludgeoned—as Dr. Hacha of Czechoslovakia had been 
bullied and bludgeoned six months before—till he signed what 
was put before him.    The German proposal was,  in fact, an ulti- 
matum to Poland  to accept the German terms by August 30 or ac- 
cept the consequences.27 
In spite of heavy pressure from the West, the proposal was not accepted. 
When the Polish plenipotentiary failed to appear, Ribbentrop read quickly 
5 Se Mendelssohn,   OP.  clt..  p.   152. 
27 Lindley M. Fraser, r^rmanv between Two /Jars  (New York:,   Oxford U. 
Press, 194-5), p. 129. " 
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to Henderson—who did not understand German extremely well—a list of 
rather generous German terms which Poland :iight have had had she ful- 
filled the German request, but refused to give a copy either to 
Henderson or to Poland.    The German invasion took place on the first 
of September. 
VJhen Ribbentrop told Ciano that war was certain,  the Italians 
were dismayed.    They were not ready for a European war,  and they had 
signed the Pact of Steel on the twenty-second of May with the under- 
standing that war would not come for at least three more years.    She 
offered all her aid,  both political and economic, in localizing the 
conflict, but Kussolini notified his ally on August 25 that if Germany 
were to attack,   "I want to let you know in advance that it would be 
better  if I did not  take the initiative in military activities  in 
view of the present situation in Italian war preparations...."28 From 
August 31 to September 3,  fearing to be drawn into battle,   Italy made 
an attempt to mediate  the dispute,  an all-out effort  to organize a 
second   "Munich?    On August 31 Kussolini sent notes to  Great Britain 
and France proposing  that, he invite Germany to a  conference to discuss 
the troublesome clauses of the Versailles Treaty;    The answer came back 
that the conference must be an effort to solve not just one, but all 
outstanding problems. 
The proposal was then relayed to Berlin, who accepted on the 
second, but demanded to know whether the Allied notes of September 1 
were to be considered as ultimata.    The allies replied negatively, but 
added that before the negotiations began the German troops must be with- 
drawn.    This demand,  of course, had no chance of being accepted.    Mus- 
solini informed Hitler that his attempt at mediation was a failure. 
*d Sontag and Beddie,   OP: cit.. p.  82. 
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But, he added, 
Danzig is already German and Germany is folding already securities 
wnSch guarantee most of her demands.    Besides, Germany has had al- 
ready its  "moral satisfaction."    If it would accept the plan for a 
conference, it will achieve all her aims and »t ^£*J**J£ 
vent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal 
and of extremely long duration.^ 
Hitler replied that he would be glad to negotiate,  if he could be sure 
of success, but that he could not jeopardize brilliant military work by 
"diplomatic intrigues." 
I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I«gr to ««* l£j ** 
The corxiitions of the fourth partition of Poland resembled the 
first three in many ways.    Austria had been subdued, France was in a 
weakened condition, and the active collaboration of *>ssia had been 
obtained.    The only element lacking was British acquiescence.    * Septem- 
ber 3, Britain and France presented the German Government with an ulti- 
.atum: withdraw from Poland Mediately or war would be declared.    In 
the words of Winston S.  Churchill, 
^ -f (the orevious) advantages had been squandered 
now, when every one of JgJJ^TjwOi leading France by the hand, 
and thrown away, Great Jj^-gJX^f that very Poland which with to guarantee the integrity of Poland    oi j g& ^ 
hyena appetite had only ■J^^*^!™ There was sense in fight- 
corruption of the Chechoslovakian State        ^ ^ judged ^^ 
ing for C^c^n
sloV^iale^ei
9ofModern intellectual thought and morality, 
able, rash, below the level «Jm° iea declared themselves ready 
0. S.pt.aW 3, .t 11=00 A. M.. M «- *»- «» — i"'a8i°- 
Great Britain declared war. 
30 Jbid., P. fW\       ~\ 
31.Lukacs, "P- 0&+t P- *** 
14?. 
The aggressiveness of Adolph Hitler forced the military contest. 
The realization of the concept now depended, not upon financial systems 
nor upon skillful 'fifth columff activity nor upon diplomatic pressure, but 
upon the amed  strength of the Reich.    As Hitler said, 
for three hundred years it was the aim of the English and French 
rulers to prevent any real consolidation of Europe and, above all, 
to hold Germany in weakness and impotency.... Germany shall be dashed 
to pieces and reduced to small States.    With that the Reich will lose 
its political power and with it the possibility of securing for the 
German people their living rights on this earth....The fighting 
beginning today decides the fate of the German nation for the next 
thousand years.' 
32 Fifield, no.  citw. p. 65. 
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THE DEFEAT OF THE LEBENSRAUM CONCEPT? 
With the military defeat of the Hitler regime and with the 
subsequent disgrace  of the  Nazi  ide olgy,  the concept of Lebensrauir. 
seemed  to sink also into oblivion, for the prerequisite to its 
realization was a  strong and aggressive Germany.     Having been so much 
a part  of German political speculation for so long a time,  and 
having played so large a part in fascist dogma,  it is doubtful 
whether the concept will ever be forgotten, esnecially as long as 
biased nationalistic histories are served to German schoolchildren, 
as they are to every other school child who by the accident of birth 
happens to be born subject to a national state.    But it is also 
extremely unlikely that the Lebensraum concept will ever again be 
galvanized into the goal and ideal it was under Hitler's rule, unless 
it can once more draw unto itself all the fervor and fanaticism of 
a totalitarian ideology; for "the aggressive designs of the Nazi 
Germans were not accidents arising out of the immediate political 
situation in Europe and the world.    They were a deliberate and essential 
1 
part of the Nazi foreign policy."      If one doubts this point,  one may 
look at the abundant evidence of Mein Kampf. 
Cne other reason why the Lebensraum concept is probably as 
dead as Manifest Destiny or as the White Man's Burden is the fact 
that East Central Europe is no longer the weak and divided area it 
was following the First World War.    If the region has been made the 
Tlnternational Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 
Opinion and Judgement.   (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1947;, 
p.16. 
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Lebensraum of any power, that power is Soviet Russia, under whose 
economic, political, an<l ideological hegemony the area now largely 
rests.     East Central Europe is now united in the power struggle of 
the Communist bloc. 
Germany itself has been split in two by this same struggle. 
And along with this enforced toootence there is another reason for 
the demise  of  the Lebensraum vision:    Germany has lost  its tactile 
communication with East Central Europe; she no longer infiltrates 
it physically as  she  once did.     Migrations which took place during 
and after the Nazi era  have broken down the minority groups and. 
drawn them to Germany .roper.    As a race they are no longer the 
"common denominator" of the Lebensraum area. 
Granted that historians and others will keep alive the 
traditions and memories of the mittel-European past,  and 
recognizing that  suffering and a sense of martyrdom can fuse a 
more vigorous  effect into such history than  it might normally 
enjoy,   the fact remains that the Germans have lost  their physical 
contact with  that wide area  of Mdttel Europe wherein  they had 
lived in scattered groups.    The memory lives on, but the reality 
of returning  to those remote areas of the Baltic,  the Car- 
pathians,  eastern Poland,  the Hungarian  Flain,   or Yugoslavia 
grows dimmer by the year.    And  it was precisely that reality, 
of  Germans scattered through the area,  that gave vajor substance 
to the claim that the Germans were the indespensible,  unifying 
factor of a "itteleuropa. 
No one can deny the tremendous strides taken towards the 
realization  of Lebensraum under National Socialism.     The Treaty of 
Versailles had left Germany an area of 181,500 square miles from a 
former 208,780, and reduced its population from 67,812,000 to 60,000,000. 
Before the  outbreak of the rar  Hitler had  increased  the population to 
3 
88,000,000 and the area to 258,863aquare miles. 
2 'eyer, op.cit.. p. 324.. 
3 pifield,  on.  cit..  p.  58. 
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By the end of the war, the Reich had been in c< ntrol not only of 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but also of Holland, Norway, 
Denmark, Luxemberg, 
Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy,Aumania, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria, as well as of large parts of Russia—an hegemony covering 
the entire Lebensraum area and stretch! g far beyond it. 
It may properly be argued that it was not any theory of 
-ebensraum nor ajfc' superior technique of aggression which gave Hit- 
ler his most astounding successes- and which instilled in him an 
increasingly end ever-more-arrogant lust for domination, but that he 
conquered by sheer go d fortune, that it was easy victory which drove 
him on to war. All this is certainly true, but one ouat not overlook 
the power of an ideal to give focus and scope to aggressive energy, 
nor the power of an ideal to lift :nen above themselves, to give them 
a vision beyond the every day, and tc follow the leader which seems 
to promise a realization of this vision. And no one can deny that 
Hitler was the master of mob psychology. The fact that an intelligent 
and educated \'eatern European nation was able gladly to aggrandize its 
own race as master, to worship power as its god, and to follow after 
a new messiah, is a phenomenon the explanation for which must be 
sought, not in the ideas of the Grossdeutsche supporters of the 1870's 
nor in the ideas of the early geopoliticians, but in the conditions 
of -Jestern society itself, of which this nation was a part. 
It may properly be argued that German expansionism was morally 
no worse than that of other European nations who happened to attain 
national unity earlier, in an age when the world vss not quite so 
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crowded,   that   the only difference w?s the quantitative  one of the 
Reich's more effective totalitariam organization cornled with the 
fact that the  national  individualism of the early modern era  is no 
longer possible today.     All this  is certainly true,  but  one must 
not overlook the fact that to explain is not to excuse.    The fact 
that no man is  ever completely normal does not prevent society from 
restraining the madman.     "To  initiate a war of aggression,  therefore, 
is not only an  international  crime;   it is  the supreme  international 
crime differing  only from other war crimes in that  it contains within 
itself  the accumulated evil  of the whole." 
But if   one  is to attempt to find a reason for insanity, 
and  to fix the  blame for it,   one must direct his accusations not 
only to the madman for his moral weakness—and  Hitlerian Germany was 
mad  by anyone's definition—but also towards  the society which the 
madinan kept and which did  so much to determine his development.     By 
this criterion,   "there is no great power inside or outside ourope 
that did not add to the troubles with which the Continent was beset; 
the Soviet Union by its efforts to undermi-e the social  order  of Western 
Europe, Japan by starting a new era of imperialistic expansion, the 
United States by a sudden reversal of policy from active participation 
in the World War and in the treaty-making of Versailles to political 
isolation, and  finally each of the European states in countless fashion!! 
Europe had been slowly moving towards a cataclysm long before the rise 
of fascism; yet the unnecessary harshness of Versailles rising out of 
5 
U  International Military Tribunal, op, cit,, p. 16. 
5 Wol^ers, op. cit.. p. 3. 
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a desire for revenge, and the interwar economic policies—the 
unfeeling administration of debts and reparations coupled with 
high protectionist tariffs and a haughty refusal of the richer 
countries to trade with the poorer and  newer ones—all these 
manifestations of the new religion of nationalism greatly aggra/a ted 
a bad situation and impelled Europe into its crisis. 
Each European nation,  enwrapped  in the  constricting garment 
of its own nationalism, gazing at the world myopically through a 
haze  of  self-interest, was as much to blame for the fascist revolution 
as were the totalitarian states themselves.    The fact that a  scheme 
such as Neumann's  cooperative,  federal i'itteleuroua  could  become the 
Lebei.sraum of  Hitler,  is due to a social madness by  the name  of 
integral nationalism.     Lebensraum.  therefore,   is a European moral 
problem.    Europe had lost  its backbone.    The main beneficiaries and 
builders  of  the past-World-War I policy,  England and  France,  were 
unable to prevent disaster.    The nations of the world, whose collective 
will might have been a strong force, were unable to cooperate in the 
League of Nations. 
The issue  of a crisis depends not so much  on its magnitude 
as  on the  courage and resolution with which it is met.    The 
second  German bid for domination found Europe weak and 
divided.     At several junctures it coulr have been stopped 
without excessive effort or sacrifice,  but was nctj  a failure 
of  European statemanship.     Behind  the German drive were 
passionate forces,  sustained by obsessionist,  sadistic hat- 
reds and by a crude ideology;  to these the Germans, whom 
defeat had deprived of their routine cf life, showed even 
more than their normal receptivity, while the rest of Europe 
had neither the faith,  nor  the will,  nor even sufficient 
repugnance,  to offer timely,  objective resistance.    Some 
imitated Hitler and hyena-like followed in his track;  some 
tolerated him, hoping that his advance would reach its term- 
by saturation, exhaustion, the resistance of others,  or the 
-5V 
mere chapter of accidents—before it attained them; and some, 
while beholding his handiwork, would  praise hi- for having 
"restored  the  self-respect of the Germans."    Janissaries and       £ 
appeasers aided Hitler's work:    a failure of European morality. 
6 Namier,   OP.   cit..  p.  ix. 
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APPEND  IX 
APPENDIX 
GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS 
AO,    Auslandsorganisation. 
AUSLAENDER SONDERKONTEN FUER INLANDSZAHLUNGEN,    a  serarate account 
system for payment of foreign trade debts. 
AUSLANDSDEUT3CHER,    ethnic German living outside Germany,  regard- 
less of citizenship. 
AUSLANDSORGANISATION,     foreign organization of the  N.S.D.A.P. 
concerned with German nationals living abroad; the A3d Gau. 
AU3WARTIGES AMT   (A.A.),     German Foreign Ministry. 
BUNDESTAG,     the Federal Diet. 
DEUTSCHES VOLKSTUM,  DEUTSCHTUM,    a  vague word embracing various 
meanings according to  context,  e.g., Germanism,  German racial 
feeling, German racial elenent, etc. 
DIENSTSTELLE RIBBENTROP, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity 
as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance 
after his appointment as Foreign Minister. 
FUHRERPRINZIP,    leadership principle of the N.S.D.A.P.   ("Respon- 
sibility of the subordinate to the superior;  authority from the 
superior to the subordinate"—GBring). 
GAU,    one of the 43 regional divisions of the N.S.D.A.P. 
GR0S3DEUTSCHLAND,    a united Germany including Austria. 
GROSSRAUrviRTSCHAFT,    an economic system including a large extra- 
territorial sphere of influence. 
KLIENDEUTSCHLAND,    a united Germany excluding Austria. 
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE DEUTSCHE ARBEITERPARTEI  (N.S.D.A.P.), 
National Socialist German Workers'   Party. 
162. 
OBERKOMMANDO DER VEHRMACHT,     Supreme Command  of the Vehrmacht;   Supreme 
Headquarters of the Vehrmacht. 
PUTSCH,    uprising, e.g., the July 25, I'm, uprising of the Austrian 
Nazis in which Chancellor Dollfuss was killed. 
REICH,    empire;  Germany. 
PEICHS"ARK,    German mark; official rate of exchange about 40 cents in 
1936-38. 
SUDETEN DEUTSCHE HEIMATFRONT,   Sudeten German Homeland Front Party. 
TURNVERB1NDE,     gymnastic or athletic associations. 
VOLK,    vague word meaning Germandom, the German people. 
VOLKSBUND FUR DAS DEUTSCHTUM IM AUSLAHD,     "League for  Germandom Abroad", 
a pre-1933 Pan-German    organization which became allied with the N.S.D.A.P. 
and was used by the Auslandsorganisation to unite Germans everywhere; 
called "Verein fftr das Deutschtun im Ausland" until 1933. 
VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE,     central agency for problems concerning 
VoDksdeutsche, ethnic Genrans of non-German citizenship; formed as 
the Bflro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppen- 
fflhrer Lorenz in 1937. 
VEHRMACHT,    German armed forces. 
VELTPOLITIK,    world-policy, global politics. 
7?TTsnwRTffT FlfR GKOPOLITIK.    an outstanding geopolitical periodical. 
